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ROGER HUYSSEN

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JUNE 23, 1980 Vol. 115 No. 25

TIME

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A Letter from the Publisher

On rare occasions TIME devotes a special issue to a subject it feels is of major importance: the American Woman (1972) and the South (1976) are examples from the past decade. Last summer the magazine's editors decided that the Soviet Union should be the focus for such a single-topic edition. Because of its inherently secretive nature and historical suspicion of the West, the U.S.S.R. has long been a nation much talked about but little understood. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, the Olympic boycott and the ensuing collapse of U.S.-Soviet relations, a new cold war became a reality, and the need for American knowledge about Soviet society was more pressing than ever. Says World Editor John Elson, who was in charge of the project: "I hope readers get from this a sense of the extraordinary complexity of the Soviet Union. It's not a gray, faceless monolith but an enormously vital country, with eleven time zones, diverse races and nationalities, and more than 100 languages."

Reporting for the special issue began in late fall when Moscow Bureau Chief Bruce Nelan approached Soviet officials with a long list of people and places TIME wanted to visit. The Soviets were initially quite helpful, recalls Nelan, but after the invasion of Afghanistan and the Carter Administration's tough response, "we were told that we would get no assistance and that our reporters and photographers from the U.S. would not get visas." Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott, who has covered the Soviet Union for TIME and was the translator-editor of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, was in the U.S.S.R. when tensions began to mount. Says Talbott, who wrote this week's opening story and the appraisal of U.S.-Soviet relations: "It was like being out of doors without enough warm clothes on and watching the mercury drop another ten degrees before my very eyes."

Spring, however, brought a thaw in the official Soviet attitude toward the project. Managing Editor Ray Cave spent four days in Moscow speaking with top Soviet officials. Photographers Mark Meyer and David Burnett traveled thousands of miles across the country to take many of the issue's photographs. Reporter-Researcher John Kohan, who speaks fluent Russian and was making his fourth trip to the U.S.S.R., visited a psychiatric outpatient center, rode with an ambulance team, went behind the scenes at the old Moscow circus, spent a day at a tractor factory.

In the U.S., TIME correspondents interviewed more than 100 Soviet experts, and the magazine's writers, working in their usual departments, received nearly 1,000 pages of reporting from the field. Assistant Picture Editor Michele Stephenson and Researcher Julia Richer culled 50,000 photographs. Tom Bentkowski produced the issue's special design. For guidance in their Stakhanovite labors, the staff could turn to TIME Soviet Specialist Patricia Blake—who wrote the Books story on Russian fiction—and Seweryn Bialer, professor of political science at Columbia University, who served as consultant.

The result is a copy of TIME dedicated to one subject, but at the same time as diverse and stimulating as any other week's edition of the magazine. Sums up Talbott: "Our issue makes clear that there is plenty to criticize about the Soviet system. But it will also help TIME's readers better understand the Soviets, their problems and perspectives, and therefore fear and hate them less."

John a. Meyers

☭ Special Issue ☭

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The Empire: A nation of huge size and potential confronts major problems, including a demographic time bomb in its burgeoning Muslim population. The Brezhnev era has been a period of unprecedented stability, for which most citizens are grateful, but has the leadership prepared well for the future?

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Economy & Business: After more than a half century of unquestioned progress, the Soviet economy is in the midst of a serious slump. ▸ For the hidden entrepreneurs who "live on the left," crime often pays. ▸ Turning out tractors in Minsk with banners and "thirteenth pay" bonuses.

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The Military: An elite officer corps and all the conscripts an army could want make the U.S.S.R.'s fighting machine the envy of military experts the world over. For nearly all Soviet males, the draft—with rough, spartan years in uniform at almost no pay—is a way of life, with reserve obligations until age 50.

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Medicine: Despite having one-fourth of the world's doctors and numerous internationally recognized medical centers, health care in the Soviet Union is surprisingly primitive for a developed country. The emergency ambulance service, however, is a model of efficiency and speed.

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Images: Red for the revolution, of course, but also the amber of vast wheatfields, the blue tinge on new-fallen snow and a thousand other tints and shades. Unlike the cliché conception of a gray monolith, the Soviet Union is a blazing canvas of hues and vistas. A seven-page visual portfolio of an empire.

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Dance: One of Moscow's cultural marvels, the Bolshoi Ballet, carries on a great tradition of lavish spectacle and virtuoso dancing. But defections and widespread dissension in its ranks have thrown the troupe, along with its embattled Director Yuri Grigorovich, into something of an artistic crisis.

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Much like the U.S., but for different reasons, the Soviet Union confronts an uncertain energy future.

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Cover: Illustration by Roger Huyssen.

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Letters

St. Helens Blows

To the Editors:

You say Mount St. Helens [June 2] is something of a baby among volcanoes, or a mere 37,000 years old. Some baby; some burp.

Mabel Austin
Las Vegas

I have searched my vocabulary for one word that best describes the photograph of Mount St. Helens. I considered gorgeous, fantastic, astounding, awesome, but decided on wow!

Patricia A. Kuehn
Lakewood, Ohio

Humbug to all these highfalutin scientific explanations of the eruption! With all the pollution we've caused, the good ole earth just plain vomited.

Hayden Letchworth
East Aurora, N.Y.

While sitting in the ashes and donning my sackcloth, I am contemplating the achievements of mankind. We split the atom, we walked on the moon, we invented every imaginable destructive weapon of war. Now there is a new rumbling in our midst presenting a different challenge: How do we tame an angry mountain?

Maria Brandenberg
Chehalis, Wash.

Waste in Space

I am appalled that NASA and the Government are thinking of sending nuclear wastes into space [June 2]. Just because we have carelessly polluted our earth, we have no right to pollute the universe.

Dan Kluchinski
Clifton, N.J.

Any risks involved in shooting nuclear wastes into solar orbit are nothing compared with leaving them here on earth.

Wally Simpson Jr.
Waldwick, N.J.

Why not send all nuclear wastes in rockets whose trajectories would take them within several billion miles of a black hole in space? These gravity fields could become the world's nuclear garbage dumps of future generations.

Dwight H. Skeels
Palmyra, N.Y.

Promised Land

TIME's Essay "Guarding the Door" [June 2] dealt well with the issue of a continued welcome to immigrants until the last paragraph. There Lance Morrow suggested that the rational lines must be drawn as to whom we can accept.

I submit that rationality is neither useful nor appropriate. These people need our country. That fact alone justifies their admission. They do not want welfare —they want independence. They still look upon the U.S. as a land of opportunity and are anxious to work for it. We must keep the door open, rather than guard it, lest we destroy ourselves by ignoring the needs of others.

Dana M. Schmidt
Rochester

I find it interesting that although the U.S. is at a low point with respect to foreign relations and other problems, it is still seen as a Promised Land by many of the world's oppressed people, while often taken for granted by many Americans.

(A/1C) Bobby T. Brooks, U.S.A.F.
Monte Vergine, Italy

If events continue on their present path, eventually the Communists will have all the world's land and we will have all the world's people.

Emily Creswell
Phoenix

Turmoil in South Korea

Regarding the recent political turmoil in South Korea [June 2]: How can the U.S. stand by and watch the resubjugation of a nation and a people? That we could continue to protect and trade with a fanatical military dictatorship is abhorrent. Let us use our economic and diplomatic power to alleviate this situation while we still can.

Richard Rosenthal
Berkeley, Calif.

What Is the Line?

French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's "Lone Ranger" diplomacy [June 2] with Moscow is just another case of dissatisfaction with the Carter Administration. Moscow would love to divide the West on today's problems, and if the Soviets are successful, it will be because Western Europe is probably tired of playing *What's My Line?* with Washington.

Michael Di Chiara
Mount Vernon, N.Y.

Pablo and Fernande

Your cover story on Picasso and his art [May 26] was the best I've ever read.

However, a commonly believed error crept into the accompanying article on his life: that he never gave Fernande Olivier, his first mistress, any financial aid. I saw her in 1966. She was white-haired and bedridden, looked very small in her tiny apartment in the environs of Paris, and had pinned on the wall postcards of Picasso's Blue Period paintings. She told me she had never asked him for a penny, but that when she became too crippled to work a year or so before, a mutual friend had told Pablo, and since then he had paid for her rent and her care. As she spoke of him warmly, her face lighted up and you could see how pretty she had been.

Later that week I saw Alice B. Toklas, also bedridden. She told me she had been in love with Picasso. When I told her I had seen Fernande, she said testily, "Oh, yes. Fernande. So pretty—and so dumb." The old ladies remained in character, didn't they? And when I saw Picasso that winter he seemed half the age of either one.

Lael Wertenbaker
Marlborough, N.H.

Princess Leia Needs *You*

I don't agree with Gerald Clarke's thought that there isn't as much "effervescent giddiness" in *The Empire Strikes Back* as in *Star Wars* [May 19]. Even more than *Star Wars, Empire* made me want to jump in my spaceship and rush to help the rebels against Darth Vader.

Chris Davis
Urbana, Ill.

Mistaken Identity

While accurately identifying the Pentagon's manpower problems [June 9], TIME suffered an identity problem of its own. It transposed identifications under the pictures of Lieut. General Glenn Otis and Professor Morris Janowitz.

Don Sider
TIME *Correspondent*
Washington, D.C.

In some copies of TIME *the captions were indeed reversed.*

God's Love

Atheist Madalyn Murray O'Hair's son William [May 26] is a living symbol of what God can do for a person, no matter how far he may stray. God still loves his mother, if only she would turn to him.

Elsie Roach
Altavista, Va.

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TIME/JUNE 23, 1980

In Search of a Theme

A bumpy week as Carter struggles to find an upbeat approach

Even for this peculiar presidential election, it was a week of bizarre happenings. At a $125-a-plate fund-raising dinner in San Francisco, Independent John Anderson sat stunned as sequin-clad Gary Poole led his disco dance troupe through a series of exotic routines. A male dancer hauled a woman, clad in a white jumpsuit, around the stage on a leash. After the dance was over, Anderson remarked to the 400 partygoers: "I'm guilty of a certain Midwestern naiveté. I've never seen anything quite like this before."

In Los Angeles, Ronald Reagan tried to lay to rest the issue of his age (69) in one of the strangest interviews of the political season. He told the New York *Times* that he is as alert now as he was 20 years ago, is not forgetful and does not suffer from "blue" periods. Six doctors who have examined the Californian in recent years assured the newspaper that he is physically and mentally fit. Reagan promised that if he becomes President, he will resign at the first hint of senility. Said he: "I would walk away."

And for Jimmy Carter, who wanted to adopt a supremely presidential style, it was a bumpy week indeed. Carter had long been grumbling to associates that his campaign strategy needed to be overhauled. At a 2½-hr. shirtsleeved meeting with his top political aides on Sunday, he decided to give the task to his closest adviser, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan. Jordan accordingly joined the re-election committee as deputy to Chairman Robert Strauss. As Jordan's successor in the White House, Carter named Jack Watson, 41, the former Atlanta lawyer who managed the President's transition team in 1976 and since then has served as presidential assistant for intergovernmental relations and secretary to the Cabinet.

Jordan's first duty is to design an upbeat theme for the campaign *(see following story)*. As a step in that direction, Carter backed down from his refusal to debate Anderson, which had drawn heavy criticism from many Democrats as well as Republicans. The President said he is willing to share a podium with Anderson as long as he still can have at least one head-to-head debate with Reagan.

Despite Carter's search for a positive campaign theme, he spent much of the week defending his record and his refusal to include large new spending programs in the federal budget for 1981, which Congress pegged last week at $613.6 billion. The budget is balanced on paper, though most economists expect the recession to result in a 1981 deficit of at least $20 billion.



On Monday morning, members of the Congressional Black Caucus emerged from a meeting with Carter at the White House clearly disappointed with his unemployment and urban policies. Illinois Democrat Cardiss Collins complained that Carter's policies are causing "a great deal of distress—financially and spiritually."

Carter delayed his response until that afternoon, when he spoke in Miami Beach at a convention of the Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America, an inner-city job training organization that operates in 41 states. "Keep the faith," he told his mostly black audience of 800. "We will not solve the problems of energy, inflation and economic stagnation by imposing sacrifices on the poor." He made only one commitment: that the Government would help find jobs for the 100,000 young people now in federal training programs.

Carter got a more forceful demonstration of black sentiment at his next stop, in Miami's riot-scarred Liberty City ghetto. When Carter's Cadillac limousine pulled up at the James E. Scott Community Association Center, a white concrete blockhouse, angry blacks in the crowd of several hundred people waved placards that read HAIL TO THE CHIEF RACIST and HEY, PEANUT MAN, WE NEED MORE THAN PEANUTS. Inside the building, Carter told a score of community leaders that it was up to them to devise a plan to restore the neighborhoods that were devastated by last month's rioting. Said he: "I didn't come here to solve the problems—I'm here to help. It should be a fifty-fifty partnership between Miami and the Government."

As Carter left, the crowd booed and hooted. Nonplused, he briefly grinned and waved before entering his car. Just as his limousine began to pull away, some demonstrators started throwing bottles, cans and rocks. A Heineken beer bottle bounced off the roof of the President's car. "Go! Go! Go!" shouted a Secret Service man, and the presidential limousine roared away. A bottle struck a photographer; other missiles broke the windows of a staff car and a bus in the President's entourage.

Next stop was Seattle, where the President was briefed at the Olympic Hotel on the Federal Government's plans to send $3 million in initial aid to help rebuild the homes and businesses devastated by the explosion of Mount St. Helens. Then the President descended one floor to the Grand Ballroom to address some 300 mayors at the annual U.S. Conference of Mayors. They already had heard from John Anderson, who had proposed sending the cities $8 billion in new federal aid, from existing excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, to rehabilitate mass transit lines, streets and sewer systems. A small group of mayors, most of them Republicans, had also met with Ronald Reagan, who has suggested increasing federal revenue sharing with states and cities as part of his plan to transfer to

Flanked by guards, Carter peers out anxiously as his car speeds to safety

Angry demonstrators jeer and boo the President in the Liberty City ghetto

Urging black community leaders to keep the faith

them some of Washington's functions, starting with welfare and education.

Senator Edward Kennedy was ready to promise them $12 billion, mostly for jobs and housing programs. But at the last minute the mayors withdrew their invitation to Kennedy because he wanted to speak on the same day as Carter. The White House suggested that the President would cancel his own appearance rather than share the forum—and the news coverage—with Kennedy. Sticking with the probable Democratic nominee, the mayors, two-thirds of whom are Democrats, gave in to the President. Kennedy delivered his speech anyway, to a convention of public employees in Anaheim, Calif.

In Seattle, Carter made no new promises at all. Instead, he delivered a bland 34-min. defense of his economic and job policies. He was interrupted by applause only once, when he gibed at Reagan, who was never mentioned by name, for proposing a 30% cut in federal income tax rates and rollbacks in Government programs. The President called those "facile quick fixes." Finally, in a line written into his speech at the last minute, Carter assured the mayors that if the recession deepens and unemployment worsens, "I will work closely with you, and we will take other steps which may be necessary."

He did not specify the steps, to the dismay of many mayors who were hoping that he would promise them more federal aid. Complained Mayor Ernest Proulx of Holyoke, Mass.: "He keeps complaining that he can't get his programs through Congress. What kind of defense is that? That's like a mayor crying that he can't get a program past a city council." Mayor Kenneth Gibson of Newark gave Carter more credit. Said Gibson: "Considering what he's had to work with, he's done a commendable job."

All in all, it had been a difficult week for the President. So, it was perhaps with a sense of relief that he choppered off to Camp David at week's end, laden with black vinyl-jacketed briefing books, to prepare for his trip to Europe this week. Accompanied by Rosalynn and Amy, he will stop off in Rome for a state visit, call on Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, and then fly to Venice for two days of economic talks with U.S. allies. ■

"Hey, Peanut Man, we need more than peanuts."

Defending his economic and job policies—but making no new promises—at the U.S. Conference of Mayors in Seattle

A New Job for Ham Jordan

The chief idea man starts to think out the campaign

"I've spent almost half my life working for Jimmy Carter," says Hamilton Jordan, 35, the President's idea man and Chief of Staff. His off-hours behavior drew such heavy criticism that Jordan decided a year ago to drop out of public view. Now he will re-emerge from the White House to work on Carter's re-election. TIME *Washington Bureau Chief Robert Ajemian talked to Jordan and wrote this report:*

It happens often to a good idea man: the boss becomes attached to him, and so dependent that he installs him in the wrong job. So it was with Jimmy Carter and Hamilton Jordan. Jordan is an extraordinary thinker, a man who drags concepts out of thin air, but is a terrible administrator. He has the toughness to handle the most difficult assignments, but he hates details. He has been a poor White House Chief of Staff. Now the boss, convinced that his campaign badly lacked any positive theme or concept, has turned once again to his favorite thinker. "It's time," said Carter to Jordan, "for you to go off and write one of your papers."

They are an odd couple, Carter so tidy and pious, Jordan so disorganized and irreverent. That irreverence has caused Carter more than his share of embarrassments. He has looked in disbelief at the various bumps in Jordan's personal life but never lectured him. Carter's affection for his young aide has several levels, and this year in particular the President has more than a parental interest in Jordan. He knows that his campaign will be far different from the one in 1976, that his public is unimpressed and cynical. Jordan's ideas and advice will be needed.

Sometimes the President finds it difficult to follow that advice. Jordan has been urging Carter, for instance, to resist attacking Ronald Reagan, to leave such criticism to the media. But the President has already started condemning his opponent. Carter and Jordan have had another disagreement over the Republican candidate. To the President's acute discomfort, Jordan hopes that Reagan will move well ahead of Carter in the polls. In Jordan's view, the Californian still has never been studied closely, and once Reagan is out in front he will not be able to stand the pressure. Says Jordan: "Such big forces converge to stop a man from becoming President. Look at Ted Kennedy and George Bush and what that exposure did to them." Then the Georgian had another thought. "It makes me appreciate all the more what Carter pulled off in 1976," he said.

A restless man with a short attention span, Jordan is unable to sit still long, and now he paced the floor restlessly. He was wearing blue tennis shoes and white



WALTER BENNETT

Deputy Campaign Chairman Jordan

shorts, his shirttail hanging out. His body is thick and hard, his face tanned from daily jogging and tennis. He hasn't changed much in four years, still frisky, fresh-faced.

His one-room studio apartment is filled with contrasts, much like the man himself. The charcoal walls are covered neatly with contemporary art, lithographs



RODGER E. WISS

Chief of Staff Watson

Details for one, planning for the other.

by Rouault and Picasso, several Warhols. An unmade bed, the black velour cover twisted on top, sits low in the corner of the room. The modern glass tables are stacked with art books. There is a small balcony off the eleventh-floor studio, but Jordan is afraid to step out. He fears heights. When one of his girlfriends wants to sit outside, Jordan will sometimes edge onto the balcony, pressing against the wall, and sit nervously with his back against the building.

Until recently, after charges of using cocaine were dropped, he seldom left his apartment after work. If he did go out, he always took a few friends to be witnesses in case someone confronted him and started a scene. He heartily dislikes the pretenses of politics, and has made no close friends in Washington. He likes to be with women but ends up spending a lot of time alone.

Jordan's needs are simple. He cares little about clothes, often wears the same suits until they wear out, and is almost as indifferent to food. Unable to sleep beyond 6 o'clock in the morning, he has only a bowl of cereal for breakfast. He stopped eating red meat five years ago, convinced that it is unhealthy, and sticks to fish and chicken. He hasn't been to a movie in five months, watches only news and old movies on television, seldom reads for pleasure. He spends enormous amounts of time on the telephone.

Jordan remains naturally cheerful even though he has been badly tarred. Mostly he blames himself. "I set myself up as a target for all the people who disliked Carter," he says. Jordan deep down wishes people took him more seriously, but he says it mockingly: "People think I'm some kind of a buffoon," he says, "and I really can't blame them after all they've read." He feels that his troubles have reflected badly on Carter's reputation and has apologized to him several times. The morning after the cocaine story broke in the papers, he waited early for Carter in the Oval Office and offered to resign.

Jordan is no longer stimulated by his White House job and is elated about handing over his chores there to Jack Watson. He prefers an undisciplined schedule that gives him time to do what he's best at: thinking and planning. As Chief of Staff he was usually late to meetings, returned few phone calls. He still hides when he can, and even the President gets impatient about his disappearances. He rises to big challenges, and only three events in the past year, he says, have really stirred his blood: helping Carter get rid of Cabinet Officers Joe Califano and Mike Blumenthal, thwarting Ted Kennedy, and working on the release of the hostages. He gets worked up when he talks of meetings with the Shah, recalling the monarch's piercing eyes staring suspiciously at him, refusing to believe that no country except Panama would accept him. He dealt covertly for months with the Ira-

nians, and they had their own name for this American who might break the impasse: the Cowboy.

Now Jordan is ready to fix Reagan in the center of his imagination. He already has his own core view of the campaign: Carter must continue to rely on the South as his base, no matter how hard Reagan challenges him there. "If we can't win in Kentucky and Alabama," says Jordan, "then we're going to lose Michigan and Illinois. It means bad news everywhere." Holding the South, contends Jordan, will depend largely on Carter's capacity to turn out the black vote. If the blacks and Hispanics decide to stay at home, Carter will lose states like Texas and California

Jordan says he is not bothered by the candidacy of John Anderson. He believes that the liberals who are attracted to Anderson now will recoil when they learn more about his conservative voting record. Jordan sees another edge "We know Republicans are helping him, and that will backfire. We may have to lump them together, run against both of them."

Jordan was not unnerved by Kennedy either. He remembers the panic at the White House the moment Kennedy announced he was running. Only Carter and his inherent cockiness kept things steady. "If he hadn't shown that confidence of his," says Jordan, "the whole thing could have come apart."

Jordan has a hard time concealing his dislike of Kennedy. He was the only man at the White House, including Carter, who was convinced a year ago that Kennedy was going to declare. He wrote the President one of his canny memos about it, in January 1979, which said: "The absolute worst thing we can do is behave in a way that suggests we fear a Kennedy candidacy." Jordan instead recommended juggling the 1980 schedule of primaries so that several Southern states voted early. Wrote Jordan to Carter: "If we win the early contests, it is difficult to see how anyone could defeat us for the nomination If we lose early, it is difficult to see how we could recoup and win the nomination." That strategy turned out to be right

But for all the excitement that political wars hold for him, Jordan is looking ahead to going home. He wants one day to return to the South. In his early years he had hoped to become a doctor, and that failed. Now he has the urge to write, not only of Jimmy Carter's presidency, but of his own Georgia days, of his segregationist grandfather, of an uncle who fought that system, and how all of that shaped him

When he does look back, it will not be on great concepts of state he laid down or great world events he managed. Instead, country boy that he is, he will remember the political duels, the infighting "What a legacy for us," Jordan said mischievously to a friend, "to have beaten Lester Maddox, George Wallace, Kennedy and now Reagan." It would be nice to go home with that. ■

Male Call at the Post Office

Draft registration bill survives a Senate filibuster

Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield vowed to use every stalling technique the Senate's quaint rules would permit. At 3:30 a.m. Alaska Republican Ted Stevens read monotonously from a lengthy Senate committee report. At 4 a.m. Connecticut Republican Lowell Weicker worked himself into a spirited and largely irrelevant plea for the U.S. to become independent of foreign oil. But each Senator spoke only to a nearly empty chamber Their colleagues dozed on cots in darkened conference rooms or in their otherwise vacant offices. This was the Senate's first all-night filibuster since 1978, an effort to prevent the registration of some 4 million 19- and 20-year-old youths for possible future drafting.

Hatfield's determined drive to block draft registration had been doomed from the start. Although he was supported by an unusual mixture of conservatives and liberals from both parties, the Senate clearly was ready to approve the plan proposed by President Carter last January, just after Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. The House had passed the necessary funding by a vote of 219 to 180. After two days of what turned out to be a six-day filibuster, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd called for a vote to invoke cloture, limiting further debate to 100 hours. Byrd was surprised that it passed immediately, 62 to 32

Byrd and Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, a strong supporter of registration, then cleverly employed parliamentary maneuvers to exhaust Hatfield's delaying tactics. At one point, for example, Nunn proposed cutting the bill's funds by an insignificant $10,000, and his amendment passed. That technically changed the bill enough to render inoperative some 75 other amendments Hatfield had introduced in an effort to delay passage

After Hatfield admitted defeat, the Senate passed the bill on a 58 to 34 vote. Almost as many Republicans (16) as Democrats (18) voted against it, blurring any campaign issue along party lines. Among the presidential candidates, Ronald Reagan, John Anderson and Ted Kennedy have all opposed the Carter plan. The American Civil Liberties Union said it intends to file a suit against the law, claiming it is unconstitutional since it does not apply equally to women. Carter had asked that women also be registered, but Congress rejected that.

The act provides $13.3 million to be used by the Selective Service, which still exists as an agency though it has been dormant since 1975, to carry out only the registration. If Carter or any successor wanted actually to draft anyone from the pool of young men to be registered, he would have to persuade Congress to pass a new law giving Selective Service that power. Selective Service officials expect to take five weeks to get the registration procedure worked out. It will thus probably begin in late July

Senate opponents Nunn and Hatfield meet during debate

The law requires all young men born in 1960 or 1961 to sign up at local post offices, where they will give their name, address, date of birth, telephone and Social Security numbers. Beginning in January, all men must similarly register as they reach the age of 18. There is no provision for any physical examination or testing to determine whether anyone who registers would be fit for military service Anyone who fails to register can be fined $10,000 or be imprisoned for five years

One of the uncertainties is just how many young men will ignore the law. Hatfield complains that even if there is only a small resistance, like 2% of those required to register, the enforcement problem would be huge. Says he: "It is impossible to prosecute 80,000 noncompliant people." Nunn does not agree, and warns: "We shouldn't let the impression go out that young people are not willing to make the sacrifice to protect the national security of this country." ■

Carter *vs.* Clark

President urges prosecution

The situation is shrouded in legal subtleties, but that did not stop Jimmy Carter, who is no lawyer, from barging right into it. Strolling to the back of Air Force One on a flight over the Rockies, the President responded garrulously to reporters' questions about former Attorney General Ramsey Clark's trip to Iran despite Carter's ban on travel there. Said Carter: "My inclination is, within the bounds of the law, to go ahead and prosecute both Clark and the others who went against my directive."

Only two days earlier, one reporter noted, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie had taken a far softer line on Clark's joining a ten-member delegation of private U.S. citizens who took part in a Tehran conference on alleged U.S. intervention in Iran. Muskie said that Carter's ban sprang from concern "about the safety of Americans traveling in a country where there is anti-American hostility." Added Muskie: "The purpose of the policy is not to punish people who violate it, but to prevent people from going." Snapped Carter when asked about Muskie's views: "I don't think Ed Muskie has any legal responsibility for determining whom to prosecute or not to prosecute."

In a strict legal sense, neither does the President. While he is charged broadly with ensuring that the laws are "faithfully executed," it is considered improper for him to suggest publicly what the Justice Department ought to do in a case that it has not yet even investigated. But Carter's tongue ran on. "I would guess civil penalties would be more appropriate," he said of Clark's trip. "I am not trying to discount the possibility of criminal prosecution." Carter said he had been advised by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti before issuing his travel ban on April 17 that his order was legal. Moreover, said Carter, Clark was "a misguided American," whose mission "might exacerbate an already serious situation and cause further damages to the hostages."

Many Americans might agree that Clark had meddled irresponsibly in the hostage situation, but that does not necessarily make him liable to prosecution. Stopping in Paris on his way home, the lanky, Texas-born Clark said that as Attorney General from 1967 to 1969, "I tried to enforce the law as I saw it, not make politics out of it." Said he: "Presidents shouldn't interfere in the law." In his own case, Clark insisted, "the Constitution assures Americans of the right to travel."

At the Justice Department, lawyers privately agreed that Clark had "a good argument" on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court in 1958 had ruled that "the right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law." While the Executive Branch has the right to deny U.S. citizens the use of passports to travel to certain countries, the court said in 1967, only Congress can enact criminal laws penalizing Americans who decide to go to such countries anyway. Congress had repeatedly refused to do so.

Clark in Paris during return trip from Tehran

"Presidents shouldn't interfere in the law."

The Carter Administration based its Iran travel ban on a 1977 law, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Designed to prevent Americans from trading with certain countries when national security is involved, the act could only be applied to Clark on the nebulous theory that any money he spent in Iran, or was given in the form of free lodging or meals, constitutes illegal "transactions and foreign exchange." His airfare and other expenses were paid by the Iranian government.

Civiletti said the President's statements would not influence whatever he might decide to do about Clark. More privately, Justice Department lawyers deplored Carter's intervention. Said one: "Carter shot off his mouth again." Explained a Civiletti aide: "The Attorney General genuinely feels Clark's conduct is unfortunate, but he doesn't want to prosecute him."

At a time when Carter's human rights policy still urges the Soviet Union to give its political dissidents the freedom to leave that country, it would seem ironic for the U.S. to prosecute a former Attorney General for exercising his right to travel abroad and express his opinions, however unpopular they might be at home. ■

Total Recall?

U.S. warns; Ford resists

A driver brakes and shifts into park. His passenger jumps out while the engine is running and slams the door. The transmission pops into reverse, and the car lurches backward. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration last week made an "initial determination" that some such sequence has been happening often enough to Ford Motor Co. vehicles to suggest a flaw in their automatic-transmission design. It was a step toward ordering the biggest recall in history, involving some 16 million Ford cars and trucks built between 1972 and 1979.

The NHTSA said it had received 23,000 complaints, which included 98 deaths. Ford protested that transmission failures occur no more often in its cars than those of other manufacturers, and that it had not been able to spot any design defect.

If the NHTSA orders a recall, Ford, already reeling from the auto sales slump, is expected to fight. It could challenge the order in court. Or it could propose a compromise, such as installing a warning light or buzzer to warn drivers when the transmission is not fully locked into park. Even that could cost, says Ford, more than $300 million. ■

"I Can't Stop!"

Comedian severely burned

An explosion rocked his bedroom, and black Comedian Richard Pryor was engulfed in flames. Hearing his screams, his maid summoned his aunt Jenny, who rushed to his room and smothered the blaze with bedclothes. In shock, Pryor bolted from the house in the Los Angeles suburb of Northridge and rushed into the street. When police arrived with an ambulance, he was still running. "I can't stop!" he shouted. "I'll die if I stop!" His polyester shirt had melted onto his arms and chest, and he suffered third-degree burns from the waist up. At week's end he was still on the critical list at Sherman Oaks Community Hospital.

The Los Angeles police say Pryor told them that the accident occurred while he was "free-basing" cocaine. This newly fashionable practice involves purifying the coke by mixing it with highly flammable ether, which, when it evaporates, leaves coke crystals that burn with a steady flame and are smoked through a water pipe. Pryor's lawyer later claimed that the accident occurred when Pryor started to light a cigarette with his butane lighter while holding a glass of rum. ■

Richard Pryor

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

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EUROPE

Bold New Stroke for Peace

The Venice summit gives a big boost to the Palestinians

"What is essential is that all efforts should not be contrary to Camp David, nor support Camp David, but be alongside Camp David." So said Italian Premier Francesco Cossiga last week moments after the European Community summit in Venice had unveiled one of the most assertive initiatives that Europe as a whole has undertaken in years. It was no less than a major diplomatic effort to bring its own political force to bear on the search for peace in the Middle East, and to get the long-ostracized Palestine Liberation Organization into the peace process.

The Community's declaration, issued at the close of the two-day summit, had four main thrusts. First, it declared that "the Palestinian people must be placed in a position to exercise fully their right to self-determination." It also asserted that the P.L.O. "will have to be associated" with any peace settlement. Further, it called for the creation of a European fact-finding mission—probably of Cabinet-level membership—to determine the positions of the adversaries in the region and explore possible new avenues of negotiation. Finally, even though it carefully upheld Israel's unquestioned "right to secure borders," it sharply castigated Israel for establishing "illegal" settlements in the occupied West Bank, a process it called "a serious obstacle to peace."

In terms of the Atlantic Alliance—already ailing from a series of recent blows—the European action is bound to pose a new political challenge for President Carter when he meets the European leaders at the industrial countries' economic summit at the same site in Venice this weekend. For the moment, however, the U.S. reaction was relatively sanguine. That was only out of a sense of relief, because the European initiative could have been stronger. In Washington, within hours of the summit, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie expressed a conciliatory view of the European action. "I do not see anything on its face which directly challenges the Camp David process," he said. As for its most sensitive point—the invitation for the P.L.O. to be "associated" in any peacemaking—Muskie said that it seemed to be implicit that the Europeans were talking about a future time when the P.L.O. might have renounced its commitment to seek the destruction of Israel. And at such a time, he said, reiterating long-standing U.S. policy, it would indeed be acceptable to give the P.L.O. a role in peace negotiations. Thus, he concluded, "the ball is now in the P.L.O.'s court."

France's Giscard d'Estaing strolls in Venice

Egypt said it welcomed the European initiative. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butros Ghali called the principles contained in the Venice declaration "compatible" with the Camp David accords and said: "We have no objection to any contacts the Europeans may seek in the common quest for peace." That left Israel, which, to no one's surprise, bluntly rejected the European action, especially the gesture toward the P.L.O. "It is certainly not a constructive act that can be conducive to peace," snapped a senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official. "It can only complicate the peace process." Palestinian reaction was cautious. Said P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat: "Partly positive, partly lacking."

"Well, they went ahead and did it," said one White House aide, "but it sure could have been worse." In fact, the declaration fell far short of an earlier proposal by some of the Europeans to amend U.N. Resolution 242; instead of referring to the Palestinians as refugees, a new version of the resolution would have effectively recognized their right to a homeland. Before the summit, President Carter had warned the Europeans that the U.S. would veto any such measure. The President was concerned that an initiative of that sort could jeopardize the Camp David peace process and cause Israel to pull out of the stalled talks on Palestinian autonomy. For the same reasons, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had also asked the Community to reconsider

The European leaders accordingly backed off. But they nonetheless felt compelled to make their position

West Germany's Schmidt and Britain's Thatcher striding to summit

Compelled to state their position on dangerously rising tensions

clear in terms of what they perceive as dangerously rising tensions in the Middle East and, particularly, the impasse they suspect is being caused by election-year politics in the U.S. Explained British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, obviously trying to soften the seeming rebuke to Carter: "We really are trying to supplement what the U.S. is doing, to do something very, very positive—to stop talking just in a few abstract terms and try to clothe those terms with practical reality. And we'll do it, as always, in partnership."

The vigor of the European Community's initiative contrasted with the almost surreal serenity of the summit's site in the historic center of Venice. The statesmen were as enchanted with the beguiling city as countless ordinary tourists before them. French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing went for a brisk ride up the Grand Canal in his motor launch, the *Ile de France*. Thatcher, still clad in a flowing evening gown, stole out of her hotel at 2 a.m. for a stroll beneath the stars. Mindful of threats from the terrorist Red Brigades to disrupt the successive summits, the Italian government marshaled an imposing display of security forces, including 8,000 reinforcements flown in from around the country to patrol the city's waterways and narrow streets. Venetians were sometimes startled to see navy frogmen emerging from the littered green waters of the canals after periodic searches for limpet mines.

Inside a 17th century Benedictine monastery on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore, across the Grand Canal from the Doge's Palace, the Europeans spent several hours deliberating their Middle East policy statement. Giscard, who had long been out in front in favor of Palestinian self-determination, wanted the statement to call for outright "participation" of the P.L.O. in negotiations. In the end, faced with opposition from Denmark and The Netherlands and, most of all, by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, he conceded that such wording was premature; the conferees agreed to use the less provocative term "associate."

Although some observers interpreted the overall effect as a kind of *de facto* recognition of the P.L.O., the Europeans insisted that their declaration as a whole was evenhanded. On one side, it recognized Israel's "right to existence." On the other, it warned Israel against "any unilateral initiative to change the status of Jerusalem," a reference to a recent bill in the Knesset stating that Jerusalem should remain undivided as Israel's capital. Finally, in a separate gesture of pro-Western loyalty, the European leaders also supported the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, calling it "genuinely national in nature." All in all, it was a forceful showing. As Carter packed his bags for Venice II, he could not help being mindful that Venice I had delivered up an important new player on the Middle East chessboard: Europe. ■

MIDDLE EAST

Keeping the Talks Alive

Israel and Egypt inch back toward the bargaining table

After a troubling hiatus of suspended peace talks and intensified violence in the occupied West Bank, Israel and Egypt last week began to inch back to the bargaining table. In quick succession, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin both accepted Jimmy Carter's invitation to send their top negotiators to Washington in early July. There was little cause for celebration; everyone knew that formidable differences remain on the issue of Palestinian autonomy and that no major concessions are likely to be made by either side before the U.S. election. Moreover, the European Community's resolution in Venice had introduced an unpredictable new factor. But at least it was a way of keeping the peace process turning over, if only in slow motion, keep things from breaking apart."

In the West Bank, the population remained tense following the terrorist attacks on two Palestinian mayors two weeks ago. An Israeli policeman in the Old City of Jerusalem was shot and wounded by a sniper, the first such incident within the Old City in several years. Obstinately, Begin defended the "inalienable right" of Jews to live wherever they wish in the West Bank. He announced that Israel will build ten more settlements in that area, after which it will concentrate on strengthening and enlarging existing settlements. He claimed that Carter had once endorsed such a strategy—an assertion that the State Department quickly disputed. For their part, the Israelis reacted angrily to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie's comment that the Jewish settlements are an obstacle to peace.

Israeli troops detaining an Arab suspect after the sniper shooting of a policeman in Jerusalem

Despite the tension, a drive to keep the peace process turning over, even if in slow motion.

Even though he had been the one to break off the negotiations last month, Sadat was anxious that talks resume among the three negotiators: Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, Israeli Interior Minister Yosef Burg, and U.S. Special Envoy Sol Linowitz. Sadat still had plenty of misgivings about the Israelis, and he demanded last week that they stop setting "preconditions or *faits accomplis*." Translation: he remained upset about Israeli demands that the future of Jerusalem should not be discussed, and angry that the Israelis were forging ahead with plans for more Jewish settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. But Sadat is also convinced that his best hope for an eventual peace settlement lies in a Carter victory at the polls and, ideally, a Begin defeat in next year's scheduled elections in Israel. So he wants to help Carter by emphasizing that the American President's chief foreign policy accomplishment, the Camp David agreement, is still alive. Says one Egyptian official: "We're at a stage where we just have to

In the meantime, Anwar Sadat made an abortive effort to mend fences with his old allies and bankrollers, the Saudi Arabians, who had broken with him over his negotiations with Israel. Sadat announced that he was ready to go to Riyadh to talk with the Saudi leaders, but the Saudis quickly rebuffed him and brought an abrupt end to his proffered friendship. In a stinging speech the next night, Sadat reverted to form and assailed the Saudis as well as Libyan Strongman Muammar Gaddafi, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez Assad. Shouted Sadat to a meeting of provincial officials: "I will never surrender Egypt's will to make her own decisions to the lunatic Gaddafi, the bloodthirsty Hussein, the traitor Assad or to the Saudis, who are at once afraid of the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Iraqis and even their own shadow!" Having thus dispensed with Arab adversaries, Sadat made plans to retreat to his Ma'mura resthouse near Alexandria for the duration of the summer. ■

ENERGY

OPEC Raises the Ceiling

An oil miniglut cools off demands from the cartel

Whenever the 13 members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries get together, two things seem certain: they will bicker vociferously among themselves, and then they will raise the price of their precious crude. That is precisely what happened at the OPEC oil ministers' 57th meeting last week at the El Aurassi hotel in Algiers. After lavish feasting on caviar and couscous, the oil ministers argued until 3 a.m. but then reached a compromise that allowed some of them to push the price of oil still higher. The 13 countries decided to set a price ceiling of $32 per bbl. on crude. For certain higher quality grades of oil, the price could go to $37 per bbl. OPEC prices now range from Saudi Arabia's $28 per bbl. to Algeria's $38.

The Algiers decision reflects some change in OPEC's pricing philosophy. Usally the cartel has fixed a floor price and agreed not to sell oil for anything less. Since the Iranian revolution set off the latest world oil shortage, the difference between the floor price and the top rate charged by some OPEC members has grown considerably. Now the new ceiling price policy should limit the oil escalation by hawks like Algeria, Libya and Nigeria.

The agreement to set a maximum price was forced on the cartel by the current miniglut of oil. Greater conservation and the sharp recession in the U.S. have decreased the world's thirst for petroleum. OPEC's economics experts told the ministers at the beginning of the meeting that world oil production is now about 1 million to 2 million bbl. per day greater than demand. The excess output is acting as a restraint on countries wishing to push the price of oil ever higher. Said Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, after the meeting: "The agreement does not impose restrictions on others not to raise their prices. But I don't think they are going to raise prices because of the downward trend of the markets."

Nevertheless, last week's decision immediately set off some price shifts. While high-price countries like Libya and Algeria did not push theirs higher, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar and Venezuela announced that they would begin demanding as much as $2 per bbl. more for oil on July 1. Those four countries have been recently charging a basic price of about $30 per bbl. for crude. Saudi Arabia refused to increase its rates for now, but Yamani hinted that he might raise them by $1 per bbl. to $4 per bbl. in order to unify OPEC prices. Some oil experts expect the Saudis to hike prices by about $2 per bbl. within a few weeks.

Western energy experts estimated that the latest increases would boost the average cost of OPEC oil nearly a dollar, to just under $32 per bbl. That is nearly double the $18.72-per-bbl. price of last June. Officials of oil importing nations immediately denounced the price rise as extortionate, but one U.S. official conceded that it would add only a penny to the price of a gallon of heating oil or gasoline. Still, the increase could raise the world's oil bill by $40 billion this year.

Last week's meeting underscored again the weakened role of Saudi Arabia inside OPEC. While that country still pumps one-third of all OPEC production, it can no longer solely determine world oil policy. Prior to the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia virtually dictated crude prices because it had surplus production and could threaten to drive the cost of crude down if the other countries did not follow its lead. Now the Saudis are pumping oil at the rate of 9.5 million bbl. per day, which is 1 million more than before the fall of the Shah of Iran and near to their current capacity. They have thus lost their leverage over other cartel members. The Saudis could not convince the other OPEC members that they should agree on a lower ceiling price. In fact it took four hours of extra bargaining for Yamani to persuade Iran Oil Minister Ali Akbar Moinfar, whose country produces about one-tenth as much petroleum as Saudi Arabia, to change a single key word in the conference's final communiqué.

Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister Sheik Yamani

A message from the way he held his brow.

The oil-consuming nations can hardly derive much solace from the relatively modest price increases. The current oil surplus is expected to have evaporated by fall. Even if it has not, the Saudis and others could decide to reduce production to keep pressure on prices. Other oil countries believe that Saudi Arabia will soon cut output. Said Kuwait Oil Minister Ali Khalifa al-Sabah: "There is no specific promise, but that is certainly my understanding—if only through the way Yamani held his brow."

As OPEC ministers departed from last week's meeting, they left no doubt that they will start raising prices again just as soon as world petroleum demand permits. The group will meet in September and could then return to its old ways. Said Libyan Oil Minister Abdul Salam Zagaar: "The ceiling is going to be $37 until September, and then we will see what the market will do." ■

WEAPONRY

Anthrax Fever

New report on germ research

In April 1979 Soviet citizens on the outskirts of Sverdlovsk in the Ural Mountains developed fevers and respiratory problems. Hundreds died. The Soviet Union identified the epidemic as intestinal anthrax, a bacterial disease spread to human beings by infected livestock.

But the symptoms strongly resembled those of pulmonary anthrax, which is far more deadly than intestinal anthrax. Also, Sverdlovsk is the site of a military facility that Western intelligence agencies have suspected of developing biological warfare weapons. Had something gone wrong during an experiment, accidentally releasing lethal spores into the atmosphere? The U.S. challenged the Soviet Union in March, seeking to determine whether the Sverdlovsk incident was a violation of the 119-nation Biological Weapons Convention. That treaty prohibits the production and stockpiling of killer bacteria, such as those that cause pulmonary anthrax, for military purposes. The Soviets stuck to their story that the outbreak was intestinal anthrax.

Since then a task force of U.S. Government experts has continued its detective work. There may never be a final verdict. Unlike the SALT agreements, which can be verified by spy satellites and other means, the Biological Weapons Convention is almost impossible to police. Moreover, the treaty is vague about what constitutes stockpiling. But TIME has learned that a draft of the task force's report, classified top secret, diagnoses the Sverdlovsk syndrome as almost certainly pulmonary rather than intestinal anthrax. No matter how the incident is resolved, the Soviets seem to have been caught engaging in some kind of nefarious activity and then lying about it, a revelation that is sure to contaminate further the atmosphere of détente and arms control. ■

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IRAN

"The Place Reeks of Conspiracy"

As strife mounts, Khomeini denounces the nation's chaos

Leftist demonstrators unleashing a barrage of stones during Tehran violence

In Tehran, right-wing Muslim fanatics attacked a rally of leftist Mujahidin with clubs and paving stones. Tear gas filled the air, and Revolutionary Guards opened fire on the brawling mob surging through the streets. The bloody fighting near the U.S. embassy left at least one dead and 300 injured

In the mountain village of Jamaran, two miles north of the capital, the corridors of Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini's modest house buzzed like a beehive. Turbaned mullahs, ostensibly come to congratulate the Ayatullah on the anniversary of Mab'ath, the day God chose Muhammad as his Prophet, seized the occasion to denounce their enemies and advance their respective causes. The byzantine scene prompted one local observer to remark, "The place reeks of conspiracy."

No one seemed more aware of the strife swirling in Iran than Khomeini. Just two days before the Tehran street clashes, in a speech to his provincial governors, he had issued an extraordinary warning of impending "chaos." Said he: "I am worried that the Islamic Republic could be defeated by those who are on our side. If dissension among us continues, then we shall destroy one another." Thus after months of thundering against the U.S. and other allegedly demonic foreign forces, Khomeini had finally admitted that the greatest threat to his regime stemmed from its own internal conflicts.

Though Khomeini cited no names, he was clearly alarmed by the bitter power struggle between moderate President Abolhassan Banisadr and hard-lining Ayatullah Seyyed Mohammed Beheshti, the leader of the clergy-dominated Islamic Republic Party. Behind their personal rivalry lay opposed visions of government: Beheshti and his fundamentalist allies seek total power in a single-party theocratic state. Banisadr and fellow moderates like Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh want a modern, pragmatic government within an Islamic revolutionary framework; they are especially eager to shore up an economy reeling under 50% inflation, 30% unemployment and drastically declining oil production.

Beheshti's party has so far succeeded in hamstringing Banisadr. First, it has used its domination of the ruling Revolutionary Council to frustrate the President's attempts to name a Prime Minister and resolve the problem of the 53 U.S. citizens held hostage since Nov. 4. Now the clerical party is making the same tactical use of its domination of the newly elected parliament.

The Ayatullah speaking from his balcony

The great threat: "Dissension among us."

Out of patience with his clerical rivals, Banisadr blasted back at them last week. "Some people want me to be the President while they exercise my powers," he declared in an interview. "I shall not hesitate to take action against those who consider themselves above the law." On the issue of the hostages, he warned against attempts to put them on trial as spies, as recommended by a number of the mullahs. Such trials, he said, would create "great complications."

Banisadr's view was seconded by Ghotbzadeh, who down-played the idea of trials while attending a two-day meeting of the Socialist International in Oslo, Norway, which Iran sought to use as a forum for its "anti-imperialist mission." But his exasperation over the whole perplexing issue also prompted him at one point to exclaim: "To hell with the American hostages!" Actually, no resolution of the hostage crisis was likely to emerge before mid-July at the earliest, since the faction-ridden parliament, to which Khomeini has left the final decision, will not even consider the matter before choosing a Prime Minister. Furthermore, most parliamentary members polled by the local press seem to favor trials

As political infighting intensified, so did civil strife. Two days after Khomeini had warned of impending chaos, the government announced that it had arrested six soldiers for plotting to topple his regime and return the Shah to power. The conspiracy had allegedly developed in an army unit stationed in the largely Kurdish-inhabited province of Western Azerbaijan, where renewed fighting last week between government troops and autonomist Kurdish rebels reportedly left a "large number" dead

Watching over Iran's tumult was an octogenarian who seemed to be in danger of losing control of the revolution he had triumphantly ushered in 16 months ago. Much of the fault appeared to be Khomeini's own. He had wavered indecisively while the mullahs undermined the authority of a constitutionally elected President. His obdurate pronouncements had favored the fanatics over the pragmatists. Now even his own authority seemed threatened by Beheshti and his colleagues. "No honest observer can escape the conclusion that Khomeini himself has encouraged the Islamic Republic Party to become a Frankenstein," charged a senior Iranian politician. "He should kill the monster before it is too late." Taming the mullahs was probably Khomeini's main goal in speaking out against factionalism last week. But time might be running out both for the Ayatullah and for the clerical hard-liners As one Western diplomat observed: "People have had enough of mullahs. The most likely future rulers of Iran are either leftists or army officers." ■

World

JAPAN

Shock of a Fallen Samurai

Ohira dies ten days before an uncertain election

His nickname, "the Bull," was well deserved. At an age when most elder statesmen stay at home, Japan's Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, 70, went charging all over the world. Last January he personally promoted his pet project, the concept of Pacific Basin cooperation, by traveling to Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. A staunch U.S. ally, Ohira came to the U.S. to talk to President Carter last month before he visited Mexico and traveled to Canada to renew his acquaintance with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. When he learned of Tito's death, he rushed to Belgrade for the funeral. Back home, after his government lost a vote of confidence in the Diet, he refused to resign but called a new election instead. Just as he was about to start a vigorous campaign, he was taken to a Tokyo hospital for exhaustion. Even then, with a diagnosis of angina pectoris, Ohira chafed to get out of bed. He ordered a party official to fly to Venice to find hospital facilities so that he might personally represent Japan at this week's world economic summit. He never got to go. Last week, early one morning, Ohira died of a heart attack.

Ohira's death was not expected to provoke any significant change in Japan's foreign policy and solidly pro-Western loyalty; Ohira himself had regularly reaffirmed it, with the full backing of his conservative Liberal Democratic Party. The problem was that no one was prepared to guarantee how long his party might remain in power: it had been left leaderless just ten days before the national elections that will test its narrow majorities in both houses of the Diet.

Although the party has been in power without interruption for 25 years, it has been seriously divided since the election last fall. Ohira had confidently planned to increase his party's strength in the Diet's 511-member lower house, but a candid speech about higher taxes provoked a slight loss instead. Opponents and members of his own party began calling for his resignation. Rival party factions became so embittered that last month, when the opposition Socialist Party called for a no-confidence vote, a customary political maneuver, Ohira was shocked to see his government toppled largely by members of his own party who abstained in the voting. The defeat forced him to dissolve the Diet and call the June 22 election.

Late Prime Minister Ohira

A symbol of embattled principle.

"If I were to prepare a balance sheet of my life, I suspect that the figures on the liability side would be all too large and my assets in comparison all too small," Ohira once wrote. To some Japanese, in fact, Ohira was just a stubborn bureaucrat, resisting disparate cries for change, but to many others he was a symbol of embattled principle.

Reared as a poor farm boy, Ohira graduated from Tokyo College of Commerce, one of Japan's top institutions. During World War II, he worked as a tax official in China's occupied Inner Mongolia, and on his return to Japan became a section head in the Finance Ministry. He was elected to the House of Representatives in 1952 and served ten consecutive terms. As Foreign Minister in Kakuei Tanaka's Cabinet from 1972 to 1974, Ohira successfully promoted the normalization of Japan's relations with China. Even though Tanaka's government was toppled in 1974 by corruption charges—Tanaka himself was accused of taking a $2 million bribe from Lockheed—Ohira went on to become Prime Minister in December 1978. Said he to his doctors just before he died: "I would have no [personal] regrets in resigning, but I am in politics for the sake of Japan."

Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi Ito was named to fill Ohira's position until the election is held and a new Diet can be convened. If the Liberal Democrats retain their majority, they may name a noncontroversial figure to serve out Ohira's term as Prime Minister, which ends in early December. Hirokichi Nadao, 80, who is one of the founders of the Liberal Democratic Party and house speaker, is one possibility; Eiichi Nishimura, 82, the vice president of the party, is another. Local politicians were already saying that Ohira's death actually might help restore party unity, and thus bring victory in the election. Such optimism is in keeping with ancient lore: the army of the fallen samurai always wins the battle in his honor. ■

Milestones

MARRIED. Mary Courtney Kennedy, 23, No. 5 of the eleven children of Ethel Kennedy and the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, and an aide in Uncle Ted's campaign; and **Jeffrey Ruhe,** 28, assistant to ABC's news and sports chief Roone Arledge; in Washington, D.C.

MARRIED. John Williams, 48, hot Hollywood sound-track composer (*Jaws I* and *II, Star Wars, The Empire Strikes Back*), who succeeded Arthur Fiedler as conductor of the Boston Pops Orchestra this year; and **Samantha Winslow,** thirtyish, a Los Angeles freelance photographer; he for the second time, she for the first; in Boston.

DIED. Philip Guston, 66, influential U.S. painter; of a heart attack; in Woodstock, N.Y. The Canadian-born son of Russian immigrants, Guston joined Jackson Pollock, a schoolmate of his in Los Angeles, and other contemporaries like Willem de Kooning, Robert Motherwell and Mark Rothko in forging the abstract expressionist movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the past decade he returned from his often dreamlike works to representational painting. His explanation: "I got sick and tired of all the purity. I wanted to tell stories."

DIED. Milburn Stone, 75, veteran character actor who as the vinegary yet avuncular Doc Adams in TV's popular *Gunsmoke* series played friend and foil to James Arness's Matt Dillon and Amanda Blake's Miss Kitty throughout the show's 20-year (1955-75) run; of a heart attack; in La Jolla, Calif. Stone became so strongly identified with the role, for which he won an Emmy, that he once quipped, "To everyone except my family I'm Doc. Getting so I have to restrain myself from making house calls."

DIED. William A. Patterson, 80, U.S. aviation pioneer who as president and later chairman of United Airlines for 32 years (until 1966) made it the world's largest commercial air service; after a long illness; in Glenview, Ill. With the backing of Planemaker William E. Boeing, Honolulu-born Patterson in the 1930s put together four small freight carriers to form an airline that now serves 112 U.S. and Canadian cities and boasts annual revenues of $3.4 billion. Among Patterson's innovations: hiring what he called female couriers, forerunners of today's stewardesses.

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VOLKSWAGEN DOES IT AGAIN

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INSIDE THE

More powerful than it has ever been, a colossal empire now confronts a decade of



U.S.S.R.

decision, and its choices will change history



The spectacle reflects the power. Bathed in white light, Moscow's Red Square at night is one of the most impressive symbols of strength in the world—as large and brooding as the land itself. The flat, stark lines of the Kremlin's forbidding and protective wall dominate Lenin's tomb and the glorious domes of St. Basil's Cathedral. The Soviet Union, an empire whose expanse dwarfs the one ruled by ancient Rome, now confronts a pivotal decade in its history. Before long, an entirely new generation of leaders must replace that of President Leonid Brezhnev and his aging associates on the Politburo. There is, meanwhile, growing tension between East and West, with the world's two superpowers increasingly seen to be in confrontation. The military strength of the Soviet Union is clearly the equal of the U.S.'s; the Kremlin is seeking to project its influence in Africa, Asia and the Middle East; with rising anger and suspicion, the Soviet Union and the U.S. assail each other on a dozen geographic and economic fronts.

Never before has it been so important for Americans to be knowledgeable about the Soviet Union, to understand what it has become. In this special issue, TIME examines the "other" superpower, exploring the diversity of its society and the vigor of its peoples, the deep sources of its strength and the roots of its persistent weaknesses.

A Fortress State in Transition

Brezhnev's legacy: stability, security and—perhaps—stagnation

Wretched and abundant,
Oppressed and powerful,
Weak and mighty,
Mother Russia!
—Nikolai Nekrasov, *Who Can Be Happy in Russia?*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not just a country, but an empire—the largest, and probably the last, in history. Occupying 15% of the earth's land surface, the Soviet Union stretches from a cluster of virtual colonies in Eastern Europe to the Bering Strait off the tip of Alaska, across two continents and eleven time zones; more than 3,000 miles—roughly the distance from New York to San Francisco—separate the ice fields of the Arctic Ocean from the sun-parched Kara Kum Desert. The 262.4 million citizens of the U.S.S.R. belong to more than 100 ethnic groups and claim descent from Varangians, Turks, Mongols and countless Eurasian tribes. Their government preaches to them, in Russian, about the supreme wisdom of a 19th century German atheist. They, however, speak in more than 100 tongues and worship Jehovah, God, Buddha, Allah, or the animist spirits of nomadic hunters in the far north.

Banner-waving crowds jam Red Square to celebrate May Day 1980

Prodigious achievements of a society that bulges with muscle.

Nature and human enterprise have endowed the Soviet Union with wealth and power. The prodigious achievements of the U.S.S.R. in mining, agriculture and energy production still conjure up images of the infamous Siberian mines, collective farms and hydroelectric projects of the 1930s, where armies of political prisoners, conscript peasants and idealistic volunteers "built Communism" under the cruel supervision of Joseph Stalin's armed guards and commissars. Today's reality is less harsh, but the profile of the country still bulges with muscle; the recitation of its endowments and achievements is still redolent of brute force, monumentality and projects that dwarf and sometimes devour men.

The U.S.S.R. has moved ahead of the rest of the world in the production of steel, pig iron and cement. It ranks second in the manufacture of aluminum as well as the extraction of gold —the two metals that respectively symbolize the modern and the primitive strengths of an economy. The Soviet Union's farms produce more barley, cotton fiber, wheat, oats and rye than those of any other country and—an incongruous sweet touch —more sugar and honey. Huge petroleum reserves, second only to those of Saudi Arabia, have made the country self-sufficient in energy, although that could change by the middle of this decade because of the difficulty in finding and exploiting oil and gas in remote and inhospitable expanses. By numerous indexes —electrification, physicians and nurses per capita, teacher-to-pupil ratios, books published per annum—the U.S.S.R. is an advanced, and still advancing society. Despite censorship and an official ethos that discourages innovation, Russian culture of the Soviet era has produced masterpieces of Western civilization, especially in music, poetry and dance.

Militarily, the Soviet Union is a true superpower. It ranks first in annual defense expenditures (about $165 billion) and second (after China) in men under arms (3,658,000). Nearly one out of every six soldiers on earth serves in the Soviet armed forces. Over the past 30 years, its navy has evolved from little more than a well-armed coast guard to an armada of global reach; it challenges the U.S. Seventh Fleet for command of the Indian and western Pacific oceans, and the South China Sea. Technicians of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces man command-and-control silos that can launch intercontinental ballistic missiles, some of them with as many as ten independently targetable warheads, at the U.S. in 30 to 35 minutes. Soviet ICBMs are bigger, more numerous and more powerful than those of the U.S.

Yet for all its size and strength, its human and natural richness, the U.S.S.R. remains strangely impoverished, even cursed. While its gross national product is second only to that of the U.S. ($2.4 trillion *vs.* $1.4 trillion), it ranks 17th in *The Book of World Rankings* on a scale of combined social and economic indicators, after such countries as Sweden, Australia and Iceland.

The U.S.S.R. also gets poor marks for conservation. The Soviet constitution of 1977 promised "to preserve the purity of air and water, ensure reproduction of natural wealth and improve the human environment." That lofty goal is honored mostly in the breach. Pollution in most urban areas is getting worse every year—not yet as bad as Los Angeles' or Detroit's, but getting there. The campaign to clean up the industrial filth in Lake Baikal—which became an international *cause célèbre*—has been the exception that proves the rule. Soviet environmentalists usually lose their battles against economic planners who are trying to meet short-term production quotas even if that means wasting resources or fouling the air, soil and water.

It is as though the Soviet Union were too sprawling for its own good, too diverse to take care of itself without hurting itself, or as though none of those gods or prophets in whom its people believe—particularly Marx—had intended for so heteroge-

neous and far-flung a swath of humanity and real estate to be one nation. The manifestations of the curse have been rough, often brutal, totalitarian rule and a populace that seems forever aggrieved, deprived, yet often submissive.

These twin misfortunes were not born with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. They were present when the Soviet Socialist Republics were known as "All Russia" and their ruler called himself Tsar (from Caesar). One major theme that resonates through writings from the golden age of Russian literature, the 19th century, is national self-pity. "Oh, God, how sad our Russia is!" sighed Alexander Pushkin on reading Nikolai Gogol's *Dead Souls*.

Today's Soviet citizens are better off than the peasants and urban poor that Poet Nekrasov eulogized. Indeed, they are somewhat better off than they were ten years ago. But if not wretched, they are still oppressed and unhappy. Their state is mightier than ever, yet its ability to provide for their daily needs is inadequate.

The main reason is a system that will not, and perhaps cannot, work. The Soviet economy has always been stultified by too much central planning, too little entrepreneurial incentive. Factories, farms and individual workers are caught up in a machine that spews forth quotas and directives, sucks up output, inefficiently manufactures and distributes goods, and rarely rewards initiative. Those deficiencies, inefficiencies and inflexibilities are now catching up with the economy and slowing it down. During the 1980s, Western experts predict, the Soviet growth rate will drop even lower than last year's estimated 0.7%. Moscow's economists will also face a planning nightmare: trying to meet the needs of the military and heavy industry, and at the same time satisfying the expectations of consumers.

Those expectations are subjected to constant, ubiquitous frustrations. "The shopping lines almost define the society," reports TIME Moscow Bureau Chief Bruce Nelan. "The stores are always out of something, low on something else, sometimes rationing flour, meat or butter. As the lines grow longer, the mood grows sour. Someone tries to jump a place. 'Get back! Don't think you're special!' protests the chorus. At the meat counter, two women carry suitcases. They draw knowing, resentful glances. They are hoarders. But they will bribe the butcher, fill their suitcases and perhaps be back later in the morning.

"Cashiers overcharge routinely, often refuse to make change, or ignore customers while they chat on the phone. Muscovites complain about 'the cult of rudeness' of salespeople, who seem to take perverse satisfaction in disappointing, bullying or cheating customers, as though they were working off the frustration they have built up during their own hours in line shopping for their own families.

"The Soviet Union has one of the industrialized world's worst distribution and retail trade systems. Thus this spring there are no sheets, underwear or children's shirts. 'We have money but nothing to buy,' is a refrain of everyday Soviet life. Those who can make their own clothes find material scarce and expensive. For example, four yards of polyester fabric costs the equivalent of $30; the same in an American store costs $2.50. Needles, thread, thimbles and buttons are also *defitsitny* (the term for items in short supply, which often really means impossible to find). The clerks do not care, because they get paid whether or not they sell anything. When goods can be purchased, they are likely to self-destruct. The lining might come out of a suit on the third or fourth use. Household appliances burn out. Furniture splinters and loses its veneer. But never mind. The plan is being fulfilled."

Leonid Brezhnev has complained in several recent speeches about factories, costing millions of rubles, that have remained unfinished for more than a decade. The skyline along the Moscow River has, for five years now, featured the new headquarters for the government of the Russian Federation, the largest of the 15 Soviet republics. It just stands there, unopened, its interior unfinished—a joke among many Muscovites, but an embarrassment to many others.

"I love my country," a Moscow economist says. "I certainly

don't want to leave it. But I'm so frustrated by the conditions. Why does it have to be so hard? Everything in our history has always been a struggle. Everything is too centralized. There's no initiative. I feel so helpless. I can't change anything. I want the future to be better. But will it be? I know the statistics on output, but I don't see the results."

The daily grind and the seemingly ineradicable deficiencies of the system have had a corrosive effect on the morale of the society. Alcoholism is a growing problem. Demon vodka is a major cause of divorce and crime, as well as of absenteeism, accidents on the job and the poor productivity of Soviet workers. The capitalist world, of course, is in no position to preach temperance to Communists. But Soviet drinking—and drunkenness—differs qualitatively from the proverbial American three-martini lunch. When a Soviet opens a bottle of vodka, he frequently means to finish it. He is not just seeking relaxation or a release from anxiety into elation: he will often drink himself straight into oblivion.

The Moscow press has reported a disturbing increase in drunkenness and crime—or "hooliganism," as it is called—among youth. Soviet parents, in talks with Westerners, complain openly about the cynicism, acquisitiveness, materialism and "bourgeois values" of young people.

Writing in the *Teachers Gazette*, Secondary School Instructor A.I. Gusev voiced a common concern: "I was dismayed when I asked my pupils why they took summer jobs at a collective farm. Nearly all their answers began with the words 'to buy' and 'to get'—jeans, a watch, a motorcycle, a tape recorder. Why are so many of our youngsters becoming overwhelmed with the passion to make money?"

The answer, in part, is that other passions—to make a revolution, to establish justice, to build a truly egalitarian society—have long since dimmed in the U.S.S.R. Teenagers and students have absorbed more completely than their parents the most discouraging and disillusioning facts of Soviet life. One fact is elitism. At universities and technical institutes, students see a few of their classmates granted special privileges, admitted to more desirable programs and eventually given better jobs, all because their parents are prominent or well-connected. Talent, brains and hard work do bring opportunities for upward mobility in the system. But so do status, pull, hustling and ruthlessness.

SICHOV—SIPA BLACK STAR

Massing to buy shoes in Moscow's GUM department store

Plenty of steel, but try to find sheets or a needle and thread.

One of the lessons of a Soviet education is that while one must know the Marxist-Leninist catechism, and party membership is a great asset, being a true believer is not necessary; it may even be a disadvantage in a society where power enjoys more respect and earns more reward than ideological purity. A British Foreign Office expert on the U.S.S.R. sees the country as "running out of ideological élan with which to face the many challenges of the future."

Ideology is still an important, indeed inescapable, aspect of Soviet life. Its trappings are everywhere. The country is plastered with huge billboards, on buildings and highway overpasses, proclaiming in white letters on red backgrounds, *SLAVA TRUDU!* (Glory to Labor!) and *SLAVA KPSS!* (Glory to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union!). But pedestrians and motorists ignore the slogans. Virtually no one ever uses the word *slava* in everyday conversation, except in the very common phrase, *Slava Bogu*, which means "Glory be to God." Yet the state goes right on repainting the billboards every year.

People do read newspapers, listen to the radio, watch television and go to the movies, where they are also barraged with propaganda.* But with a lifetime of constant practice, Soviet citizens develop a mental filter that allows them to block out the ideological exhortations and concentrate instead on entertainment or just-the-facts news—to the extent that facts are printed.

Most neighborhoods have a storefront *agitpunkt* (agitation and propaganda point), which is festooned with slogans and piled high with party literature. But when local residents stop in to study the bulletin board and ask questions of the official on duty, the chances are they are interested in new regulations that might affect their lives or gossip about apartments about to become available. They have minimal interest in the proper Marxist interpretation of the latest event in international affairs or who is likely to win the upcoming election to the district council. Since all elections are limited to a single slate of candidates, there is little suspense. Propaganda, in short, has become the background noise of Soviet society.

The leadership is aware that the people are tuning out. Brezhnev has complained that the state's "strong and qualified propaganda apparatus" is not doing a good job. "Not infrequently, newspaper material, television and radio broadcasts are not convincing enough, lack a serious overall view." He urged "ideological front workers" to improve their product, especially in the highly simplistic presentation of foreign news. Meanwhile, *Pravda* editorialized last year against "the fear of discussing the problems facing our society, the tendency to smooth over and avoid unresolved problems, to blur real shortcomings and difficulties."

As any responsible government would be, the regime is clearly worried about the catalogue of social ills—increasing alcoholism, crime, divorce and youth problems—not so much as a breakdown in ideology but as a breakdown in social discipline. It is also concerned that these problems are occurring just as the U.S.S.R. becomes more vulnerable to "contamination by agitation and propaganda" from the West. Shortwave broadcasts by the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, BBC and Deutsche Welle in Russian and other languages of the U.S.S.R. provide generally reliable reporting and less ideological filler about events inside the Soviet Union than *The Beacon*, the nationwide hourly news program beamed from Moscow. The Western radio stations also offer Soviet listeners tantalizing glimpses of capitalist life through feature stories and interviews, while playing the siren song of rock and folk music.

*One awesome statistical distinction of the U.S.S.R. is the number of its movie theaters: there are 154,000 of them, which is 58% of all the cinemas in the world. The U.S. is second with only 16,000. One reason for this amazing proliferation is that Soviet doctrine—especially before the advent of television—emphasized film as a medium of propaganda and indoctrination. Another and perhaps more important reason is that the Soviets are eager for any entertainment as a relief from boredom.

I know I do. And I'm not talking about football. My wife, Marianne, and I grew up in Cincinnati. But we didn't really see it from the tourist's point of view until we started bringing the kids back for visits. Now, even we're amazed at everything there is to do.

We've spent hours roaming through the excellent art museums and enjoying Cincinnati's wonderful Symphony, Ballet, Opera, and May Festival. And one of our favorite things is to pack a picnic lunch, go up to one of the beautiful city parks that overlook the Ohio, and just watch life floating by on the river.

"YOU'LL LOVE PLAYING IN CINCINNATI."

Roger Staubach
Former Quarterback, Dallas Cowboys

Speaking of the river, you sports fans already know that Cincinnati's Riverfront Stadium is the home of the world famous Reds baseball team. Tickets are almost always available, so whenever we're up during the spring or summer, we plan on catching some Reds action. Cincinnati's big on pro football, too. And now that I'm off the field, I'm looking forward to seeing the Bengals live.

Cincinnati's also known for some other Bengals... the extremely rare white Bengal tigers that have been successfully bred at the Cincinnati Zoo. That's another "must" on our itinerary. It's called "the Midwest's liveliest zoo" and considered to be one of the finest in the world.

If the kids are in the mood to ride a "real" Beast, we head for Kings Island, the giant theme park just north of town. Their Beast is the biggest, fastest roller coaster in the world. And right next door we can take in the National College Football Hall of Fame.

At the end of a great day, there's a wide choice of places to relax, from convenient downtown hotels, to suburban resort centers, to budget motels. And the hardest thing about finding an outstanding meal in Cincinnati is deciding which one to choose. One of only 13 restaurants in the country to receive the Mobil 5 Star Award is located here. And there are 6

restaurants that rate 4 Stars.

I could go on about all the ways we love to play in this town. But I think an even better idea is for you to mail in this coupon or see your travel agent. And discover for yourself how much fun is waiting for you when you meet Cincinnati.

MEET CINCINNATI

For more information on the great places to go and things to do in Cincinnati, fill in this coupon and mail it to: Lois Smith, 200 W. 5th Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202. Or stop in and see your local travel agent.

Tell me more about: (check as many as you wish)

- ☐ Cincinnati Reds/Bengals
- ☐ Horse Racing
- ☐ College Football Hall of Fame
- ☐ Hotels/Motels/Restaurants
- ☐ Coliseum Events
- ☐ Cincinnati Zoo
- ☐ Kings Island
- ☐ Theater/Live Entertainment
- ☐ Museums/Art Galleries
- ☐ Cincinnati Symphony/Ballet/Opera/May Festival
- ☐ Other _____

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

Andrew Jackson entertains Martin Van Buren.

Andrew Jackson, "Hero of the Plain People," enjoyed the simpler pleasures of life. To friends, like Martin Van Buren, he displayed his personal liquor chest. Jackson's decided preference for Old Crow is reported in a 19th-century newspaper.

OLD CROW
THE ORIGINAL SOUR MASH

OLD CROW. THE PROUD TASTE OF AMERICA SINCE 1835.

which are immensely popular among Soviet youth.

Yet despite all of their hardships and disenchantments, despite their fascination with the world beyond their borders, most Soviets remain essentially apolitical and certainly patriotic —an ideal combination of attributes, from the standpoint of the state. Their principal concerns are fairly familiar among people the world around: making ends meet, getting ahead as much as possible, staying out of trouble. The West is much more enticing to them for its image of material abundance, physical comfort and sense of vitality than for its democratic values, intellectual freedoms and political institutions

Veterans of World War II proudly display their medals in Red Square

After centuries of invasions, a sense of embattled vulnerability

In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, Alexander Solzhenitsyn describes from his exile in Vermont how a peasant family in the middle of Russia wants simply to be left alone: "If only the petty local Communist despot would somehow quit his uncontrolled tyranny, if only they could get enough to eat for once, and buy shoes for the children, and lay in enough fuel for the winter, if only they could have sufficient space to live even two to a room."

Few Soviets accept Solzhenitsyn's messianic vision of a Russia straining against its chains, yearning for some spiritual revolution that will throw off Communist rule and replace it at least temporarily with an ill-defined "authoritarian order founded on love of one's fellowman." The Soviet Union's other giant of opposition, Physicist Andrei Sakharov, has been promulgating a very different sort of dissent lately from his internal exile in the industrial city of Gorky. Sakharov is a liberal in the Western mold, a believer in pluralist democracy. But neither alternative seems to reflect the aspirations of the Soviet masses For all their admirable courage, the few thousand Soviet dissidents still at large have their principal following in the West They sometimes behave like high officials of a shadow government, hoping to get their manifestoes played back into the Soviet Union by Western radio, but the resonance of those messages among their countrymen seems to be very faint. To the extent that they have an impact, the dissidents are often dismissed by the general public as reckless dreamers or denounced as traitors, which is just the way the official press portrays them.

One reason for the man in the street's aversion to dissent is that political troublemakers historically have very often ended up in prison, or dead. Six decades of totalitarianism have made most Soviet citizens submissive. As a consequence of the U.S.S.R.'s current social and economic ills, there is even a certain amount of popular sentiment that the leadership is not cracking down hard enough

Most Equal of the Equals

The political system that eventually will choose Leonid Brezhnev's successor as leader would appear to be a model democracy. It is headed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., which is composed of 1,500 members and which elects a select body of 39 representatives known as the Presidium. In fact, political power rests with a gigantic, self-protecting and self-selecting bureaucracy that is effectively controlled by a small and cautious elite.

The constitution adopted in 1977 —the fourth in the history of the U.S.S.R.—was the first to assert the primacy of the Communist Party in Soviet government and life. The country's only legal party is identified as the "nucleus" of the system and its sole authority on ideology. To maintain control, the party tightly restricts its membership: a candidate must have been a member of Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, be recommended by three people who have each been members for three years, and pass other screening procedures, including serving a year on probation. Of the 193 million citizens who were 18 and older in 1979, only 16 million, or 9%, were party members. (In Khrushchev's day the figure was 6%.) Except for a few scientific administrators, virtually every responsible official in the Soviet government is a party member. Although it is impossible to separate party from government, one point is clear: the party makes policy.

At the top of the party pyramid is the Central Committee, whose 287 members include the most powerful individuals in the nation. Fourteen of the most equal among the equals on the Central Committee constitute the policy-setting Politburo, which has been carefully controlled for most of the past 16 years by Brezhnev and his circle.

The Central Committee chooses the General Secretary of the Communist Party, the most powerful position in the nation. The authority of the office that Brezhnev now holds is not defined by the constitution, nor is its term. Stalin, who never held the presidency, was a dictator from 1929 until he died in 1953; Khrushchev was largely able to run things his way until he made a number of blunders (harming Soviet agriculture, widening the split with China) and the Central Committee threw him out. Brezhnev has relied on a coterie of allies and exercised his power much more discreetly.

Decisions of the Politburo are, in effect, adopted and carried out by an elaborate system of local, regional and national governments whose apex is the Supreme Soviet, an elected parliament. This body consists of the Soviet of the Union, composed of 750 members, each of whom represents a district of about 350,000; and the Soviet of the Nationalities, also composed of 750 members, including 32 from each of the 15 republics. The Supreme Soviet, which meets twice a year in the Kremlin, can raise and debate issues, and hence may affect the decisions of the Central Committee. Officials claim that the general attitudes of a newly elected Supreme Soviet sometimes influence the Politburo. But the legislators would never advocate a position known to be at variance with the views of the leadership. Indeed, members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet often also belong to the Central Committee.

The Soviet masses who are not party members can work through local organizations, such as trade "unions" and newspapers, to influence policy; but these too are controlled by the party. The Supreme Soviet is elected every five years; there is just one slate of candidates: the party's. In March 1979, when the Supreme Soviet was last chosen, 99.99% of the eligible voters were said to have cast their ballots. TASS, the Soviet news agency, declared: "By their unanimous voting for the candidates, the Soviet people expressed complete support for the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet state."

At its most macabre, this law-and-order sentiment has crystallized as scattered nostalgia for Stalin. Postcard-size photographs of the dictator sometimes decorate the windshields of trucks and taxis. Seeing Stalin's picture in a book, over the shoulder of a Westerner, a Russian woman in her 50s sighed, "Ah, there was a real man, a real leader!"

Another reason for the Soviets' basic acceptance of their lot is that despite all the discontents and deprivations, their standard of living has unquestionably improved. Says a Moscow housewife: "You have to remember where we started. After the war, my mother had to get water from the courtyard, then heat it on a kerosene stove, shave the soap and do the washing on a washboard. Now we have hot running water."

She, like most of her compatriots, wants to be proud of her country. She clings to the notion—which official propaganda does everything it can to encourage—that the Soviet Union is as good as any other country, or at least if it lags behind in some ways, then that is because the world is a dangerous place and the U.S.S.R. must look first to its defenses.

Soviet love of country has an elemental quality that transcends politics and ideology. As patriots, Soviet citizens tend to be fundamentalists—and very forgiving ones where the sins of their father figures are concerned. Even after the horrors of Stalinism, they are much less inclined than other peoples —notably including Americans —to question the basic virtue of their nation or to question their rulers' commitment to peace. It is difficult to imagine the U.S.S.R. undergoing the sort of national paroxysm of self-doubt, self-criticism and self-flagellation that gripped the U.S. during the Viet Nam War.

Most Soviets instinctively share their leaders' professed nightmare of "encirclement by our enemies." Even without the reminders of official propaganda, many citizens vividly remember the devastating horror of World War II, in which 20 million Soviets died. "The Great Patriotic War" is a deep, painful wound that has yet to heal. In conversations with Westerners about current events and the danger of World War III, Soviets often run through an honor roll of long-dead relatives "who never returned from the front." At a concert in the theater of Moscow's Rossiya Hotel, Soviet Baritone Joseph Kobzon brought an audience of 3,000—many of them wearing campaign medals—to tears with patriotic ballads. Behind him, a giant screen showed scenes of starvation during the siege of Leningrad, the carnage of the Battle of Stalingrad, and the ecstatic trainside reunions of homecoming soldiers with their loved ones.

SOVFOTO

Muezzin Gamid Javadov calling Muslim believers to prayers in Baku

Tolerance as Islamic militancy rises on the borders.

Almost every city and town has an exquisitely landscaped, monumentally columned shrine to local war dead. The eternal flame is sometimes guarded by smartly uniformed teen-agers, frequently girls, who often carry Kalashnikov assault rifles. Memory of the war easily translates into public willingness to make economic sacrifices for the sake of military preparedness.

Soviet policy toward both the world outside and the U.S.S.R.'s own ethnic minorities is deeply rooted in long-standing Russian xenophobia. Over the centuries, the Russians beat back wave after wave of foreign invaders, absorbing some but seeking to ward off others by the continual concentric accretion of buffer territory around the core of Muscovy. At the center of Muscovy—Moscow. At the center of Moscow—the Kremlin. The very word means fortress.

This historical experience left the nation with a deep-seated sense of embattled vulnerability—insecurity in the face of Asiatic hordes to the east, inferiority in the face of more sophisticated, more cohesive European civilizations to the west. Other legacies are a faith in strong armed forces and weak neighbors, and a reliance on institutionalized distrust in the form of an all-powerful secret police.

Despite the fact that he was a Georgian who never learned to speak Russian without a heavy accent, Stalin succeeded in consolidating the most formidable tyranny of all time, partly because he made himself the guardian of Mother Russia in the face of real and perceived foreign enemies. Since then, the U.S.S.R. has made a fetish out of strengthening its military defenses against external challenges.

But Stalin's successors have yet to deal with a burgeoning internal threat to fortress-Moscow. This is the growth of national pride and self-assertion on the part of non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Their awakened nationalism now competes with the Russian nationalism that has underlain the country's highly defensive brand of patriotism for more than 60 years. Because of high birth rates in many of the non-Slavic regions of the U.S.S.R. and their own virtual zero population growth, Russians now constitute only 52.4% of the citizenry. By the end of the century they will themselves be a minority of the entire population.

This demographic time bomb is ticking away slowly inside the Soviet economy. Further industrialization is increasingly vital to Soviet economic progress; most factories, however, are in the western part of the country, while in largely undeveloped Central Asia overpopulation is accompanied by underemployment. So far, Soviet economic planners have not come up with a way of moving either the industrial base or the growing work force so as to bring them together.

The prospect of a Soviet Union in which non-Russians outnumber Russians has prompted some reactionary impulses among the old men of the Kremlin, who believe deeply in the fundamental Russianness of the country. The innocuous-sounding but powerful All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments has served increasingly as an outlet for an officially sanctioned resurgence of Slavophilism. Many top officers of the armed forces worry about non-Russians some day dominating the military. This fear has contributed to the growth of a mystery-shrouded fraternal society called Rodina (the Motherland), which has come perilously close to crossing the boundary from Soviet patriotism to Russian chauvinism.

Even among fellow Slavs there are sharp tensions. Russians tend to regard Ukrainians as ne'er-do-well country cousins, an attitude that Ukrainians, with their distinct cultural traditions and strong ethnic pride, resent and resist. Out of deference to their numbers—42 million, the second largest nationality—the Soviet leadership has sought to create a limited partnership with the Ukrainians. They are the only non-Russians to have significant representation in the central elite.

Meanwhile, in the urban areas of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Russian is steadily encroaching on native languages among young people. They have the option of attending classes

Worker in a machine-tool manufacturing plant in Georgia

taught in local languages, but they know—and their parents know—that upward and outward mobility in Soviet society depends on being able to converse fluently with a Muscovite. In Frunze, capital of the Central Asian republic of Kirgizia, middle-aged government officials speak heavily accented Russian; occasionally they need help in translating expressions from their native language, which is related to Turkish.

In the provinces, visiting Russians are still toasted as "our respected elder brothers," but Soviet propaganda plays skillfully on the theme that the country as a whole—the entire brotherhood of nationalities—is doing spectacular things in the world, and that all ethnic groups are benefiting. Says Harvard Professor Adam Ulam: "There is a consciousness of national greatness, a sense that the Soviet Union is now one of the two superpowers, that its influence is rising while the West's is declining. Psychologically, that has been a very strong factor in the average Soviet's attitude toward the regime. He is conscious of his prestige in the world."

Will Moscow's two-track policy of Russification and Sovietization enable the U.S.S.R. to survive as the world's last multinational empire? Some Western experts, with more than a touch of wishful thinking in their speculation, predict that the U.S.S.R. will come apart along its Muslim seams in the south and east. Others, including National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, also look for trouble in Eastern Europe, particularly in Brzezinski's native Poland. Columbia University's Seweryn Bialer agrees. Until now, he says, the Soviets have been fortunate that uprisings have broken out in only one country at a time in Eastern Europe—East Germany, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968. "They will not be so lucky in the '80s," he predicts.

At the moment, however, there are no signs that any unrest is getting out of control, nor would a fresh outbreak of trouble necessarily threaten to break up the empire. In Eastern Europe the presence of 31 divisions of Soviet troops discourages excessive independence or disorder, such as the food-price riots that rocked Poland in 1970. There are also garrisons outside the capitals of the Central Asian republics. The soldiers stationed there, in the main, are from other parts of the country rather than local boys; if they were ever ordered to quash an uprising, they would not be firing on their ethnic kinsmen.

There were scattered but serious anti-Russian riots by the Uzbeks of Tashkent in 1966 and 1969 and the Tadzhiks of Dushanbe in 1978. In those cases, the Soviet army garrisons outside those cities were put on alert and used for crowd control. A U.S. Government Kremlinologist has hypothesized that if it were not for the presence of Moscow's military and security forces, as many as seven of the 15 Soviet republics would exercise their constitutional right to secede from the U.S.S.R.

But it is not just force of arms that keeps the union whole. The central government has deliberately pursued a policy of relative permissiveness toward Islamic culture, which unites about 43 million Soviet citizens, nearly one-sixth of the total population. Since Lenin's time, the Kremlin has been sensitive to the danger that heavyhanded atheistic propaganda and cultural repression might trigger a replay of the 1916 Muslim revolts that broke out against the Tsar in Central Asia. With Islamic militancy embroiling the Soviet Union's southern neighbors, from Turkey to Pakistan, the Kremlin leadership is treading carefully lest it stir up restlessness among its own Muslims.

Officials insist that Marxism-Leninism respects the separation of mosque and state. Religion, they say, must be given a chance to die a natural death; they will do nothing to hurry it along. Nonetheless, Khelyam Khudaiberdiyev, an official of Uzbekistan's radio and television station in Tashkent, insists that "only one in 100 of us is a practicing believer.* In a big family, there might be an old aunt who will still pray. My mother prays, for instance. She's 80." Salyk Zimanov, a member of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan, sums up the official view, with its overtones of condescension: "Religion seems to exercise its strongest influence at funerals. That's when these people who call themselves mullahs turn out."

Zimanov may miss the point of his own observation: a cultural or spiritual force that is strongest in society when people deal with death is not necessarily a dying force. Perhaps the contrary. In Central Asia, local authorities have tried to give military funerals to soldiers killed in action against the Afghan rebels; on

*There are no reliable figures on religious observance in the U.S.S.R., but in their own propaganda pamphlets, printed in Arabic for distribution in Islamic countries of the Middle East, Soviet authorities claim that more than half of the country's Muslims are believers. That statistic may be an exaggeration, intended to enhance the Soviet claims of religious tolerance, but the percentage of practicing Muslims is certainly many times greater than 1%.

A phalanx of humming generators in a hydroelectric plant in Bratsk, Siberia

An advanced, and still advancing, society of human and natural richness.

Lenin's portrait—and legacy—looms over the meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in the Kremlin's Palace

a few occasions, these attempts met with violent resistance by villagers who wanted their sons buried according to Islamic custom, not the dictates of the state. The authorities moved quickly to hush up the incidents.

In addition to treading carefully in its policies toward Islam, the regime has also tried to neutralize anti-Russian sentiment by buying off the populations of Transcaucasia and Central Asia with material benefits and protection. The citizens of Soviet Azerbaijan live more prosperously, and certainly more calmly, than their ethnic cousins in the northwestern provinces of Iran. The Muslim groups that straddle the Sino-Soviet border, for example, have traditionally fared somewhat better under Moscow's tutelage than Peking's. The Russians' fast-approaching status as a minority in their own country forces them to be more compromising than the Han Chinese, who make up more than 90% of the 1 billion citizens of the People's Republic.

Largely because of its huge population—four times that of the U.S.S.R.—China remains an obsession with the Soviets. When Kremlin leaders look to the east, they see two nightmares coming together: their most numerous and implacable foreign enemies in China, and the demographic challenge of their fast-breeding, ethnically alien compatriots in Central Asia. It is for this reason that the most intense manifestation of Russian xenophobia is Sinophobia. On the streets of Moscow, for example, the occasional Chinese visitor inspires something palpably different from and deeper than the resentment that Muscovites display toward the thousands of Third World exchange students who attend Patrice Lumumba Friendship of Peoples University. Those foreigners are unpopular because they have access to hard-currency stores, and because of their comparatively generous government stipends and their notoriety as black marketeers. On a bus or a metro car, a dark-skinned foreigner will often hear someone behind him muttering *"Chernomazy"* (literally blackface, but every bit as insulting as "nigger").

Orientals, however, inspire a reaction that is tinged not just with racism but with fear. Vietnamese, Koreans, Mongolians, and even Soviet Central Asians often find that early in a conversation with Russians they have to establish clearly that they are not Chinese, or pro-Chinese, before their hosts lower their guard. Says a young Muscovite: "When we see yellow skin and slanted eyes, we automatically want to know, is this guy *nash* [one of ours]? Is he on our side?" If an American talks international politics with a Russian, the subject of China is sure to come up. Sooner or later, the Russian is likely to lean forward and say, almost in so many words, "We white folks have got to stick together."

Soviets of all nationalities seem more offended by Washington's increasing cooperation with China than by the Olympic boycott, the grain embargo, or any of the other post-Afghanistan anti-Soviet policies of the Carter Administration.

Yet for all their fear of the Chinese and their anger at the American tilt toward Peking, Soviets appear somewhat more sanguine about their ability to contain what some still call "the yellow peril" than they did a decade ago. Says Alexander Yakovlev, a leading Sinologist at Moscow's Institute for the Study of the Far East: "China does not have the military strength to threaten world peace on its own, and even the military and economic aid of the U.S. and other Western countries will not make a big difference."

MEYER

Politburo leaders: Kirilenko, Suslov, Brezhnev; second row, Pelshe, Victor Grishin, Nikolai Tikhonov; third row, Romanov, Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko

No matter how self-serving and dubious, such predictions indicate a new confidence that has come with the U.S.S.R.'s recent attainment of superpower status. That accomplishment has been largely the work of Leonid Brezhnev and his comrades. When the present collective leadership took over from Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviet armed forces lagged behind the U.S. in every important category of strategic weaponry. Now they have caught up across the board and pulled ahead in some areas.

This fact reinforces the average Soviet citizen's patriotism, even if he is otherwise apolitical. Says Harvard's Ulam: "The Soviet patriot believes that the function of the state is to be as powerful as possible. He remembers that tsarist Russia was defeated in World War I; now his country is one of the two greatest influences in the entire world. This is a sort of surrogate for his sufferings. Whatever else it has done to him, Communism has made Russia a much more powerful country."

Brezhnev and his comrades, moreover, have accomplished the buildup without resorting to mass terror or wholesale purges. They have presided over 16 years of political stability—"the first such period since the revolution," says British Historian Leonard Schapiro. Nikita Khrushchev, while a much more sympathetic figure in many ways, ordered reforms one day, crackdowns the next, and engaged, as his comrades-turned-usurpers charged, in "hare-brained schemes." His was a manic-depressive leadership. Before him were 25 years of Stalin's government by massacre. The toll: at least 20 million dead in camps, prisons and famines. Before that, the civil war, the revolution, and centuries of upheaval under the Tsars.

The Brezhnev leadership has, for a while at least, brought some order to the turmoil of Soviet history. For that it almost certainly gets credit with much of the populace. To be sure, the present leaders have not found a way to keep meat in the grocery stores or underwear in the department stores. Nor have they loosened the reins of repression during the past 16 years. At the same time, however, material conditions are easier, and life has settled into a consistent, predictable norm that avoids the extremes of Khrushchev's erratic liberalization and Stalin's relentless terror. For many Soviets, that is reassuring, especially against the backdrop of their country's new prestige and power abroad.

The Soviet leaders claim to be the custodians of a great revolutionary tradition. Nothing could be further from the truth. They are among the most conservative leaders on earth, and their conservatism is basically compatible with the aspirations of a people whose lives have been torn apart at regular intervals throughout their history. Soviet foreign policy, with all its unabashed sponsorship of radicals and "wars of national liberation," is essentially a means of keeping the U.S.S.R.'s enemies off balance if not under control and thus making the world safe for Soviet Communism. That same motive lay behind the invasion of Afghanistan in December.

The hallmark of the Brezhnev leadership has been to combine an expansive foreign policy, a formidable military buildup and a period of sustained domestic political stability. Says Columbia's Bialer: "I see the 1960s and '70s as a very benign period in Soviet history. It is quite possible that future historians will say this was the greatest, the best period in their history. It was a society that for the first time was able to provide both guns and butter, to raise the standard of living a bit, and to reach military equality with the West. They had many problems, but none that developed into a systemic crisis. Therefore it has been generally an extraordinarily successful period in their history. Nor has it been a short period. Brezhnev has been in office longer than Roosevelt was. It is a whole era."

Nonetheless, the Brezhnev leadership has not prepared well either for a transfer of power at the top or for the future of the society as a whole. Sensing that failing, many Soviets are fearful that there may be harder days ahead. Reports TIME Correspondent Nelan: "Government officials admit privately that the economy is a mess, that things are unquestionably going to get worse. There is an atmosphere of apprehension. Everyone is waiting to see what will come after the present aging, ill and inflexible oligarchy passes from the scene. The hope is for more dynamism—if not after Brezhnev himself, then after an interim, transitional successor. But that is only a hope."

The odds are against such hopes being realized. One reason is that the present leadership and the leadership system as a whole work against dynamism. A management team that cannot, or will not, transfer power to a younger generation of executives except by the attrition of mortality is by definition guilty of mismanagement. The Brezhnev Politburo is like an aging board of directors that has no compulsory retirement policy, no adequate pension plan and no tradition of honoring emeritus directors. So each board member hangs on and on, becoming increasingly shortsighted as he becomes increasingly sclerotic. Such a corporation, no matter how large and powerful, would not recommend itself as a long-term investment. There is no reason to expect that the members of the post-Brezhnev leadership, or the one after that, will reform the gerontocracy once they have risen to the top.

SOVFOTO

Brezhnev being awarded the Lenin Peace Prize on March 3

Credit from the populace for bringing order to turmoil.

Whatever its other accomplishments, the Brezhnev leadership has done nothing to ameliorate the problems of excessive centralization in economic planning, of the stagnation and proliferation of bureaucracy and of political patronage that rewards sycophancy and caution while discouraging innovation. These facts of Soviet life, which have stifled dynamism for decades, are now more deeply embedded in the system than ever. Inefficiency and inflexibility have been institutionalized, not just in the economy but in the political system itself.

Curing that problem would almost certainly mean making drastic changes in the very structure of Soviet society, as well as in its ideological foundations. To do so would require a degree of foresight and boldness that, up until now, the system has suppressed, and it would risk unleashing sudden, unpredictable change and upheaval in a country where both are anathema.

Nevertheless, for all their hankering after order and continuity, the Russians have surprised the world, and themselves, before. They could do so again. It was in the context of an admission of his inability to "forecast to you the actions" of the U.S.S.R. that Winston Churchill made his famous statement in 1939: "Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Less well remembered but equally trenchant was what he said next: "But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." Four decades later, the U.S.S.R. is still enigmatic, even—perhaps especially—to itself; and it is still trying to unlock the enigma of its own future by figuring out where its interests lie. ■

Moscow's Military Machine

An elite officer corps, and all the conscripts an army could want

It is a ritual as regular as the seasons. On one day every spring and autumn, railway stations across the Soviet Union are festooned with patriotic banners, bands blare stirring martial rhythms, and local dignitaries make speeches praising soldierly virtues. Then, as crowds of tearful friends and relatives wave farewell, anxious young men climb aboard the waiting train: they are the current crop of 18-year-old Soviet draftees—about 1 million a year—heading off to begin their military service. After basic training and indoctrination at the camps, invariably hundreds of miles from their birthplaces, they will take a solemn oath to defend the motherland "with all my strength and in honor, without sparing my blood and without regard for my life."

PHOTOREPORTERS

An honor guard of air force cadets braces smartly at Moscow's airport

"You are urged to appear," says the postcard from the draft board.

With this vow, they formally become part of one of their country's most important institutions. The role played in World War II by what was then called the Red Army as savior of the motherland is still vividly remembered and celebrated. Military themes pervade Soviet literature, cinema and television. Beyond that, the might of the Kremlin's military juggernaut alone gives the Soviet Union legitimate claim to superpower rank. There is much pride but little exaggeration in the statement by Moscow's Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov that "the Soviet military has everything it needs to fulfill worthily its sacred mission . . . The Soviet Union has the military capability to complement its foreign policy."

In the critical area of strategic weaponry, the Soviets now enjoy, overall, what some experts call "essential equivalence" with the U.S. SALT II will not affect Moscow's numerical lead in several categories. The U.S.S.R. is ahead 1,398 *vs.* 1,054 in intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, 950 *vs.* 656 in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and an estimated 7,836 *vs* 3,253 in megatonnage, an important measure of a nuclear arsenal's sheer destructive force.

Soviet conventional military muscle is equally impressive. While the U.S. and many of its NATO allies have been trimming their armed forces for the past decade, the Soviets have been expanding theirs. As a result, their 3.6 million-man active force is nearly twice the size of the U.S. military and second in the world only to China's 4.4 million. During the past decade, the Soviet tank force has grown by 35%, artillery by 40%, fixed-wing tactical aircraft by 20%. On average, one new medium-range SS-20 mobile missile system, with three warheads, is deployed every week. Twenty new warships are delivered to the Soviet navy every year, *vs* twelve for the U.S. in 1979.

While Moscow's ever enlarging arsenal is expensive, its military manpower is relatively cheap, accounting for less than 30% of defense spending. By contrast, personnel costs devour 53.4% of the $131 billion U.S. military budget. Moscow's source of cheap manpower: conscription. Every Soviet male must register with his local draft board at age 17. A year later, under the Universal Military Service Law of 1967, he receives an official postcard that simply states, "You are urged to appear" at an induction center. Those who fail to do so without a legitimate excuse are subject to arrest and face up to ten years of hard labor. Understandably, draft dodging is very rare.

When reporting for service, the draftee is channeled into a military branch. Though he can indicate his preference, he must accept the draft board's decision. Generally, those with good records and the highest intelligence are sent to the air force, the strategic rocket forces or the navy. Non-Slavs, however, are usually excluded from these elite units. Says Rand Corporation Analyst S. Enders Wimbush: "Soldiers are clearly recruited in a way that reflects the worries of society. The average Russian citizen and Soviet decision maker have questions about the allegiance of the non-Slav, especially the Central Asian." Typically, ethnic minority draftees are sent to construction battalions, as are minor criminals, political dissidents and those who barely pass the physical and mental examinations. These battalions often work in remote, harsh regions of the country.

The Soviet navy demands three years of service; army and air force draftees spend two years in uniform. Although women are not being conscripted, an estimated 10,000 volunteers now serve in such noncombat roles as nurse and clerk. Only about 12% of Soviet males escape military service. Many of these fall below the armed forces' physical and mental standards; others are given hardship waivers to stay home and support infirm parents or wives. Some Western experts believe that it is relatively easy for university students to avoid active military service. Technically, however, every able-bodied male at a university or other advanced institution is supposed to take reserve officer training and become a junior lieutenant at graduation. After serving six months in uniform, they enter the active reserves and undergo frequent retraining. All Soviet males have some reserve obligations until age 50 and are periodically called back into uniform.

After two months of basic training that is similar to U.S. boot camp, the draftees join their assigned active units. They have already received extensive paramilitary preparation. Before draft age, all Soviet males are given 140 hours of military training at school or work. The armed services, moreover, sponsor voluntary organizations whose activities have military application. Among them are sports clubs that specialize in marksmanship, grenade throwing, navigating and parachuting.

The life of the Soviet draftee is not easy. Indeed, Soviet authorities often justify its harshness by citing the famed 18th century Russian General Alexander Suvorov, who said: "Difficult in training, easy in battle."

Suvorov would probably be pleased with today's Soviet military. The typical barracks is a long two-story wooden hut with beds so crammed together that they touch. The soldier's only token of privacy is a small wooden locker in which he keeps his uniform, two sets of underwear, shaving gear, a toothbrush and a few other permitted personal items, such as photos and letters. Latrines are often no more

than a row of holes in the ground. Hot water is rare and usually saved for "sanitary day," when troops take their once-a-week shower. One hygienic measure that is rigorously enforced: draftees' heads are clean-shaven. Among other advantages, the young troops are easy to spot off base.

Cabbage, potatoes, macaroni, *kasha* (cooked buckwheat), bread, fish, tea and a bit of meat normally make up the draftees' diet. On special holidays, fruit and jam are added. The troops down their fare quickly. Reason: The last to finish must clean the mess-hall table. Soviet draftees have little chance for female contact. While they can leave base one day each month, many do not do so, because the nearest village is often beyond walking distance. Longer furloughs are granted only as a special favor or for emergency reasons. On rare occasions, a divisional command may organize "social evenings" and bring prostitutes onto the base.

Between 6 a.m. reveille and 10 p.m. lights out, the conscript normally has about two hours of free time. One familiar escape from boredom and routine is alcohol. Buying liquor, however, is difficult. Draftees earn a mere four rubles a month (about $6), enough for 13 bottles of beer or a third of a liter of vodka or a dozen packs of cigarettes. Because draftees are short of cash, the Soviet military has a theft problem. Auto parts, grease, rope, felt boots, heavy overcoats and other items in short supply for civilians are smuggled off base to nearby villages and sold or bartered for liquor. Soviet soldiers are as adept as their counterparts elsewhere in the world at concocting an alcoholic brew from such unusual sources as after-shave lotion, brake fluid, plane deicer and even shoe polish.

Less than 6% of the recruits decide to remain in uniform beyond their draft term. The backbone of the Soviet military, as in most nations, is its corps of 400,000 commissioned officers and 1 million noncoms. The gulf between draftee and officer is enormous. NCOs live with their families in relatively comfortable housing either on or off base, shop in commissaries carrying special food and goods and have one month of vacation each year. They earn comparatively high wages; the Soviet equivalent of a staff sergeant with ten years of experience makes 60 rubles ($90) a month—roughly what a high school teacher is paid.

Commissioned officers do even better and rank higher in prestige than lawyers and doctors. An army senior lieutenant with three years of service makes about 150 rubles monthly. A colonel's 500 rubles a month is roughly equal to the earnings of a factory manager; the 48 marshals and fleet admirals of the Soviet Union are paid 2,000 rubles monthly, about the same as a Cabinet minister. More important than salary, however, is the officers' access to luxuries unavailable to most Soviet citizens. Officers enjoy free annual vacations at exclusive resorts, top-quality housing and privileges at shops that carry scarce imported foods.

Potential career officers are recruited when still in high school. After passing a difficult written examination and two interviews, they enroll for five years in one of the Soviet Union's more than 150 military colleges. At graduation they become junior lieutenants. All eventually join the Communist Party and are expected to remain in uniform throughout their professional careers, even if repeatedly passed over for promotion. The best officers are sent to one of the U.S.S.R.'s eleven general staff colleges for up to three years of advanced training. Graduates of these institutes are much respected by their peers in the West. Says a West German defense expert: "In theory, strategy and tactics, Soviet military training is top grade." Especially admired are the senior commanders, such as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, 62, the Chief of Staff, and Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, 70, Commander of the Navy. Says Kremlinologist John Erickson, director of defense studies at the University of Edinburgh: "They are very able, very tough and on a par with the best military brains in the West."

In a special group, without counterparts in the West, are the estimated 100,000 *zampolit*, or political officers. Assigned to every unit down to the company level, they are responsible for indoctrinating the troops with Communist Party ideology. They give lectures on patriotic duties, recite editorials from the Soviet press, stage amateur theatricals and lead excursions to local war memorials and battlegrounds. One other important task: reporting on the political reliability of their fellow officers and the enlisted men.

In Stalin's day, political commissars could countermand the orders of line officers. This is no longer true, but the party still dominates the military. No professional soldier serves on either the Politburo or the Central Committee's powerful Secretariat. (Defense Minister Ustinov's primary military experience was managing defense-related industries.) Not that the military is without clout. There appears to be a symbiotic relationship between the military and the party leadership that Rand Corporation Expert Benjamin Lambeth sums up as a "mutual accommodation in which the military accepts the legitimacy of the party's supremacy in return for getting resources for force development."

The Soviet military faces some problems that could impair its capabilities in extended combat. One difficulty is mounting ethnic tension as more non-Slavic minorities join the ranks. Name-calling is common and fights are frequent. Another problem is the reluctance of Soviet officers to take initiative. They have been trained to prize iron discipline, they believe in conformity to a highly centralized command system, and—above all—they follow orders. But on a modern battlefield, communications can easily be cut and unit formations disrupted. Under these conditions, Soviet officers might not be able to take advantage of sudden opportunities and improvise winning tactics.

Despite these problems, the Soviet military is likely to become even more formidable in the '80s. If nothing else, it is gaining its first intensive combat experience since World War II in trying to quash guerrilla opposition in Afghanistan. Although it now appears that Soviet forces are having more trouble than they probably anticipated, Western military experts believe that the initial invasion was an impressive military operation. The Soviet forces, which were commanded by Marshal Sergei Sokolov, 68, demonstrated that they had mastered the techniques of airlifting enormous quantities of men and supplies, coordinating air and ground attacks, and controlling the action on a distant battlefield via complicated satellite communications systems. And, as the U.S. did in Viet Nam, the Soviet command is battle-testing its weapons and officers. Assessing the Afghan invasion, Edinburgh's Erickson says, "If Brezhnev had asked the general staff back in 1973: 'Can you carry off such a campaign?' the answer would have been no. Now the general staff says, 'We can.' This is a development that the Western alliance can ignore only at its peril." ■

S. CHOV—SIPA BLACK STAR

Young trainees hustling through a drill during their session in boot camp

What Ever Happened to Détente?

Eyeball to eyeball with the bad news bears

Détente means the relaxation of tensions between nations. By that definition, the détente era in Soviet-American relations is over. Since Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan in December, Washington's policy toward Moscow has been almost exclusively punitive: a boycott of the Olympics, a partial embargo on grain sales, tightened restrictions on high-technology exports. The SALT II treaty that Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed a year ago this week may die on the Senate shelf. After more than a month in office, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie has yet to meet with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. Muskie did meet on May 16 with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Vienna, but their exchange consisted largely of reviewing mutual recriminations. Each side has a long list of charges against the other.

Beyond the immediate points of contention, anti-Soviet opinion in the U.S. has crystallized around three general, related concerns: first, the U.S.S.R. continues to build up its military capability beyond levels that seem justified by the legitimate need to defend itself; second, it has begun in recent years brazenly and disruptively to project its power into the Third World; and third, Soviet encroachments in mineral-rich Africa, the oil-rich Middle East and the sea lanes of the Pacific threaten the vital economic interests of the Western democracies and Japan. The Soviet Union is seen as exploiting—if not actually instigating—new problems for the capitalist world. "The Soviet tendency in recent years to take advantage of targets of opportunity—incrementally, deliberately, persistently—raises questions in Congress and among the public about the U.S.S.R.'s commitment to détente," Muskie told TIME last week. "It raises questions whether they really share our perception about the world, whether they believe in domination or coexistence."

Soviet-American relations have been on a downward slide since 1974, when Richard Nixon resigned over Watergate —an event that some Soviets still regard as part of a sinister plot by American hard-liners to unseat a President who then favored a policy of accommodation with the U.S.S.R. Those relations fell off a cliff when Jimmy Carter became President. Looking back over the past 3½ years, Soviets launch into a long, angry, but obviously one-sided litany of grievances: the President's letter to dissident Physicist Andrei Sakharov barely three weeks into Carter's presidency; Carter's ill-fated —and ill-considered—opening move in SALT, which would have required drastic reductions in the Soviet arsenal; his unseemly rush to normalize diplomatic relations with Peking, grant China most-favored-nation status and sell it military equipment; his saber rattling over the belated discovery last August of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

As an overall complaint, the Soviets say the Carter Administration has been guilty of "vacillation and inconsistency," of shifting policies and switching signals. "The present leadership in Washington has never adopted one line to which we could adjust or respond," says a Soviet diplomat, echoing a view shared by many critics of the Administration in Western Europe and the U.S. The Soviets are especially bitter over one shift in Carter's policy. They say he deliberately tricked the U.S.S.R. into thinking that it might be a diplomatic partner in the Middle East. In the fall of 1977, a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the Middle East was finally scrapped after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's surprise initiative toward Israel. Carter then launched the Camp David process. In the Soviet view, the U.S. was deliberately excluding the U.S.S.R. from the mediation in order to deprive it of credit and influence.

SIMON—GAMMA LIAISON

Carter and Brezhnev at 1979 meeting to sign SALT II

The need next time is to blink simultaneously.

Of all the Carter Administration's military moves, the Kremlin objects most to the decision last year to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe to counter Soviet rockets aimed at the West. Says Oleg Bykov, a top specialist on the U.S. at Moscow's Institute of World Economics and International Relations: "That decision epitomizes the fact that negative forces have got the upper hand in the U.S. Those weapons are targeted on our territory."

The Soviets accuse the U.S. of insensitivity to their legitimate security interests, and they claim that those interests are endangered by the new mood of militancy in the U.S. "Your desire to control the oil-producing areas of the world is driving a frantic effort to enlist other countries in this region to that goal," says Bykov. "What is so often forgotten in the U.S. is that for us, that area is on our doorstep. The situation is similar to what might arise south of the Rio Grande; America would certainly be sensitive to instability on its borders."

In other words, the Kremlin argues that it would be more tolerant of a U.S. invasion of Mexico than the Carter Administration has been over the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan. What is officially euphemized in Moscow as "the recent events in Afghanistan" is, according to Bykov, "a peripheral issue that exacerbates the overall strained relationship between our countries."

Afghanistan, however, is clearly anything but peripheral. By their virtual annexation of the country, the Soviets have made its fate central to their most fundamental disagreement with the U.S. At issue: What rules should govern the rivalry now that the U.S.S.R. has emerged as a true superpower, coequal with the U.S. in military might?

That question has arisen only in the past few years, as the U.S.S.R. has caught up with the U.S. in the accumulation of weapons that would be used if the two countries ever went to war with each other. From Moscow's viewpoint, the question was given particular force by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when John Kennedy faced down Nikita Khrushchev and forced him to remove Soviet rockets from the island. A relieved Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State, added a memorable phrase to the annals of diplomacy when he commented at the time: "We were eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked."

An aide to Brezhnev told TIME that the party chief came to office in 1964 mindful of one lesson learned from the missile crisis—namely that the Soviet Union must pursue "a lessening of tensions" with the U.S. On the other hand, the humiliation of having seen their country accept Kennedy's ultimatum over Cuba made Brezhnev and his comrades, particularly those in the military, vow that never again would the U.S.S.R. blink first. They undertook an all-out campaign to match the U.S. in intercontinental nuclear weaponry, so that the next time a Soviet ruler faced an American President eyeball to eyeball, he would do so as an equal. By the late 1970s Moscow had achieved that goal. For the first time in the long and uneasy relationship between the two nations, there is an approximate balance of strategic might, sometimes called "parity" or "essential equivalence."

At first blush, it might seem paradoxical that the U.S.S.R.'s catching up

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with the U.S. as a superpower should profoundly upset the relationship. After all, strategic equality would seem to be the most logical and equitable basis for peaceful coexistence. Certainly that is what the Soviets say. "The problem with you Americans," asserts an official of Moscow's Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, "is that you can't bring yourself to live with us now that we've finally corrected the imbalance. All this talk about 'the Soviet threat' in your country is nothing more than disguised nostalgia for what you regard as the good old days when you had a monopoly or at least superiority in power."

There has never been anything more offensive than a Russian on the defensive. The Soviet quest for absolute security has, with good reason, generated insecurity on the part of other nations. Will the U.S.S.R. be less paranoid and therefore less predatory now that it has attained the status of superpower? Recent history is not encouraging. The more powerful the Soviets have become in the past two decades, the more they have used their power to aid and abet the forces of violence, instability and radicalism around the world. They have been the bad news bears.

In the Middle East, they are backing terrorists and rejectionists among the Arabs. In Africa, Moscow has often worked against negotiated settlements, urging guerrillas to fight rather than talk—and particularly to fight any regimes that had U.S. backing. Whenever possible, the Soviet Union has tried to convert sponsorship of a "national liberation movement" or a "people's revolution" into subjugation of a country. Afghanistan is only the most recent and flagrant example.

Soviet exertions of power abroad have a seemingly irresistible, irreversible quality that makes them much more threatening to world peace than American adventures. In justifying the occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet spokesmen argue that the U.S. has been deploying its troops, establishing bases and generally throwing its weight around for decades; now that the U.S.S.R. has achieved superpower status, it should be entitled to pursue its interests and protect its national security in similar ways.

"You still assign to yourself a global role and to us a very limited, regional sphere of influence," says a foreign ministry official in Moscow. "Well, you'll have to get over that notion. It's outdated and unjust. We too are now a global power, and we have the right to compete with you on a global scale. That is only fair if we are truly your equals."

That claim ought to be rejected until and unless the Soviet Union shows some sign of agreeing with the U.S. on a joint code of superpower conduct that forbids, or at least inhibits, naked aggression and the exploitation of regional instability. At their summit meeting in Moscow in 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev actually tried to formulate such a code, but it was hopelessly vague and thus catered to the Soviets' love of lofty-sounding principles and giant loopholes. The key phrase in the twelve-point declaration of principles they signed: "Both sides recognize that efforts [by one] to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with" détente. Soviet behavior since then has made a mockery of that pledge.

Raw military power is the principal foreign policy resource of the U.S.S.R., hence its reliance on strong-arm tactics in seeking to influence other countries.

LOCHON—GAMMA LIAISON

Soviet troops and equipment at airfield on the outskirts of Kabul

Deep split over what the Kremlin dismisses as a "peripheral issue."

While the U.S. has dispatched aid missions, Peace Corps volunteers and cultural exhibits, Moscow has mostly sent military advisers. Unlike the U.S., the U.S.S.R. has made little effort to assist Third World countries in economic development.

Spokesmen for official Soviet thinking are at once disillusioned, distrustful and implacably self-righteous about who is to blame for the decline of détente and who, therefore, must make the first move in a joint salvage operation. "It will take years to undo the damage done in the past few months," warns a member of the U.S.A. Institute. Moscow officials say privately that the Politburo's decision to invade Afghanistan was made much easier by three years of "hostile" Carter policies. "We had little to lose," says an expert on foreign affairs in Moscow. "Your Government had long since thrown away all its carrots and reached for every stick in sight."

Robert Legvold, the senior Kremlinologist for the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, returned from a recent visit to the U.S.S.R. deeply discouraged: "There is a sense in Moscow that we may have passed through a watershed and may be entering a long period of tensions. The Soviets recognize that what is now happening between us is of historic proportions. They believe that détente is dead for the foreseeable future. They know that by invading Afghanistan, they buried détente. But in their view it had already been fatally poisoned by the U.S. They refuse to come to terms with their own responsibility for the disintegration of U.S.-Soviet relations."

Nonetheless, there may still be hope for halting that disintegration and restoring some version of détente. The main reason is that it is overwhelmingly in the interests of both sides to do so. Both need peace to survive. Moreover, neither the U.S., with its recession, its dangerous inflation and its need to improve its conventional forces, nor the Soviet Union, with its economic stagnation and mounting consumer demands, can easily afford another round of the strategic arms race, one that would be unfettered by even the modest constraints of SALT.

Says Bykov: "In a world where there are many shifts and realignments, there has got to be more political restraint on the part of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union." Such rhetoric would be more reassuring if the U.S.S.R. were not waging a brutal war against the Afghan people, pouring weapons into the Yemens, and supporting Viet Nam's takeover of Indochina. No wonder there is a resurgence of feeling in the U.S. that the Soviets cannot be trusted. No wonder pro-détente liberals like Muskie are less certain than before that the Kremlin is genuinely committed to peaceful coexistence. The onus of showing more restraint is squarely on the Soviet Union these days.

Until the Soviets modify their behavior, especially in the Third World, it will be virtually impossible to resurrect détente. In the meantime, one task for America is to correct any dangerous gaps that have developed in the Soviet-American military relationship. Another task is to face the Soviets with political firmness and sophistication. That means eventually resuming carrot-and-stick diplomacy—with an effective stick, to be sure, but also with the restoration of those carrots that the Soviets complain have been thrown away. Only thus can the superpowers reverse the vicious cycle of retribution and recrimination that is driving them toward more and worse confrontations. The suspense 18 years ago was who would blink first. The challenge now is for the superpowers to find some way of blinking simultaneously so that they can start looking at where to go from here.

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After Brezhnev: Stormy Weather

A new generation of pragmatists faces tough decisions

It is 63 years since the revolution, and the political leadership of the Soviet Union has still not developed a tradition or institution to assure a smooth transfer of authority. The U.S.S.R. is a nation where supreme power changes hands only through death or coup. Vladimir Lenin's demise was hastened by an assassin's bullet. There is a lingering, but unproven, suspicion that Joseph Stalin was murdered. Georgi Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev were ignominiously ousted from office. What fate is in store for the collective leadership now ruling the U.S.S.R.? Sovietologists agree that the oldsters clustered around President Leonid Brezhnev in the Kremlin will merely succumb to the inexorable logic of the actuarial tables. In the 16 years of Brezhnev's rule the average age of the Politburo has crept forward until it stands this year at 70, thus making the U.S.S.R. one of the oldest gerontocracies in the world.

It is also, of course, one of the most experienced. At a time when Jimmy Carter was a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy (1943-46), virtually every man in the 14-man Politburo was a member of the power elite. Brezhnev was a major general. Andrei Gromyko was Ambassador to the U.S. Today, however, none of these tough, hard-working old leaders is exceptionally robust. Brezhnev, at 73, suffers from several illnesses, including arteriosclerosis. Alexei Kosygin, 76, has had two heart attacks. Dmitri Ustinov, 71, is currently ailing. "When Brezhnev dies the rest of the Politburo will be gone with the wind," says one Soviet bureaucrat.

Though the present rulers will surely not be swept away quite that precipitously, Kremlinologists believe that in the five years following Brezhnev's death, most of the top leadership will be replaced. Every effort will be made to give the impression of an orderly succession. An interim leadership group composed of some of Brezhnev's surviving associates will presumably come to the fore. The immediate successor in Brezhnev's key post as General Secretary of the Communist Party is expected to be Andrei Kirilenko, who is three months older than Brezhnev, but in better health. Another contender for the job of party chief is Konstantin Chernenko, 68; like Kirilenko, he is a longtime Brezhnev supporter. But Chernenko's present low ranking (seventh in the Politburo hierarchy) and his lack of executive experience may rule him out for the top post in an interim government. The most obvious candidate to replace Premier Kosygin is First Deputy Premier Nikolai Tikhonov, 75, who has already assumed many of his boss's functions.

Three Politburo members are excluded as contenders for supreme power because they are not ethnic Russians—an unacknowledged but key qualification for the job of party boss. They are: Vladimir Shcherbitsky, 62, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, 68, and Arvid Pelshe, 81. Others, like Defense Minister Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, 70, and Party Ideologist Mikhail Suslov, 77, would appear to be disqualified because of their narrow specializations. The youngest member of the Politburo, Leningrad Party Boss Grigori Romanov, 57, may be a contender for power in a few years. For the time being, however, he has no political base in Moscow; citizens of the Soviet capital jokingly observe that even his surname, the same as the Russian imperial family's, works against him.

The next government will almost certainly pursue the conservative policies of the Brezhnev era. The leaders, though, will probably make overtures to China in an attempt to repair the 18-year-old Sino-Soviet breach. Meanwhile, thousands of middle-level officials who are now in their 40s and 50s will be jockeying for power behind the scenes. By the late 1980s, if not before, they will have completed the second stage of the inevitable transfer of authority to a new generation. Officials now holding 5,000 to 6,000 top jobs will be replaced. These will include not only members of the Politburo, but also Secretaries, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, ministers and deputy ministers, heads of provincial party organizations, leaders of the republics and chiefs of departments.

Not a great deal is known about these bureaucrats whose background, psychology and views are crucial to the world's future. But some Sovietologists—notably Political Scientist Jerry Hough of Duke—have prepared profiles of the upcoming elite on the basis of education and other significant data. These show that the new leaders will be better schooled than the old rulers, some of whom, like Kirilenko, had no real college education. Others, like Brezhnev, attended the vocational colleges that were characteristic of the 1920s and 1930s. Since the younger men began their careers around the time of Stalin's death in 1953, they are likely to be less fearful and more self-assertive than their predecessors, whose lives were under constant threat from the paranoid dictator. Nearly all the newcomers will have had more exposure to the West.

Some experts doubt that these new leaders will be any more favorably disposed to democratic reforms than their predecessors. In fact, as Soviet planners face tough priority decisions about spending on military *vs.* consumer goods in the economic hard times of the mid-'80s, the leaders may be forced to demand greater discipline and more sacrifices from the population. Such policies will present hazards for any new regime. Soviet elite—members of the party, favored intelligentsia, and so on—could become politically disenchanted with any government that severely restricts their perks. Stiff labor discipline, cutbacks on wage increases and higher prices for consumer staples could lead to popular unrest—as they have in Poland and other East bloc satellites. In sum, the most probable forecast for the Soviet Union's next generation of leaders is stormy weather ahead. ■

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Big Brother Is Everywhere

The KGB is watching, watching, watching every minute

Countless espionage thrillers and spy movies have celebrated its exploits to Soviet citizens. Officers of the organization are regularly awarded the country's highest decorations, and their chief, Yuri Andropov, 66, is a member of the ruling Politburo. Andropov himself has said that a typical member of his agency is "a man of pure honesty and enormous personal courage, implacable in the struggle against enemies, stern in the name of duty, humane and prepared to sacrifice himself for the people's cause." The object of this official adulation is the Committee for State Security—acronym: KGB.

Most Soviet citizens do not share Andropov's high regard for the KGB. They view it with deep distaste and fear, in part because memories are still vivid of the murderous role played by the secret police in Stalin's dreadful purges. Although his successors halted mass terror and greatly reduced the KGB's autonomy, the agency continues to keep stern watch over every aspect of Soviet citizens' lives.

The KGB is the latest acronym for an organization that was founded in 1917 as the Cheka and was successively known as GPU, OGPU, NKVD and MGB. A fief within the Soviet state, the KGB is an intelligence agency, counterintelligence organization and internal security police with its own uniformed military branch. Administratively it is divided into various "directorates" whose number and function are frequently scrambled, partly to confuse rival foreign intelligence services.

The KGB's First Chief Directorate is in charge of the world's largest foreign espionage operation. Says one West German analyst: "It's safe to assume that there's not a place in the world where the KGB does not have its man."

The KGB's top external priority is gathering Western military technology secrets in order to avoid costly parallel research and development at home. A secondary but nonetheless vital concern is the collecting of political intelligence and the manipulation and recruitment of foreigners who might influence their governments' policies. Though the CIA, according to U.S. intelligence specialists, is far superior to the KGB in "comint" and "elint" (communications and electronic intelligence), the Soviets excel in "humint" (intelligence gathering through human contact). This was spectacularly demonstrated in Bonn last year, when West German counterintelligence finally caught up with a KGB agent functioning as a madam. For three years the operative had run a brothel catering to politicians and diplomats from whom she obtained political and military secrets.

For every KGB spy abroad there are five working within the Soviet Union. The Second and Fifth Chief Directorates employ an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 agents who are responsible for domestic security, including operatives assigned to the surveillance of dissidents, foreign students, journalists and diplomats in the U.S.S.R. American security officers who searched the residence of one U.S. diplomat in Moscow in 1978 found 42 microphones.

Western intelligence experts estimate the KGB's present strength at 500,000. Of these, 90,000 are believed to be directly involved in intelligence and counterintelligence work. An estimated 300,000 are uniformed troops responsible for the safety of the country's leaders and the protection of its borders. The other KGB employees perform administrative duties and help run prisons, concentration camps and those psychiatric institutions

SICHOV—SIPA—BLACK STAR

Agents disguised as ordinary police

in which dissidents are often held.

KGB headquarters in Moscow is a grim, gray, seven-story stone building at No. 2 Dzerzhinsky Square; in tsarist times it housed the All-Russian Insurance Co. Behind the headquarters is the most celebrated KGB structure, Lubyanka Prison, through which tens of thousands of Soviet citizens have passed on their way to concentration camps or execution. These probably included three of Stalin's own secret police chiefs—Genrikh Yagoda, Nikolai Yezhov and Lavrenti Beria—who were shot following their fall from power. The KGB has administrative offices in every major center, and KGB officers occupy key posts in the Soviet armed forces and the regular police, as well as in factories, government offices, universities and most other major Soviet institutions.

The day-to-day work of keeping watch over the Soviet people is done by part-time informers, or *stukachi* (squealers), as they are contemptuously called. The system of informants is so pervasive that most Soviets take it for granted that a *stukach* is always near by. At work, a factory laborer may be fired from his job for telling political jokes that an informer has repeated to the head of the personnel department, who is invariably working for the KGB. At home, an apartment dweller knows that his superintendent regularly reports on any unfamiliar visitors he may receive —especially overnight. Pressures on ordinary citizens to turn informer are great. Black marketeers and others arrested for petty crimes are offered freedom from prosecution in exchange for cooperation. Plainclothes KGB operatives take pains to blend in a crowd, but can often be spotted. One giveaway: good shoes on somebody who is otherwise shabbily dressed.

Backing up the *stukachi* network is a gigantic mail and telephone surveillance operation. A Soviet dissident now in exile once ran a test of the KGB's postal monitoring system by sending 100 letters to a West European town from various mailboxes in the U.S.S.R. Only six got through. Selective surveillance of mail and telephone calls has been made much easier in recent years by computers that enable the KGB to monitor specific targets.

Andropov is the first KGB head since Beria to sit on the Politburo. He is a party man, not an agency professional. His most notable previous post: Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, where he helped put down the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Among Andropov's most important functions is to keep the KGB under firm party control so that the secret police can never again wield the power it possessed under Stalin, when it arrested, tortured and killed thousands of loyal party officials.

One highly publicized KGB responsibility is to rid the country of dissenters. Of the 2 million people currently imprisoned in the Soviet penal system, about 10,000 are so-called prisoners of conscience, who have been jailed for their religious, intellectual or political beliefs. In the past year the KGB has employed increasingly sophisticated methods to discredit dissidents; Jewish activists have been charged with speculation and other economic crimes in order to whip up local anti-Semitic feelings.

In the Ukraine, 36 human rights activists have been convicted since 1976 on charges ranging from hooliganism to sexual offenses. In Kiev, both Jewish and Ukrainian activists have been severely beaten by KGB agents. In one celebrated case last year, witnesses say they saw two men force a popular Ukrainian nationalist composer, Volodymyr Ivasiuk, 31, into a KGB car. Three weeks later his body was found hanging from a tree; his eyes had been gouged out. Such acts of brutality—still rare but apparently on the increase—are strictly illegal. The KGB, however, remains capable of acting as a law unto itself. ■

How to Succeed by Really Trying

Caviar and limousines for a Communist nobility

All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.
—George Orwell, *Animal Farm*

Like the inmates of Orwell's barnyard, citizens of the Soviet Union enjoy vastly different degrees of power, privilege and material comfort, despite the country's egalitarian ideals. Soviet Communism has theoretically abolished hereditary classes, but it has neither uprooted the ladder of success nor stifled the urge to scale it. While there are obstacles to social mobility in the Soviet Union, those who make it to the top rely on the same factors that lead to success in the West: education, hard work, talent, connections—even corruption.

At the peak of the social hierarchy is an elite, known as the *nachalstvo* (roughly, the Establishment), which includes perhaps a million people. This privileged group consists of a ruling class —those wielding power in state, party and military circles—and an upper class, comprising party-favored intellectuals, artists and top athletes. Whether they enter this exclusive club via the committee room, the Bolshoi stage or the hockey rink, members of the *nachalstvo* are assured of hidden perks denied to ordinary citizens.

Politburo members and other top political officials, for example, live in exclusive apartment enclaves and speed to work in chauffeur-driven ZIL limousines. Although their salaries are relatively modest, they have little need for money: not only are they housed by the government, they also receive a special Kremlin ration that allows them to feed their families well for a nominal monthly fee of 50 to 70 rubles. (An average family of four in Moscow might spend 180 to 200 rubles a month on food).

These political leaders, along with other Soviet elitists, enjoy the use of country dachas, yachts and Black Sea vacation resorts. While ordinary Soviet citizens queue up for scarce consumer goods, members of what one Soviet journalist calls the "Communist nobility" shop in special stores for caviar, French cognac, Swiss chocolates and Japanese stereo sets. They patronize tailors, hairdressers and cleaners who serve them exclusively. Lesser privileges are enjoyed by thousands of middle-level managers, local party cadres and other important citizens.

One key to advancement is education. By age 15, all Soviet students are slotted into distinct scholastic groups; only one of every five applicants wins entry into one of the country's 63 universities or 800 technical institutes. Competition is especially stiff for the top universities of Moscow and Leningrad and the Institute of Foreign Relations. To help get their children through the rigorous entrance exams, many parents hire private tutors at five rubles ($7.65) an hour. Others bribe admissions officers. In a case reported by *Izvestiya* last month, the woman in charge of a scientific prep school in Tomsk got an eight-year prison sentence for selling admissions. According to *Izvestiya*, she "accepted almost anything as a bribe, from mink coats to pails of berries."

The ambitious young Soviet must also be careful to choose the right profession. Engineers, once revered as the guardians of Soviet technological might, now glut the market. Nuclear physics remains one of the most respected and best-compensated fields. Journalism is another sought-after career; top Soviet reporters can boost their incomes by writing freelance articles and often are able to travel abroad.

For those who aspire to political power, membership in the Communist Party is a must. But the party card alone is no guarantee of success: few of the party's 16.5 million members ever make it into the elite class, just as many privileged citizens in the scientific and cultural fields never join the party. Moreover, party responsibilities are demanding and promotions are slow in coming, since top officials tend to remain at their posts into their 70s or 80s. In general, the aspiring apparatchik must rely on patience, hard work and diligence, plus a certain Dale Carnegie–like skill for flattering and impressing his bosses.

As in most other countries, success in the Soviet Union can depend on family and personal connections. With the right contacts, one has a lot less trouble getting into a top school, landing a good job and winning advancement. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's elder son Yuri, for example, was named First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade last year at the relatively tender age of 47. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's son Anatoli, 48, was appointed director of the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1976. Influence peddling—called *blat* in Russian—prevails at all levels of Soviet society, from the Kremlin down to the local butcher, who can set aside a choice cut of beef for a friend or perhaps his plumber—who will then come and fix his leaking pipes.



"Hello, I've come to ask a favor *on the suggestion of Ivan Ivanovich* *who happens to be my uncle."* *"Please sit down. We'll take care of everything."*

The social stratification that exists in the Soviet Union obviously conflicts with the ideal of equality, which Marx called "the groundwork of Communism." Such an inconsistency was denounced by Yugoslav Dissident Milovan Djilas in his 1957 classic *The New Class*, and elitism ranks high among the ideological sins for which the Chinese condemn the Soviets. Soviet theorists inscrutably justify such inequality as a "nonantagonistic contradiction." Others, including some Marxist dissidents, claim that the system has not really created an elite class, since political power and its direct perquisites cannot be inherited. But there is one flaw in that argument: the ease with which the *nachalstvo* can arrange good educations and careers for their offspring tends to perpetuate their privileged status. Despite the historical gulf that separates them from the prerevolutionary regime, the Communist elitists enjoy their prerogatives as unabashedly—and guard them as jealously—as their tsarist predecessors ever did. ■

Images of a Vast And Varied Land

The "gray monolith" is a kaleidoscope of color

The land is stunning in its immensity. While the mind boggles over facts, images come to the rescue. Consider the schoolgirls above, carrying flowers to Lenin's tomb. Despite their uniforms, they appear anything but collective. The monolithic face that the U.S.S.R. tries to show the world breaks apart before the camera, vanishes into singularities. Photographs belie the grayness that outsiders ascribe to Soviet life. The diagnostic red of the Revolution is here, but the palette is filled with hues: the blue glaze on new-fallen snow, an amber wheatfield at dusk, pink tingeing the cheeks of a young honor guard. To look at such things closely is to follow Dostoyevsky's advice: "Direct the telescope on Russia, and then you will be able to observe us; otherwise you can't really see anything at all."

ДА ЗДРАВСТВУЕТ ЛЕНИНИЗМ-
ЗНАМЯ РЕВОЛЮЦИОННОЙ
БОРЬБЫ, КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОГО
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

A contrast between the old Moscow and the new: at left, the multihued onion-shaped towers of St. Basil's Cathedral in Red Square; on opposite page, a Soviet citizen strolls past huge mural honoring the founder of the U.S.S.R. The message reads: "Long live Leninism, the banner of revolutionary struggle, Communist creativity and peace." Below (from far left): new apartment under construction in Moscow; woman selling cheese at market in Soviet capital; swimmers amid steam of heated pool; Young Pioneers giving patriotic salute

The U.S.S.R. is a land of visual contrasts and ethnic variety. Above, winter scene of house built when Ust-Ilimsk in Siberia was settled in the 1960s. On opposite page, a crowded farmers' market in Kiev, capital of the Ukraine. Below, a family outside their home on a collective farm near Ulan-Ude, Siberia. Faces of the Soviet Union (counterclockwise from left): Kazak metallurgist in Balkhash; Moscow child in traditional Russian headdress; mod youth with transistor radio; young Muscovite lovers; Khevsuri tribeswoman from Georgia; Uzbek girl; mustached Armenian; Moscow fashion model

Pitfalls In the Planning

Industry develops, but growth does not

One joke that Muscovites tell about their economic system involves Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, who are riding a special train. When the engine breaks down, Stalin has the crew shot. Nothing happens. After a while, Khrushchev rehabilitates the engineers. Still no movement. Finally, Brezhnev pulls down the shades and sighs, "Well, let's pretend we are moving."

In recent months Soviet leaders have had a hard time pretending they were moving. After more than half a century of often spectacular progress in building heavy industry, the Soviet economy has slipped into a serious slump. While growth zipped along at 5.3% annually from 1966 to 1970 and was a strong 7.2% as late as 1973, it fell to an almost invisible .7% last year. Steel production, always regarded as a major sign of a healthy Soviet economy, declined by 1.6% last year—the first drop since World War II.

Instead of delivering on its promise to create a workers' paradise with ample material goods for all, Marxism-Leninism as practiced by Moscow has fashioned something of an inertia-bound bureaucracy that limits incentive and suppresses inventiveness. Says Economist Judith Thornton of the University of Washington: "Imagine a whole economy organized and run like the Department of Energy or the Pentagon. Of course, there is a problem. Public organizations work less efficiently than do private ones, which are eliminated if they are not competitive."

The law of the land for the Soviet economy is the national Five-Year Plan. The State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) allocates all investment capital, sets every price and production goal and determines all foreign trade. The plan, which sets policy for some 350,000 enterprises, affects every Soviet citizen. Lawyers must try their quota of cases, barbers must shear so many heads and taxi drivers must log so many miles. The plan determines the amount of raw materials a plant will receive and the number of workers it is assigned; fulfilling the plan's

TELLTALES OF TWO CITIES

Cost of living	New York City	Moscow
Hours worked per week	39.7	42
Manufacturing worker's earnings per week	$265.60	$56.54
Monthly rental 3-room apt.	$1,000	$37
Heat and electricity per month	$82	$4.50
Bus or subway per ride	50¢	8¢
Car	$6,200 (Citation)	$10,000 (Zhiguli)
Gallon of gasoline	$1.35	$1.25
Vodka (1 liter)	$6	$11
Dental checkup	$32	Free
Ballpoint pen	29¢	$1.50
1 lb. chicken	66¢	$2.55
Pack of cigarettes	75¢	52¢
Loaf of bread (1 lb.)	62¢	24¢
Jeans	$18.50	$45
Man's leather shoes	$42	$45
Vacation (2 weeks per person)*	$910	$120
Woman's dress	$90	$60
Sofa	$600	$260
Gold wedding ring	$75	$225
Hard-cover novel	$12.95	$3
Color television	$710 (25-in. screen)	$1,094 (24-in. screen)
Pantyhose	$1.50	$10
Newspaper	25¢ (Daily News)	5¢ (Izvestiya)
Woman's leather shoes	$33	$40

All figures are typical current prices.

* **Vacations:** the New York figure represents a peak season cost with meals at a major Florida resort city; 70% of the Moscow figure is paid by the worker's union.

TIME Chart by Nigel Holmes

quotas is the only economic measuring stick.

Soviet economists would argue that it was only by following government dictates that the country was able to recover from the devastation of World War II. Following massive investments of both capital and labor, agricultural output has risen by an average of 3% annually since 1953. Even though the diet remains starchy and the nation's overburdened and inefficient distribution system produces periodic shortages of everything from pork to potatoes, per capita food consumption has nonetheless more than doubled since 1951, a feat unmatched by any other advanced nation. Industrial growth has also been heady; the Soviet gross national product, a mere 40% of the U.S.'s in 1955, is 60% today.

But Soviet leaders today are having to struggle with new and difficult problems. At the heart of the trouble lies the inability of the system to make better and more efficient use of its plants, factories and technologies. Says Professor Alexander Erlich of Columbia University's Russian Institute: "The Soviet system of overcentralized planning was clearly helpful in the past, when it was just a matter of marshaling large amounts of labor and capital. But now that the situation calls for using what they have more efficiently, the system is simply not working well at all." In the five-year growth plans, production targets are as often as not chosen because they look impressive. The Soviets have, in effect, created an economic system that values the production of 100 clunking, breakdown-prone trucks more highly than that of ten smoothly running ones, simply because the plan demands higher unit production and makes no allowance for quality.

Unlike the capitalist economies of the West, which reward successful risk taking, the Soviet system rewards caution and conformity. Any plant manager who might be interested in experimenting with new ways of doing things runs the risk of failing to meet his assigned production or delivery quota, as traumatic a worry to a Soviet manager as the fear of red ink is to an American corporate executive. Observes Haverford College Sovietologist Holland Hunter: "Everyone finds the traditional way of doing things—no innovation—the most congenial. The supreme challenge is not to rock the boat. New styling or technology would require change, and that would inevitably mean at least some faltering in production."

Examples of Soviet-style conservatism are widespread. The Soviet chemical industry was reportedly unable to replace corrosion-prone cast iron pipes with more up-to-date plastic piping because no factory could be persuaded to make the lighter product. Reason: pipe production quotas are set by GOSPLAN in tons, and any factory that switched from cast iron to plastic pipe output would immediately fall behind in its production quotas.

Though Soviet leaders periodically urge managers and workers to be more efficient, little if anything ever seems to come from such pleas. In 1965 Premier Alexei Kosygin endorsed administrative changes that would have given state firms more authority to initiate plans on their own, enter into direct contracts with their customers, and retain a larger proportion of their profits for investment purposes. But the reforms were eventually watered down so much that they became meaningless. Economic reforms always run into problems because they ultimately involve forbidden political reforms.

Despite an investment of more than



$500 billion, agriculture remains the most troubled sector of the Soviet economy. The nation employs eight times as many farm workers as does the U.S., or about 23% of the entire Soviet work force. The farm sector soaks up about one-quarter of all investment capital, five times more than that spent in the U.S. Yet for all this, actual farm output remains only 80% of the U.S.'s. Says Soviet Economic Expert Gregory Grossman of the University of California at Berkeley: "The organization is wrong, the prices are wrong, the tools are wrong. Basically, everything is wrong."

True, Soviet agriculture is plagued by climatic problems beyond the control of any government. Though the lush fields of the Ukraine produce grain in abundance, much of the country's arable land lies in far northern latitudes, where enormous swings in seasonal temperatures and erratic rainfall can lead to variations of as much as 40% in annual harvest yields. The geographical and climatic problems are compounded by the system's self-inflicted wounds of rule by decree.

Though collectivization is sometimes compared with the spread of so-called agribusiness conglomerates in the U.S., the differences are enormous because workers have little concern about production results on a state farm. Proof: the 2% to 3% of the Soviet Union's farm land that is privately owned produces about 25% of all Soviet agricultural output, primarily vegetables, fruit, milk and meat.

Farm efficiency is further crimped by the scarcity of trained manpower. With more and more young people leaving the farms and heading for factory work in the nation's cities, agricultural output is being left increasingly in the hands of the elderly and the less skilled.

Indeed, shortage of labor is a serious problem for all sectors of the Soviet economy. Employment in industry is now growing at only .7% annually, as compared with 1.8% per year in 1976-78.

When small problems in agriculture or industry fester into large ones, the Soviet bureaucracy revs up huge counterattacks that become economic overkill. Whenever Soviet grain harvests exceed expectations, for example, officials scour the countryside commandeering manpower and trucks from projects that they have to temporarily abandon.

The result is a continuous and inefficient scramble for scarce resources, as planners lurch uncertainly from one high-priority project to the next. One such enterprise is the 2,000-mile-long Baikal-Amur Mainline railway across Siberia. This has become an engineer's nightmare, as any study would have shown. Huge stretches freeze solid in the winter and then become quagmires during summer.

Though the Soviets hunger for Western technological imports like computers and machinery, they have problems marketing their own products to the West in return. The only Soviet exports sold easily abroad, in addition to vodka, are raw materials such as petroleum and gold. Despite attractive prices for Yak-40 passenger jets or Lada cars, Western countries have shown little interest in low-quality, dowdy Soviet merchandise. The Soviets usually are forced to dump their exports on the soft-currency countries of Eastern Europe or the Third World.

After seeing his standard of living rise steadily since World War II and having been promised more to come, the average Soviet citizen now faces the prospect of declining prosperity. Says Abram Bergson, director of Harvard's Russian Research Center: "Over the coming decade, the Soviets will be lucky if the increase in consumer goods is half what it has been lately." The central planning that helped achieve rapid industrialization has become the roadblock to further economic development. ■

Living Conveniently on the Left

A thriving network of hidden entrepreneurs

Yelizaveta Tyntareva, a lawyer living in Vilnius, Lithuania, a few years ago sold her Zhiguli car for 2,000 rubles (about $3,000). She then used that small amount of venture capital to buy so-called deficit goods, consumer articles like sunglasses and wigs that are almost always in short supply and high demand in Soviet shops. As she bought, Tyntareva also sold. Gradually she built up a stock of everything from gold rings, watches, wigs and jeans to velvet suits, umbrellas and cameras. The business prospered; she acquired a regular clientele among Baltic Sea vacationers, hired four assistants, and even set up a mail-order service. Unfortunately, though, Tyntareva was an economic criminal under tough Soviet "speculation" laws. Early this year she was arrested and sentenced to twelve years in prison. The penalty could have been death.



"A trifle large, but still a brand name!"

Tyntareva and her customers were part of the Soviet Union's thriving underground economy. This involves more than just the familiar black marketeers, dealing in Levi's and ballpoint pens, icons and caviar, who greet Western visitors around the main tourist hotels. It is, in fact, a second economy, parallel to the official state-controlled one. In a thriving permanent network, illegal and quasi-legal entrepreneurs, speculators and thieves sell hard-to-get goods and services to workers, peasants and even state officials.

The Soviets call it living *na levo*—"on the left." At its simplest, it is nothing more than passing on to the local butcher tickets for a popular soccer game or concert in return for a good cut of meat; tipping off the plumber about a shipment of shoes that is due to arrive in a shop as payment for fixing a leaking pipe; or holding down a second job as a furniture mover or apartment painter. *Na levo* can and does, however, also extend to smuggling consumer goods in from the West, running a hidden factory, stealing state-owned materials and skipping out from work on a state job to moonlight privately.

The economy on the left exists at every level of Soviet society. For city dwellers the private economy provides plumbers, clothes and even legal services through the homemade advertisements that cover billboards. Farmers go underground to get tools or fertilizers that are unavailable in the regular economy. Economist Gur Ofer, an associate professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, calculates that up to 12% of the average citizen's income derives from the private economy and that 18% of all consumer expenditures are made there.

Despite their illegality, private markets are readily visible in Moscow and other Soviet cities. The gathering place for Moscow apartment hunters is the subway stop on Leningradsky Prospekt. The place to buy women's goods, such as lipstick, lingerie and dresses, is inside the public toilet two blocks from the Bolshoi Theater. On a side street near the Moscow Planetarium, *fartsovshchiki* (black marketeers) have set up an underground supermarket, dealing in everything from gin to chewing gum, jeans and Western pop records. One of the hottest selling items in any market is information. Some hustlers charge one or two rubles for "a sentence." The mysterious sentence: a valuable tip-off that an item in short supply will be delivered to a certain shop the following day.

Whole industries have sprung up to service the markets on the left. Printers illicitly run off copies of scarce books, while entire hidden factories make jeans and cosmetics. Truck Drivers Nikolai Butko and Alexander Konovalov developed a very elaborate triangular trade from the Caucasus Mountain city of Krasnodar near the Black Sea. They picked up purloined steel from a state factory, delivered it to government farms in exchange for off-market tomatoes, grapes and peas, and then sold the produce in Siberia, where fresh vegetables were in short supply.

"The amount of bribery of public officials is enormous," notes Berkeley Economist Gregory Grossman, an expert on the illegal Soviet economy. "It is an extremely corrupt society where graft and bribery of officials is enormously widespread and where stealing on the job is commonplace and far more sophisticated than crude break-ins or thefts at state warehouses." One of the biggest frauds of the 1970s was the caviar caper, in which officials of the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries shipped expensive black caviar abroad in large cans marked "smoked herring." Western firms cooperating in the fraud repacked and resold the caviar. They put the Soviet conspirators' share of the profits into Swiss bank accounts. The swindle is still officially denied by the Kremlin, but the Fishing Minister abruptly resigned after some of the "herring" was mistakenly sent to domestic shops.

Though Soviet officials are aware of the booming second economy, they generally ignore the dealings of Ivan the Terrible Capitalist. Major violators are sometimes arrested, and officers of the MVD's Administration for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation have infiltrated the black markets. But the Kremlin grudgingly accepts the underground economy because it fills the gaps left in the inefficient Soviet system, eases shortages and makes consumers' lives bearable. Collective-farm managers admit that often the only way to meet their production targets is to buy supplies on the black market. "If they tried to shut down every illegal activity," says one Western diplomat in Moscow, "the economy would come close to collapsing and the party would face serious problems of public disorder." The underground economy is nowhere to be found in the theories of Marx or Lenin, but it has become an integral part of Soviet society today. ■

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

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The Making of a Minsk Tractor

Red banners and "thirteenth pay" bonuses stimulate workers

Soviet propaganda both sentimentalizes and glorifies industrial workers as the backbone of the revolution. Like the legendary miner Alexei Stakhanov, who dug an unprecedented 102 tons of coal in one six-hour shift, workers are constantly praised for scaling greater heights of industrial productivity, led on by the guiding spirit of Communist Party leadership.

At an international nongovernmental tribunal held last year in Washington, D.C., to inquire into the status of human rights in the U.S.S.R. and East bloc countries, Soviet emigrants painted a different picture. They described a sullen labor force griping about low wages, unsanitary or hazardous working conditions and trade union leadership that executes management's dictates rather than representing employees. Drunkenness on the job and absenteeism were said to be chronic problems that often resulted in shoddy goods. Although workers were assigned quotas, there was little incentive to exceed them because once someone overproduced, everyone else was driven to work at the new level.

The reality is surely somewhere between these two extremes. TIME *Reporter-Researcher John Kohan visited the Minsk tractor factory, one of the largest manufacturers of farming equipment in the Soviet Union. His report on the vast industrial complex that spreads out over almost 250 acres and employs 25,000 people:*

The tractors clank down the 200-yd.-long assembly line like gigantic metal insects: 7,500 tractors a month, 90,000 a year, all bearing the trademark Belarus MTZ. Brigades of young laborers clad in work clothes or jeans swarm over each monster, slipping front axles and gear boxes into place, bolting on metal casings, attaching three or four giant wheels.

Finally, after 53 stages of manufacture, the machines lumber off the assembly line; the bright blue ones are destined for the vast farm lands of the Soviet Union, the brilliant red ones for more than 70 nations around the globe. About 3,000 of them have even found their way to the U.S.

The overriding preoccupation in any Soviet factory is fulfilling the five-year plan that has been agreed to in advance by an individual factory and the government. Says Serafim Dedkov, deputy director of the Minsk plant: "We have a five-year plan, a yearly plan and a monthly plan. If we have set the goal of 90,000 tractors in a year, that works out to roughly 330 a day. We have to work rhythmically, turning out the prescribed number every day. If we only make 100 today, we simply can't make 560 tomorrow."

Red and white banners hanging from the walls and rafters exhort the workers to strive for higher productivity. PRECISE RHYTHM, HIGH TEMPO, EXCELLENT QUALITY, says one. The portraits of outstanding workers, only slightly smaller than the pictures of morose Politburo members that adorn buildings before national holidays, line the factory's central avenue. The plant runs on two shifts from 7:40 in the morning until midnight, but the assembly line workers, whose average age is about 30, seem relaxed. At times they even stand around joking. Despite the ever constant exhortations to increase productivity, the Soviets have an easygoing attitude. Minsk employees, for example, are not required to dress in work uniforms on the shop floor.

The plant has what Dedkov calls "a fund for economic stimulation." The fund rewards brigades of productive workers with bonuses called the "thirteenth pay" at year's end. Inducements to greater output are also built into the wage system. Most employees of the Minsk factory are paid a piecework rate for each item they produce. The amount is determined by the quality of the work, the number of pieces turned out and whether that exceeds production norms. Dedkov claims that managers are very careful before they raise goals so that a worker does not end up receiving less pay for better work.

Should a worker feel he is not being properly compensated, he can complain to an official of his union called a *profsoyuz*. Unions are almost like state agencies; indeed the former chief of the KGB, Alexander Shelepin, was the official head of the U.S.S.R. trade union movement for many years. "The goals of management and the *profsoyuz* are the same here," says Kazimir Kaspirovich, deputy chairman of the professional union at the factory. "We have no major disagreements with management."

Almost every aspect of a Minsk employee's life is centered around his factory. The tractor plant provides schools for workers and their children, summer camps for kids and vacation cabins for adults. The factory-built "palace of culture" boasts 65 amateur theatrical groups, choirs and dance companies, and there is also a giant sports stadium.

Such extensive services and facilities are maintained at the cost of a smaller paycheck for the Soviet worker than for his American counterpart. The average wage for a 41-hour week at the Minsk plant is 205 rubles ($308) a month. But a full-course lunch in the factory cafeteria costs only 50 or 60 kopecks (75¢ to 90¢), and rent for a factory-subsidized two-room apartment, including heat, electricity, water and telephone, is a scant 12 to 15 rubles ($18 to $23) a month. Medical care is free, and outstanding workers are eligible for factory-sponsored trips to Black Sea and Baltic resorts.

Thus the incentive to keep production at high levels is strong, even away from the shop floor, and Dedkov insists that at the Minsk factory there are no discussions about whether workers can fulfill the plan. The talk is only about ways to *over*fulfill it. "If we work well, we can build more rest centers, pioneer camps and preventive medical centers," he says. "If we don't, we must cut back. Everyone from the factory director on down works with this in mind." ■

Young woman tending the assembly line at the huge farm machinery factory

A five-year plan, a yearly plan, a monthly plan—and no trouble with the union.

The Tough Search for Power

A different kind of oil problem: getting at a bountiful supply

The Soviet Union, like the U.S., faces serious energy problems in the 1980s. The U.S.S.R. is by far the world's largest oil producer (11.9 million bbl. per day, *vs.* 9.5 million bbl. for Saudi Arabia). Nonetheless, in the view of many Western energy analysts, the Soviet Union will soon run into a petroleum bind even though the country is an Eden of energy riches.

The Soviet squeeze, however, is dramatically different from the American one. Energy wildcatters and big oil companies have exhaustively drilled the Western Hemisphere for more than a century, and the U.S. has been forced to rely on imports for half its oil because it has simply outgrown its readily available reserves. The Soviets, on the other hand, still have enormous amounts of oil in the ground, with estimated proven reserves of 67 billion bbl. of oil, compared with 26 billion for the U.S. and 166 billion for Saudi Arabia. But even though Moscow planners are not hindered by environmental protest groups or disagreements between government and industry, they have greater trouble finding the oil, getting it out of the ground and, finally, transporting it to where it is needed.

Just how prolonged and how severe the U.S.S.R.'s energy gap will prove to be is a subject of widespread discussion. The CIA, in a controversial and criticized report in 1977, predicted that the Soviets would have to start importing petroleum before 1985. The CIA updated that study last year and said that Soviet oil output could fall as low as 8 million bbl. in 1985. If this view is accurate, the Soviet Union will soon have to halt its lucrative oil exports, including 129 million bbl. to such Western nations as Italy, West Germany and Austria. Last year petroleum was the largest Soviet export, with about $6 billion in precious foreign exchange coming from Western Europe alone. An end to oil exports, moreover, would weaken the political and economic hegemony the Soviets have over their East bloc satellites and Cuba, which are heavily dependent on Soviet petroleum supplies.

TASS FROM SOVFOTO

Drilling rigs march to the horizon in the Baku fields near the Iranian border

The enemy is geography, and its allies are mismanagement and poor equipment.

Should the Soviets cut back their own energy consumption, or that of their satellites in Eastern Europe, the move would surely hurt their economic growth. Even in a dictatorship with the power to enforce harsh conservation measures, the political consequences might not be pleasant. Some feel that the country's growth is already slowing because of the power squeeze. Says former Department of Energy Chief James Schlesinger: "There's just no doubt that Soviet economic growth has been constrained by energy shortages."

Alexander Krylov, a top Soviet oil expert and a member of the Academy of Sciences, has predicted that "national oil output will peak in a relatively short time and then start to fall." Yet other energy experts in both the East and the West are more optimistic about Soviet potential. Leading Kremlin officials insist that their country will remain a net exporter of oil and natural gas for the next 50 years. Economist Marshall Goldman of Wellesley College maintains in his book *The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum: Half Empty or Half Full?* that the Soviets will actually increase production of energy by 2% to 3% a year through 1985 and possibly more in the years afterward. Most experts believe that the Soviet Union will eventually solve the difficult problems of extracting its reserves. In a Communist command economy, Soviet managers are able to bulldoze important national priority projects, like energy development, through normal roadblocks.

Whatever their longer term views, independent observers agree that the U.S.S.R. will suffer some Western-style energy headaches in the next few years. Indeed, the Soviets are already suffering the first symptoms of the coming crunch. Gasoline prices have doubled during the past two years, to roughly $1.25 per gal. Plans to expand car production beyond the present million-a-year level have been shelved; talk of building a second large automobile and truck factory has ceased; and *Pravda*, the Communist Party newspaper, has printed lengthy exhortations to conserve energy. Except at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, where many foreign flights arrive, jets of Aeroflot, the national airline, no longer use their own engines to taxi into takeoff position; to save fuel, they are towed into position by tractors. NATO radar bases report that Soviet air force training flights, already 30% below those of the U.S. and Europe, have been cut back even further.

The basic cause of the Soviet energy problem is geography. The bulk of the nation's population—and most of its industry—is in the western half of the country. The major oil reserves, as well as the sites most likely to yield new supplies, lie thousands of miles away, in Siberia. Getting the oil from where it is to where it is needed requires more railroads and pipelines than the U.S.S.R. possesses or will be able to build in the near future.

Another difficulty is management. Oil experts say that the Soviets have not done a good job of handling their re-

sources. Reports Arthur Meyerhoff, a Tulsa, Okla., oil engineer who has traveled widely in the U.S.S.R.: "To say that the Soviets have mismanaged their petroleum industry is the understatement of the year." Western oilmen say that the Soviets made their first serious mistake when they set drilling targets in terms of meters drilled, thus making a deep dry hole as good as a gusher in terms of fulfilling the plan.

Another serious mistake, say U.S. experts, was deciding to accelerate production by employing a technique known as water injection, whereby water is forced into wells to make the crude petroleum easier to pump. Result: more oil in the short run, but less in the long term. Some older wells in the Volga-Ural region now pump five barrels of water for every barrel of oil; and the average Soviet well pumps 50% water.

Soviet energy policy has been plagued by bureaucratic infighting and indecisiveness. No fewer than 15 different government ministries are involved in energy policy. Indeed, it was not until late 1977 that the Communist Party authorized an all-out program for oil exploration and development, necessitating a rush of orders for U.S. equipment.

The Soviets have not kept up with progress in the petroleum industry, a situation exacerbated by Western trade restrictions, like those imposed by the U.S. after the Afghanistan invasion. Vladimir Dolgikh, the Communist Party secretary for heavy industry, admitted last January that the only way to realize ambitious plans for developing energy sources in Siberia would be "to introduce new equipment, improve technology and raise labor productivity."

Soviet oil-drilling equipment is estimated to be about 40 years behind that found in the West. The standard Soviet turbodrill, for example, bores much more slowly than American equipment. It takes a Soviet team 14 months to dig down 10,000 ft.; U.S. drilling teams can reach that depth in 34 days. Seismic technology, essential for exploration, also lags far behind. The best Soviet gear probes down to 7,000 ft.; U.S. equipment is more accurate and goes down to at least 10,000 ft. Given the state of their industry, says Meyerhoff, "there is simply no way that the Soviets are going to meet their crude oil requirements."

How can the Soviets meet their energy needs? Certainly not through conservation by consumers. Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders have called repeatedly for conservation, but there is not much fat to trim in the consumer sector. A nation that has only one automobile for every 42 people (the U.S. has one for every two people) and does most of its long-distance hauling by rail cannot cut back much on gasoline consumption. Some savings might be possible in factories, since Soviet industry is notoriously wasteful of energy, largely because the government sells energy to industries at low rates, which invites managers to squander it. But significant conservation may be impossible without economic decentralization, and that is politically unfeasible.

To some degree, the Soviets can substitute other energy sources for oil. The Soviet Union has 28 trillion m^3 of natural gas, which is a third of the world's proven reserves and enough to last 70 years at current rates of consumption. Gas production is currently booming.



TASS FROM SOVFOTO

A cluster of 300-ft.-high reactor cooling towers pour out steam into the night at Novovoronezh nuclear power station south of Moscow

Coal, which the Soviets also have in abundance, is unlikely to fill much of the gap. Soviet coal reserves total 7 trillion tons, or enough to last 350 years, but most of the coal, like the other fuels, is in Siberia, where distance and climate make exploitation difficult. The coal is primarily low-grade, high-polluting lignite, and much of it is pyrophoric, that is to say, it can ignite spontaneously upon contact with oxygen. Still, Western analysts are baffled by the U.S.S.R.'s declining coal production. In 1979 output was 3 million tons less than in 1977 and 33 million tons under the goal set by the national economic plan.

Nuclear power should be a major help. Not hindered by Jane Fonda–like ecology zealots, the Soviet Union is moving ahead on nuclear energy. The country currently has 23 reactors in operation, providing 10% of its electricity, about the same percentage as in the U.S. But the Soviets intend to build fast. The present Five-Year Plan calls for construction of ten reactors a year.

Yet even if their nuclear program goes as planned, the Soviets will still need oil, and lots of it. If they cannot produce enough energy to meet their own needs, they have two alternatives, neither of which bodes well for the rest of the world. They could use their gold reserves to compete with Western buyers on the already strained world oil market. This would push prices higher and cause incalculable economic turmoil. Or the Soviets could try to conquer Persian Gulf oilfields, which begin just across their southern border. Kremlin leaders flatly deny that they covet oil vital to the industrial West, but intelligence sources report that even Saudi Arabian leaders have held informal talks with the Soviets about the possibility of selling crude in exchange for Soviet aid in refinery construction. Given the political instability of most Middle Eastern regimes, many Western experts fear the Soviets could intimidate them into bartering their oil for a token amount of technical aid. Says Schlesinger: "Unless the U.S. is prepared to put more muscle into its position in the Persian Gulf, we can expect increased Soviet pressures."

Few U.S. authorities believe it is to American advantage for the Soviets to suffer from an energy shortage. But some, like Samuel Huntington, a Harvard foreign policy strategist, advocate keeping a tight rein on shipments of all oil technology and equipment unless the Kremlin is willing to make political concessions in return.

Others find such an approach shortsighted. They believe that the U.S. should help the Soviets to expand and exploit their fuel reserves. Says Theodore Shabad, a U.S. expert on Soviet natural resources: "It is not in our interests to create an energy problem for the Soviets; it is in our interest that they be self-sufficient." American attempts to deny the Soviets much-needed drilling technology have not been totally successful. After U.S. firms were stopped from making sales, the Soviets turned to Italian and French firms for the equipment.

Because energy is the lifeblood of a modern industrial society, the Soviets will undoubtedly make an all-out effort to tap their hard-to-get reserves. It remains to be seen, though, whether the country can accomplish the job in time to avert serious shortages. Concludes Jack Ray, a Tenneco petroleum specialist who is often in the Soviet Union: "With brute strength and will power they'll muddle through, just as they always do." ■

TASS FROM SOVFOTO

Workers at a Moscow factory taking time out to read the country's leading daily

Black and White, and Red All Over

Pravda *prints all the news that fits the party line*

In periods of East-West tension, passages from its pages are quoted in the Western press like captured battlefield communiqués. Specialists in Bonn, London, Paris and Washington sift through its stilted, often impenetrable prose searching for subtle shifts in foreign policy. Photographs of the ruling elite are scrutinized for changes in status, and cartoons are scoured for arcane political references. *"Pravda,"* says its editor, Victor Afanasyev, "is read on the lines and between the lines."

Indeed, few newspapers are read as closely or taken as seriously as *Pravda* (circ. 11 million), the Soviet Union's leading daily. (Second in importance is *Izvestiya*, the government daily, circ. 8.6 million.) The paper is published by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and toes the party line, hence the government line, on matters great and small. *Pravda* means truth, but when facts and ideology collide, ideology prevails. Says Thomas Kolesnichenko, *Pravda* correspondent in New York: "We try to give people a story that is true, but in terms of a historical perspective, in terms of our understanding of world events."

Pravda is skinny compared with U.S. dailies (only six pages most days), partly because there are no advertisements, partly because newsprint supplies are chronically short. But the paper's production and distribution system dwarfs anything in the West. Pages are transmitted by satellite to printing plants in more than 40 cities, so the whole country gets delivery the same morning. *Pravda* employs 180 editors and writers in Moscow, 60 staff reporters around the country and 40 foreign correspondents. Fewer than half of these journalists come from journalism schools; the rest have worked their way up from small papers or party positions.

Each morning at 11, Afanasyev and his 30 deputy and department editors meet to make final changes in that day's edition and to lay out most of the following day's paper. All decisions are made with the party in mind. A full member of the party Central Committee, Afanasyev has direct access to top government leaders, including Leonid Brezhnev. The paper's two dozen departments (divided by geographical area and subject matter) are in close contact with the party's propaganda department and with government bureaus. Yet Afanasyev denies that everything in the paper is dictated by apparatchiks. Says he: "In reality, we do the majority of our stories ourselves. Our commentators [the equivalent of U.S. columnists] often express their own point of view. As a whole, of course, it coincides with the view of the party, but shadings could be different."

Because *Pravda* is, in effect, the voice of the party, the paper does not have a government censor. The editors are responsible for blue-penciling incorrect thinking, but they rarely have to. Explains Arkadi Polishchuk, a New York–based émigré who sometimes writes for *Pravda:* "A Soviet journalist knows what will pass and what won't. He has an 'inner editor' within him. One step out of line and a journalist's career is washed up."

The most important news in *Pravda* is not always on the front page—which consists of major editorials, official announcements, and fanfare about grand Soviet achievements in industry, agriculture and foreign affairs. Page 2 contains mostly economic reports and party news; page 3, science, culture and reader letters; pages 4 and 5 cover items from Soviet bloc countries, international and breaking news; page 6, sports, television listings and feature stories. Thus, in one issue last week, a story about summer health resorts for factory workers is found on Page One, while an analysis of the U.S. presidential race is on page 5.

Stories about the West almost invariably emphasize doom and gloom, with such headlines as SOCIETY OF VIOLATED RIGHTS or WORLD OF CAPITAL: SOCIAL PROBLEMS. Correspondents overseas do not deny that their primary duty is to promote socialism. Not long ago, for instance, *Pravda's* man in London joined a picket line of striking steelworkers, "for whom the class struggle is a daily reality, a necessity, a duty." Correspondents are restricted, however, in what they can say about foreign leaders. Says Afanasyev: "We don't attack Carter personally and we don't publish cartoons of him. We criticize him as a politician, not as a personality."

Abrupt changes in Soviet foreign policy sometimes force *Pravda* into improbable arabesques. Until late December, Afghanistan President Hafizullah Amin was hailed as a dear friend of the U.S.S.R.; the day after his assassination in a coup, he was pilloried as an "agent of American imperialism." Without mentioning that the Soviets had helped topple Amin, *Pravda* ran a front-page congratulatory message to his successor. The newspaper reported the invasion several days later, and then only with a brief item from TASS, the Soviet news agency, disclosing that the U.S.S.R. had acceded to an Afghan request for military aid. A few days after that, *Pravda* described the invasion force as "a limited Soviet military contingent to be used exclusively as aid in repulsing outside armed interference." This became the official Soviet line.

Pravda makes no mention of train crashes, crime rates, consumer purchasing power, state security matters, subsidies for athletes, or political disputes. Several years ago, when a number of workmen were killed at the site of its own new headquarters building on Pravda Street, the paper ignored the accident. *Pravda* has an aversion to admitting mistakes, preferring to run a second, and accurate article at some future date.

The paper seems to be doing more muckraking these days, usually focusing on misfeasance by major and minor officials. Afanasyev says the editors approve such articles when they feel that the reports will "improve the situation." Says he: "We are not interested in scandals in private life or discrediting an official. We do not do anything that can hurt our way of life, our system, our principles."

The Mediterranean fruit fly may look friendly but he'd like to eat all the fruit in California. In 1976, the pest was eliminated in the state by sterilization. Now, a lone male has shown up in a trap and there's fear of a new infestation. The scanning electron microscope picture is by David Scharf.

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To what extent readers believe *Pravda's* idealized version of Soviet life is difficult to determine. The paper's various responses to reader requests for information and advice are followed avidly *(see box)*. Indeed, *Pravda's* New York correspondent says he gets calls from Soviet émigrés who want the paper to write about their problems in finding jobs and housing. All told, *Pravda* received (and answered) more than 600,000 letters last year, a measure of reader loyalty that most Western editors would envy

But readers who like their newspapers free, fat and unfettered will not like *Pravda*. It is best known abroad not for its news coverage but for the pseudonymous, party-commissioned pieces by "I. Alexandrov" that are used to send signals to the West. The composite Alexandrov is a fitting metaphor for journalism in the U.S.S.R. Says Polishchuk: "Soviet journalists are in complete unison with the voice of the state. Any of them could be I. Alexandrov at any given time." ■

Sincerely, Ivan

The letters to the editor of *Pravda* serve as an important forum for Soviet citizens to air pet peeves, make suggestions and scold their less virtuous countrymen. "Every day in the school snack bar, Sasha gets change from a five-ruble bill," wrote a schoolteacher from the Moscow region earlier this year, complaining about how children today do not appreciate the value of a hard-earned ruble. "The parents aren't interested in how their children spend the remaining money." A lieutenant colonel stationed in Lithuania urged parents not to send money to their army sons, already well cared for. "An unending stream of money orders comes to us, and such amounts!" fumed the officer, adding that the funds too often financed "drinking bouts."

As a public service, *Pravda* editors often look into reader complaints. "I have long dreamed of buying a samovar," wrote one frustrated consumer from Stavropol. "How often have I searched in stores with, alas, no results." A resident of Zaporozhye wrote that her stores carried a model for 25 rubles, but added: "It looks like a galvanized bucket with a spigot." *Pravda* approached the proper ministry for an explanation and printed its response: 28 models were available, and "much is being done to improve their external appearance," said a spokesman, adding that samovars had not been overlooked in the latest Five-Year Plan. By 1985, he predicted, 2 million samovars will be shipped to stores annually.

The View from Dunayev's Desk

A top TV journalist can call it as he sees it, within limits

Just after 6 p.m. and again at 10 p.m. every weekday, crisp white letters on Soviet television screens announce *Today in the World*, a 15-minute blend of international news and commentary that is one of the most watched shows in the U.S.S.R. Vladimir Dunayev, 51, one of *Today's* regular hosts, describes the day's events—half smiling here at the absurdity of Western posturing on the Afghanistan question, curling his lip there to show contempt for U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The commentator is low key but sardonic, a bit like David Brinkley. But Dunayev differs from his U.S. colleagues in one significant respect: he works for the state, which he considers a fine employer. Says he: "The means of information should not be owned by a group of private individuals who happen to be rather rich and could misuse them."

Dunayev, like most senior Soviet journalists, did not receive any formal academic training in his craft. He graduated from Moscow's college-level Institute of International Relations, and began his career at *Trud*, the daily newspaper of the Central Council of Trade Unions. In eleven years there, he moved up from copy boy to columnist. After two years as a radio commentator in Moscow, Dunayev was sent to London for five years as a broadcast correspondent. He returned home in 1972 to assume his present position with Moscow television

Dunayev makes an average of $1,500 a month, or about six times the starting salary of a beginning reporter, and he earns every ruble. On days when he is doing *Today in the World*, Dunayev arrives in his well-appointed office on the north side of Moscow by 10 a.m. and begins reading Western publications. One of his two assistants monitors the major news services ("TASS is rather late sometimes, so I have to rely more on Western agencies," Dunayev says), while the other assistant lines up film, still photographs and other visual material. Dunayev begins by outlining his lead stories, keeping "one or two lively items in reserve, just to cheer people up after telling them what new actions the White House is going to take."

Around 5 p.m., Dunayev rehearses his program on-camera. "If it is good, I use the tape," he says. "If not, I do it live." Then he writes an entirely new script for his 10 p.m. show. "It's hell," he says. "You can't repeat either the first program or the evening news [a half-hour show aired at 9 p.m.]. Ten or 15 years ago, it would have been easy, because you could say, 'The bloody imperialists did such and such.' But now we realize it's not black and white, it's a thousand colors."

The commentator on the Moscow set of his nightly show, *Today in the World*

"The means of information should not be owned by a group of private individuals."

Dunayev says that no official reads his scripts before they are broadcast and that nothing is off bounds except military secrets. His commentary, of course, has a decided pro-Soviet tilt, but Dunayev insists that he cleaves to the truth. Says he: "The most important thing is to be objective, not for the sake of objectivity —I am a Communist and believe in my ideals—but because we have to prepare people for the real facts."

If Dunayev's notions seem strange to Westerners, U.S. television news seems equally odd to him. "It is very professional, but a bit pushy, not very civilized," he says. Dunayev covered Leonid Brezhnev's state visit in 1973 and found that U.S. reporters are not as free as they profess. He recalls: "I saw how State Department officials could manipulate journalists at briefings. And if they are given something exclusively, they are on the hook." ■

People

Popov dispenses laughter cure

The audience watching the new show, *A Cure by Laughter*, at the Old Moscow Circus already suspects what "doctor" from outer space is going to pop out of that tiny spaceship landing in the single ring, and their delight is tangible. Sure enough, what emerges is no astronaut, considering the oversize checkered cap perched on unruly shocks of blond hair, black velvet jacket, red scarf, clodhopper shoes and, of course, trademark potato nose. After 30 years with the circus, **Oleg Popov,** 49, is regarded as the king of clowns even beyond Soviet borders. How long did it take to dream up the medical mayhem in his latest laffer? Says Popov: "Six months, plus my entire life."

■

For a Jew, his is an understandable crusade; for a Muscovite, it is an uncomfortable one. But Dancer **Yuri Sherling,** 35, seeks a renaissance of Yiddish culture, which, he laments, is "decaying all over the world and has been neglected by many Jews in this country." A graduate of three famed institutes—the Bolshoi Ballet School, the Moscow Conservatory Musical School and the Moscow School of Theatrical Arts—Sherling is director-founder of the two-year-old Jewish Chamber Musical Theater. He has written the music, choreographed the dancing and starred in two hits with his company of 25. One show was an olio of jazzed-up Jewish folk songs and dances. The other, a folk-rock musical called *A Black Bridle for a White Mare*, got its title from an old Yiddish proverb: "Poverty suits a Jew like a black bridle on a white mare." Sherling has other works in preparation but, he says, finding space and support is becoming difficult. "It's as if the authorities had let a genie out of the bottle and don't know what to do about him now, push him back in or what."

Jewish Chamber Musical Theater Head Sherling makes up cast member

She sings. She dances. She plays the piano, plunks the guitar, pumps the accordion. She recently won raves for two movies, *Siberiada* and *Five Evenings*. Now Actress **Lyudmila Gurchenko,** 44, is an author acclaimed for her autobiography, published in a literary monthly, about growing up in war-torn Kharkov. The muse moved her while she and film friends watched Peter Bogdanovich's *Paper Moon*. "They kept saying how marvelous the Tatum O'Neal character was. So I said, 'Listen, guys, I was the same type of child, only I grew up with German troops and hunger and death.' They told me to write it all down." The result: *My Adult Childhood*, a mosaic of young life under Nazi occupation that has brought such a flood of letters it may end up as—what else?—a movie.

■

Since she is now the country's leading gymnast, the Soviet press has naturally begun to refer to Nelli Kim as "Charming Nelli." When she pauses to chomp watermelon in the midst of an otherwise rigid training regimen, she fits that title, but Nelli and her coaches agree that she can often be much less than charming. The only thing that justifies her moods are the results. In Montreal four years ago, Kim not only won two individual gold medals but scored two all-but-unprecedented perfect tens —one in the floor exercise program and one in her specialty, the vault. In Fort Worth last December she took the all-round women's title. Kim, now training near her home in Minsk, is the odds-on favorite for further honors in the 1980 Olympics. But she is not so sure. Kim will be 23 in July, an aging gymnastic veteran. She also has domestic distractions foremost among them, Husband and Fellow Gymnast **Vladimir Achasov.** Says Kim: "I hate to lose, but it's getting more difficult to win."

Charming Nelli Kim digs into watermelon between training sessions

Sounds rather like a Soviet football team: the Moscow Virtuosos. But what an all-star lineup. These *Virtuozy Moskvy* are 25 top musicians, organized into a chamber orchestra 18 months ago by Violinist **Vladimir Spivakov,** 35. World-renowned virtuoso himself, Spivakov alternates between bow and baton to direct his skillful charges with intensity and impishness: "Let's not be bulldozers," he will grin as the tempo speeds up during rehearsal of a Vivaldi passage. The *virtuozy* were the hit of Moscow's Russian Winter Festival and will play for Olympic audiences this summer. Spivakov would like to bring them to the U.S., but for him Jimmy Carter's cultural embargo hits a sour note.

Spivakov at *Virtuozy* rehearsal

Closing the Gap with the West

To drive the system, an offensive in physics and technology

"One cannot be satisfied with the collapse of capitalism. It is necessary to take all its science, technology . . . Without that we will not be able to build Communism."

Since Lenin uttered those clangorous words in 1919, the Soviets may have muted their tone. But they continue to view the mastery of science, along with its offshoot—technology—as essential to the triumph of their system. Indeed, in areas deemed critical by the Kremlin, notably defense, space and agriculture, Soviet scientists are lavishly supported in their research. They can buy the best lab equipment from abroad, are allowed to travel to the West for scientific meetings and are treated to personal privileges—housing, clothing, cars—beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.

Partly in response to such encouragement, Soviet researchers have made enormous strides in narrowing the scientific gap with the West; in some cases, like the physics of fusion, certain aspects of metallurgy, and mathematics, they may be ahead of the U.S. In the near future, the Soviets are likely to advance in other areas as well; they are now spending about 3.4% of their gross national product on research (compared with 2.2% by the U.S.) and are training young scientists and engineers at a rate three to four times that of the U.S. Still, for all the triumphs of Soviet science, it is plagued by major problems, some of which may be endemic to the very system that has made science a national priority. One sign: since 1917, the U.S.S.R. has won only eight Nobel Prizes in the sciences, less than a tenth as many as the U.S.

Most of the best and heavily supported research is done under military auspices, which means that the work is kept tightly under wraps. For this reason, Western analysts long could only guess about Soviet progress in, say, lasers and electron beams. Both of these technologies are essential to achieving a key Soviet defense goal: an antisatellite satellite. After word that the Soviets had developed such a killer satellite reached Washington, the Carter Administration quietly ordered the Pentagon to step up its own studies of these devices.

In nonmilitary areas, the Soviet scientific record is much easier to evaluate. Moscow may well be the world's capital of theoretical mathematics, in part because the Soviets lack the computers that enable Westerners to solve complex problems by brute force "number crunching." Says Yale Physicist D. Allan Bromley: "We've become lazy because of our digital computers. The Soviets don't have easy access to good computers; they do a lot more analytic mathematics in their heads." The Soviets are also strong in other "blackboard" sciences, like astrophysics and cosmology, where absence of up-to-date instrumentation is not critical to success.

TASS FROM SOVFOTO

Rocket carrying Soyuz spacecraft lifts off from launch pad

For some, lavish support, the best equipment and trips abroad.

Exploration of the cosmos is another key objective of the Soviets. Last year they launched payloads into orbit at a rate ten times that of the U.S. Many were military satellites, but they also included a number of manned flights. Indeed, only last week two more cosmonauts returned from a visit to the Salyut 6 space station, which has been circling the earth for nearly three years. By contrast, although the U.S. has scored a flurry of spectacular successes with unmanned planetary probes, no American has flown in space since 1975.

The Soviets are leaders in more down-to-earth branches of physics, especially the search for heavy elements. Their doughnut-shaped tokamak machines, in which hydrogen plasma is contained and compressed by powerful magnetic fields and heated to sunlike temperatures, offer perhaps the most promising route toward harnessing nuclear fusion as a future energy source. Soviet scientists are preeminent, too, in applied areas like oceanography, polar research, climatology and meteorology, and seismology. But even here they show some blind spots; though Soviet investigators made early breakthroughs in earthquake prediction, the geological establishment was slow to accept plate tectonics—a kind of unified-field theory for the earth sciences that explains everything from mountain building to volcanic eruptions.

As their interest in Western technology shows, the Soviets still have a way to go. Almost all advanced instrumentation in their labs is imported. When the Soviets do try their hand at instrument building, they sometimes fail embarrassingly; their giant six-meter (236 in.) telescope in the northern Caucasus, after years of effort, remains flawed by a defective mirror. Says M.I.T. Physicist Herman Feshbach: "They have never been able to exploit machines." Nor are they anywhere near the West in the ability to produce pharmaceuticals, plastics and other chemicals or to pursue the hottest of contemporary sciences, molecular biology.

How can these shortcomings be accounted for? Part of the problem, as in so many other instances, lies with the system. Priorities are set not in the lab or institute but by state planners, often without regard to scientific realities. Says Bromley: "In our society, ideas boil to the surface more than they do in the Soviet Union. There is no intellectual ferment, no give-and-take." Also, the senior scientists who run research institutions sometimes do so with an iron hand, making it more difficult for young, imaginative scientists to press ahead with daring ideas. By contrast, most institutions in the U.S. are only too eager to advance promising newcomers with an innovative spirit. Says M.I.T.'s Loren Graham: "That's the glory of American science."

Finally, there are the political commissars who are part of virtually all research establishments. They not only enforce ideological purity—for example, blackballing dissidents—but can veto projects that do not fit in with their conceptions of research. Indeed, only now is Soviet biology catching up with the West after years of backwardness under Trofim Lysenko, Stalin's chief scientific hatchet man, who regarded work in traditional genetics as heretical. ■

Amid the latest equipment, a team performs an operation in a special Moscow hospital

Mustard Plasters to Heart Surgery

A revolution in health care that is still being fought

Towering, superbly equipped research institutes contrast with hospitals that are bleak, antiquated and poorly staffed. Some Soviet physicians are equal to the best in the West in such fields as orthopedics and ophthalmology; yet doctors still use such primitive therapies as mustard plasters and cupping and even leeches. Treatment is administered free and drugs are inexpensive, yet patients often must bribe doctors and nurses for medication, operations, even to have linen changed and bedpans emptied.

Such is the paradoxical state of Soviet medicine. Even so, the Soviets have made great strides in health care since 1917. Says Washington, D.C., Internist William Knaus, who lived in the U.S.S.R. for 18 months and is the author of a forthcoming book, *Inside Russian Medicine*: "They took a country that was 200 years behind the rest of the world and provided the basics at a fraction of what we charge. They eliminated epidemics. Life expectancy is up and infant mortality is down. That has to be judged a success."

Just before the revolution, the average life expectancy was about 30 years. By the 1960s men were living on average to 66, women to 74 (about the life expectancy of U.S. citizens). In 1950, 84 children out of every 1,000 died before the age of one. By 1971 infant mortality had dropped to 23 deaths per thousand. Lately, though, these gains seem to be eroding. Life expectancy for men has been dropping, in part because of rampant alcoholism, and observers say that the U.S.S.R. is losing 30 of every 1,000 new citizens (double the U.S. figure).

Spearheading the medical care effort are the nation's 900,000 physicians, twice as many as in the U.S., and a fourth of all the world's doctors. About 70% of them are women. Backing them up are 2.7 million nurses and *feldshers*, or paramedics. Notes Knaus: "Theirs is a people-intensive system, ours is machine-intensive."

Nevertheless, the Soviets have gleaming facilities that are equal to anything in the U.S. TIME Moscow Bureau Chief Bruce Nelan recently toured three such centers in or near the Soviet capital. His report: "The Bakulev Institute of Cardiovascular Surgery, run by internationally recognized heart surgeon Vladimir Burakovsky, has performed at least 20,000 heart operations since it was established in 1956, 2,000 of them on children under age two. There are now 40 operations a week in its nine operating theaters.

"Eight miles away, on the city's southeastern outskirts, is the Soviet Union's most imposing medical institution: the Cancer Research Center of the Academy of Medical Sciences. Back in 1969 proceeds from the Soviet Union's annual day of voluntary work, called the *subbotnik*, were turned over to the academy for a new cancer center. About $128 million was contributed to help build a huge complex covering three city blocks, with 1,000 beds for patients. A staff of 4,000 works with the best equipment, purchased from all over the world. In the radiation therapy department, the doctors are particularly proud of their high-energy electron and proton accelerator from France. Professor Nikolai Trapeznikov, the center's deputy director-general, stresses that the work here is mostly experimental: 'For routine treatment there are 250 other specialized cancer hospitals in the Soviet Union, almost one in every large city.'

"In a wooded area in northern Moscow stands the Research Institute of Transplantation and Artificial Organs. Though its present quarters are two decades old and cramped, the scientific equipment is the newest and best, from the U.S., West Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Jokes its director, famed Surgeon Valeri Shumakov: 'Our equipment is an international team.' The institute does most of the kidney transplants in the Soviet Union (sometimes exchanging the organs with European and American hospitals), and will soon begin doing liver transplants and resume attempts at pancreas transplants as well."

Yet outside showplace institutions,

Pediatrician attending a youngster who is recovering from major surgery

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medical care is surprisingly primitive for a developed country. Most Soviet physicians are unaware of current medical developments outside their country, largely because of limited access to foreign professional publications. Boston Endocrinologist Aron Lurie, who has been tutoring émigré doctors, reports that a standard teaching tool in the U.S.S.R. is the 1950 edition of Harrison's *Principles of Internal Medicine*. When asked why Soviet doctors did not use more up-to-date editions, Lurie's exile students replied that translations are costly, and besides, said one, "not much new has happened in medicine since 1950."

Apart from the leading institutes, Soviet hospitals are mostly old, dilapidated and sometimes incredibly filthy. Drugs, equipment and techniques that Americans take for granted are rare or lacking in the U.S.S.R. Most blood tests are done manually rather than by automated equipment, and doctors must sometimes wait three or four days for the results. Disposable syringes and needles are virtually nonexistent. There are few kidney dialysis machines, and most physicians have not seen a CAT scanner, the computerized X-ray machine that is the rage among doctors in the West. Medications frequently run out.

Birth control is another area where the Soviets are lagging. The government's ideal family has three children, but couples are forced to use the unreliable rhythm method or coitus interruptus, with abortion as a back-up. According to Dr. Knaus, Soviet men do not like condoms, diaphragms come in only one size, and the pill (which is just beginning to be manufactured within the U.S.S.R.) is regarded with skepticism and fear. Intra-uterine devices are popular but in short supply. The result: in 1980 Soviet doctors performed an estimated 16 million abortions. Says Dr. Knaus: "The average woman has six abortions during her lifetime. A woman in Odessa told me, without hesitation, that her mother had had 24."

While better equipment and treatments are available for the political elite, they also have problems. Dr. Warren Zapol, an anesthesiologist at Boston's Massachusetts General Hospital, tells of being asked to tend the daughter of Heart Surgeon Burakovsky. The patient, herself a doctor, had entered a general hospital in Moscow with abdominal pain, but then, as can happen in hospitals anywhere, "she got into trouble," says Zapol. She apparently had an infected fallopian tube and then a "misadventure" with anesthesia, followed by cardiac arrest and blood infection. When Zapol arrived in Moscow, she was having difficulty breathing and her chances of survival seemed slim.

In the end, she survived—with the aid of equipment and drugs from the U.S. and the care of dedicated doctors from both countries. ■

Paramedic comforts cardiac patient being whisked to a hospital by ambulance

Dial 03 for Speedy Emergency Aid

On duty with the Soviets' efficient ambulance corps

Throughout most of the Soviet Union, dialing the number 03 brings almost instant medical help. This emergency service works best in Moscow, where 800 ambulances staffed by 2,000 doctors, 5,500 medical assistants and 2,400 drivers answer an average of 8,000 calls a day—at no charge. TIME Reporter-Researcher John Kohan rode with one ambulance team for part of its twelve-hour tour and filed this report:

3:35 p.m. A call comes in to the central ambulance station at 10 Koptelsky Lane. One of 34 telephone operators notes on a lavender slip of paper the time, name, address and problem—chest pains and dizziness. The slip is relayed to a second room of dispatchers who stay in constant touch with the 36 ambulance substations in the city. Most substations serve a radius of two to three miles, but there are specialty brigades in such disciplines as cardiology that cover the city at large.

This call is referred to a cardio-resuscitation group, one of 34 medical teams in a substation adjoining central headquarters. Dr. Vladimir Serov, 33, two feldshers (paramedics) and a driver climb into a white minibus with the words *Skoraya Meditsinskaya Pomoshch* (Quick Medical Aid) stenciled on its side. It is equipped with stretchers, medications and dressings, an electrocardiograph machine, heart resuscitator and a respirator. The driver flicks on the flashing blue rooftop light and pulls out into traffic.

4:05. At the Vernadsky Prospekt apartment complex, the team finds a corpulent 55-year-old man, clad in an undershirt and slacks, sitting on a couch. Serov asks: Is there pain or shortness of breath when he walks? No. Is he under medication? Yes, for high blood pressure. Does he have a recent cardiogram? The patient's wife nervously flips through a book until the cardiogram drops out. Serov quickly decides that the man should be hospitalized.

4:40. The ambulance pulls up at Hospital No. 51 in the Kievsky district; the patient, clutching a plastic bag filled with personal articles, is escorted inside. While one of the feldshers completes her notes, Serov and the other paramedic take a *perekur* (smoking break).

4:45. The team is back on the road, heading for Frunzenskaya Street to answer another call.

5:10. A plump 74-year-old woman in a faded nightdress answers the door. Almost incoherently, she explains how she collapsed that morning after walking into the kitchen. Vials of medicine for a heart condition litter the bedside table. The paramedics move in the EKG equipment and take a tracing. "An arrhythmic heart. Arteriosclerosis," announces Serov. "You know it often happens that the best we can do is offer help but not a cure. We can only make things easier for her." Serov decides against hospitalization—the woman did not want to go anyway—and orders her to stay in bed for a day or two. As the team leaves, the old woman, in a quavering voice, offers profuse thanks.

5:30. The ambulance sets out for Koptelsky Lane. Only 3½ hours left on the shift. ■

The Children of Pavlov

Pills, pep talks, and outpatient clinics for mental well-being

The old building on Chekhov Street, just off Moscow's Pushkin Square, was the town house of a wealthy man in prerevolutionary times. Now it is Psychoneurological Dispensary No. 14, one of the outpatient psychiatric clinics that deal with the day-to-day problems of the anxious, the alcoholic and the seriously disturbed in the Soviet Union.

More than 200 patients a day silently wander the halls, beneath a sign that reads REMEMBER, CONVERSATIONS AMONG PATIENTS ABOUT YOUR DELIRIUMS ARE FORBIDDEN. In one room 15 elderly women are putting together white ballpoint pens and costume jewelry; such work is regarded as therapy, but the pens and decorative chains are sold to help the center financially. A basement room decorated with film and travel posters is the center's Sobriety Society —the Soviet equivalent of Alcoholics Anonymous. There a young reformed drunk is sanding wood for a remodeling program that will expand the society's facilities to include billiards and Ping Pong.

Undergoing sleep therapy

Like community mental health centers in the U.S., Soviet clinics mostly dispense pills and pep talks. Some patients at Dispensary No. 14 are expected to stay the whole day; they come at 9 a.m., are fed two free meals and released at 4 p.m. Psychiatrists, about 70% of them women, have a good deal of power in dealing with patients. They not only direct treatment, but also help recuperating patients get jobs on the outside, and even track down citizens who fail to show for regular visits.

Most staff psychiatrists at the dispensary spend two hours after work each night making house calls. Particularly in the cities, the dispensaries double as social centers to give lonely and deprived people somewhere to go. Dr. Fira Passer, a short, energetic, middle-aged woman who runs the center, says that most Muscovites who come in are considered to be borderline cases, that is, people in basically good mental health who are temporarily having trouble coping with life. Says she: "They are afflicted with the problem of loneliness and the inability to find a partner or friend—neuroses connected with life in a large city."

Psychotropic drugs, such as chlorpromazine and haloperidol, are the main form of treatment. Because the Soviet pharmaceutical industry is small and cautious, it is slow to put new drugs into production. Soviet hospitals and dispensaries frequently treat schizophrenia with insulin shock therapy. After an insulin injection cuts blood sugar and induces coma, the patient is revived with glucose—a procedure repeated 20 or 30 times.

For less serious ailments, the dispensaries have their own form of talk therapy. At No. 14, these take place in a large room lined with seven couches, beneath portraits of Pavlov and Freud, the contemporary giants of modern psychology. Pointing to Freud, Dr. Passer smiles and says: "See, we're not so close-minded." However, Freudian analysis, unlike Pavlov's behaviorist ideas, has never taken hold in the Soviet Union, although the Georgian Academy of Sciences recently sponsored a symposium on the concept of the unconscious. In the U.S.S.R., talk therapy or "rational psychotherapy," is mostly a series of admonishing lectures. The doctor listens to the patient, then tells him how he ought to behave. If the complaint is deemed too trivial—anxiety, or mild depression—a patient may be told not to come back at all. Hypnosis is often used by doctors to encourage healthier behavior, like trying to get an alcoholic to stop drinking. Says Dr. Vyacheslav Kotov, chief doctor-psychiatrist for the city of Moscow: "A psychiatrist should understand his patient, but only up to a certain point. He doesn't have to turn his brains inside out in an effort to understand the patient fully."

The U.S.S.R. handles as many cases as it can by outpatient treatment. Nonetheless, statistics gathered in Leningrad and Moscow indicate that 1½% of the population is in mental hospitals at any given time, for an average stay of 60 days. The comparable U.S. figures are .8% and 30 days. Western visitors are generally impressed by the large number of staff members available. Says Dr. Gerald Klerman, the U.S. Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health administrator: "There are a good many nonprofessionals feeding, walking and checking on patients. They use the hospital system as a way to keep down unemployment, and I think this results in a lot of tender loving care." Patients also are kept busy at such tasks as gardening or cleaning their rooms, an approach that impresses U.S. visitors.

When patients are released, their records go to the local mental health center, which follows up on the case whether the patient cooperates or not. That way, says Yale Psychiatrist Walter Reich, an expert in Soviet therapeutic methods, "no one suffers from neglect, but it is very difficult to get away from the system. If you don't want to be involved with the mental health service, once you are identified as a patient, you get followed nonetheless."

There is a dark side to Soviet psychiatry: its misuse as a political weapon to punish dissidents. In 1970 Biologist Zhores Medvedev, who now lives in London, was committed to a psychiatric hospital on the order of his city commune. He was released 19 days later, after a wave of international protest. Medvedev had struck a deal with hos-

Therapist Passer, at head of table, meeting with former alcoholics in dispensary

But there is a dark side to psychiatry too, especially for dissidents.

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

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pital authorities that if discharged he would write nothing about his hospitalization or the struggle to get him out; when he learned that he would have to report regularly to mental health centers for follow-up care, he and his brother, Historian Roy Medvedev, published their now classic study on Soviet political psychiatry, *A Question of Madness*.

The rise of political psychiatry in the Soviet Union has paralleled the rise of Dr. Andrei Snezhnevsky, who since 1962 has been director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences in Moscow. Snezhnevsky is the virtual czar of Soviet psychiatry. The standard Soviet theory is that schizophrenia is caused by environmental factors. But in the 1960s Snezhnevsky began promoting his idea that the disease is genetic, permanent and diagnosable even in the absence of such classic symptoms as hallucinations and delusions.

One of his most controversial concepts involves what he calls "creeping" or "sluggish" schizophrenia, which is said to show itself early in difficulties with parents and authority figures, and with stubborn "reformist tendencies."

In Snezhnevsky's view, many people experience nervous breakdowns as children or adolescents, and think they recover completely. But their schizophrenia remains latent and can blossom 20 or 30 years later—often in the form of political dissidence. Exiled Writer Vladimir Bukovsky, now at Cambridge University, notes: "This means nobody knows whether he is schizophrenic or not unless Professor Snezhnevsky diagnoses it." That theory has proved convenient to the KGB, particularly since Soviet law allows for compulsory commitment by the courts when the accused has been classified as mentally ill. Indeed, the proceeding may be held without the dissident because he is considered too sick to attend. Thus, as Reich says, "dissenting views are pronounced the sick products of sick minds."

Roughly 1,000 dissidents have been misdiagnosed as latent or active schizophrenics and confined to mental institutions. After the World Psychiatric Association condemned the Soviet Union's psychiatry in 1977 for its political abuses, many Western doctors believed that the Kremlin would find less embarrassing ways of dealing with dissenters. They were apparently wrong. Amnesty International reports that incarceration of political dissenters as mental patients is just as prevalent as ever in the Soviet Union, and may even be increasing.

The politicization of psychiatry has in fact produced a kind of schizophrenia of the profession itself. As Bukovsky points out: "It is not easy for the ordinary person to get admitted for treatment in a psychiatric hospital. For a political case, though, it is very easy. They are taken to a hospital without making any request." ■

Sexual Equality—More or Less

Frustrated wives, lazy husbands and signs of change

Marx proclaimed it, Lenin insisted on it, and the Soviet constitution guarantees it: equality of the sexes, including comparable pay for comparable work. Some of the statistics are impressive: most of the doctors, three-quarters of the teachers and one-third of the engineers are women. So are half of all university and institute students and nearly 60% of those with technical or vocational training in high school or beyond.

Still, Soviet women are second-class comrades. Top jobs have a way of going

Female roadsweepers on the job

to men. In medicine, a profession with much less prestige in the Soviet Union than in the West, virtually all the elite surgeons and administrators are male. Mathematics and the sciences are masculine preserves. Though a third of the Supreme Soviet and 25% of Communist Party members are women, none occupy positions of real power, including membership in the Politburo. Even in what are considered traditionally female professions —education, health, post office, telephone and telegraph operations, and shopkeeping—the majority of managers and decision makers are men. As Nikita Khrushchev once admitted to an agricultural conference, "It turns out that it is men who do the administrating and women who do the work."

The rhetoric of women's lib may be little known in the U.S.S.R., but the battle of the sexes seems to be heating up. One recent underground feminist publication issued by bitter women in Leningrad attacked the typical Soviet husband as a brutal, drunken, selfish lout. The document charged that "the male contribution in the home is almost nonexistent. Any man who even knows how to hammer a nail is considered a rarity."

The point is well taken. A Soviet survey showing that while women were spending hours in long shopping lines, arguing with bureaucratic clerks and doing household chores without the benefit of a bevy of modern appliances, husbands were lazily watching TV, reading newspapers, tippling with their cronies or otherwise being idle.

They are not very good lovers either. Many a Soviet male has never seen his wife naked, and creative lovemaking is not high on the husband's list of living priorities. Ignorance is partly to blame, and some of that is being overcome by Western influences. One Moscow woman says her "naive, inexperienced husband" has been performing heroically since she showed him a smuggled copy of *The Joy of Sex*. A slowly improving standard of living has had an impact too. Many couples who once made love under the covers in an apartment crowded with relatives now have their own apartments and are more relaxed about sex. Says one such wife: "Now I feel freer to tell my husband what gives me pleasure and what doesn't."

Some Soviet commentators have suggested that many of the typical husband's attitudes—which are not exactly unknown in the West—are signs of disguised aggressiveness. In effect, the man is saying, "You're so free and capable, why don't you handle the chores for both of us?" Nonetheless, reports Victor Perevedentsev, a specialist on socioeconomic affairs in Moscow, the Soviet family is slowly changing from a patriarchy into a "biarchy"—equality in the home. Says he: "Women are rebelling, and they, of course, are correct in doing so."

The real irritant, though, is that the frustrated Soviet woman faces inequality both at home and at work, yet must shoulder the responsibilities of both. On the one hand, a dreary full-time job; on the other, the problems of raising kids and keeping her marriage together. That is increasingly hard to do; divorce is rising rapidly, and one marriage in three now fails. The state gives women some help in the form of child care and maternity leaves, but that is hardly enough to ease their dual burdens. One solution being advocated by an increasing number of women: part-time jobs, and plenty of them, to lighten the load and allow a little more breathing space for self-development. ■

Socialist Realism's Legacy

As much as in the '30s and '40s, modernism is anathema

One wet Sunday in September 1974, a couple of dozen Soviet painters carried their canvases into a patch of wasteland in Cheremushki, an outlying district of Moscow, and began to set them up on makeshift stands. A small crowd of onlookers gathered, and so, to one side, did a platoon of KGB agents with bulldozers, dump trucks and water cannon. The secret policemen were disguised as civilians doing volunteer work on the abandoned site. As the spectators peered at the paintings and a few Western reporters clicked their cameras, the agents attacked, flinging the canvases into rubbish trucks. Then the bulldozers and water cannon moved in, grinding over fallen works and chasing the drenched artists from the site.

Within 40 minutes the battle was over. Eighteen paintings had been mutilated and burned; four painters were under arrest. The infectious spores of bourgeois formalism, carried by Jews and other rootless cosmopolitans, had been sanitized; the integrity of the official style of Socialist Realism stood vindicated.

Provincial by Western standards, the artists whose work was vandalized by the state at Cheremushki may not have been of high interest, outside the U.S.S.R., to a historian of style; it was as though the New York City police had been sent to crush one of the weekend art shows at Washington Square. Yet the meaning of the event lay not in the merits of this "dissident" art as art, but in its power to provoke repression simply by existing. Of all the major Occidental powers, only the U.S.S.R. treats art as though it were politically dangerous. By doing so, it ensures that art does matter politically. So a cycle of self-fulfilling repression continues.

In the West, artists succeed or fail in the marketplace. There is no official line on art, in any useful sense of the term. But in the U.S.S.R., art must toe the ideological line. If dissident —which generally means "modernist" —artists are not persecuted as systematically as dissident writers, and fewer of them actually end up laying rails in Siberia or being shot full of drugs in KGB madhouses, this merely reflects the fact that art is not as forceful a channel for maverick ideas as literature. Nevertheless, state approval governs every aspect of the production, exhibition, sale and discussion of painting and sculpture. The essence of totalitarianism is that there must be no gaps in the monolith, nowhere for culture to create its models of dissent.

This deep hostility to modernism, a permanent legacy of Stalin, seems especially ironic to Western eyes because it was in Russia, between 1910 and 1925, that one of the great experiments of modern art was carried out. The leaders of the avant-garde, among them Kasimir Malevich, Naum Gabo, Vladimir Tatlin, Alexander Rodchenko and El Lissitzky, wanted to serve the new power of the left by combining revolutionary art with revolutionary politics. Russian constructivism was, in fact, the only heroic modernist style that drew its strength from the revolutionary impetus. Yet its sin was in being abstract, and for that it was consigned to darkness by Stalin and his cultural apparatchiks after 1929.

SOVFOTO

Alexander Gerasimov's *Marshal Joseph Stalin* (1944)

Sin is abstraction, virtue is bland, pious idealism.

According to the dogma of Socialist Realism, all art and literature must conform to the triple standard of *partinost* (party character), *ideinost* (socialist content) and *narodnost* (closeness to the people). For Stalin, this ideal was most faithfully reflected in the work of his favorite painter, Alexander Gerasimov, whose portraits of the dictator in various noble poses hung in museums, offices, factories and homes everywhere. At the same time, in the '30s and '40s, Stalin used every kind of coercion to apply the Socialist Realism doctrine, destroying the avant-garde and the contacts with Western artists that it needed. By 1953, when Stalin died, no Soviet artist could see, except in the most fragmentary way, any modernist art at all; the work of the constructivists, that heritage of Russian intellect and radical enthusiasm, was invisible.

"Socialist Realism is the only method of our art," wrote one of the surviving hacks in 1954. "Any other method is a concession to bourgeois ideology. In our country, where socialism has been victorious, where there has arisen a moral and political unity of the people unprecedented in the history of mankind, there is no special basis for different directions in art." Thus the lid clamped down, and it has remained down ever since, condensing the bland, dull, obsequious and piously idealistic nature of official "realism."

Today the most powerful state weapon against the dissident painter who cannot or will not join the Union of Soviet Artists—a closed Socialist Realist shop—is the law on *tuneyadstvo* (parasitism). An unemployed artist (and all nonunion members are, by definition, unemployed) can be punished with one to two years of prison. Apart from this, the "unofficial" artist must deal with a hundred resistances unknown to his Western counterpart.

Where can a sculptor find bronze, steel or plaster without union approval? How can a painter get access to studio space, even paints and canvas? How and where can the work be exhibited? How can anyone hear about it except by word of mouth, since all art writing in magazines like *Iskusstvo* (Art) or *Sovietskaya Kultura* is a direct emanation of union views, themselves determined by the Ministry of Culture?

Most unofficial Soviet art is earnestly provincial, dotted with quotations from Western modernist styles —abstract expressionism, Pop, minimalism—which cannot be assimilated properly because of the scarcity of information; one copy of a Western art magazine affects painters more, in this *samizdat* atmosphere, than do five museum shows in Manhattan. But the surprise is that such art exists at all. The dissident artist must expend so much energy on survival that he has less left for self-development. There is still no room for him in a society whose art has one purpose: to reinforce the narcissism of state power, under the guise of education. And the bitter moral dignity of his predicament cannot be much comfort. — ***Robert Hughes***

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Unseparate Church and State

After six decades, uneasy coexistence is a victory for Orthodoxy

A light rain is falling upon the Trinity Monastery of St. Sergius in Zagorsk. The monastery stands behind a fortress wall, half a mile around and 50 ft. thick, that protects the weathered stones and ancient relics of Trinity Cathedral. It is graduation day at the most important of the Soviet Union's three surviving Russian Orthodox seminaries. The 78 graduates, clad in black tunics and trousers, take their places in the cathedral before the ornate screen, hung with treasured icons, that separates the sanctuary from the congregation. Hundreds of candles shimmer against the gold and silver on the walls, and the smell of hot wax mingles with that of flowers.

Later, in the seminary building—a former tsarist palace—Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and head of the Russian Orthodox Church, bestows his blessing in a deep, resounding voice and offers a few words of instruction. The candidates stride forward to receive their diplomas and then bend to kiss the Patriarch's hand. Afterward, new graduates, friends, proud families and church dignitaries, assembled from all over the U.S.S.R., dine on bread, cheese, sausages and potatoes.

Something is stirring in Russian Orthodoxy. Congregations are getting younger. Applications for seminaries are increasing. About two-thirds of the new priests come from families that are indifferent or hostile to religion, a dramatic indication that youthful unbelievers are converting to Christianity, despite the atheist orientation of Soviet schools. The graduates at Zagorsk are about to take up their duties with a church that still maintains 11,000 active parishes after six decades of Soviet rule, often marked by systematic persecution. Official Soviet statistics admit two out of five burials are accompanied by a church service, and one out of six babies is baptized. In the Kharkov cathedral there are 120 to 170 baptisms every Sunday. Today the Russian Orthodox Church has 73 bishops, 10,000 priests and, according to U.S.S.R. government estimates, 30 million members who regularly attend services. Some Orthodox priests put baptized membership at 60 million.

Intellectuals are converting, and long dormant theological debates are reviving on such matters as whether to replace Old Church Slavonic with modern Russian in the liturgy. According to Anatoli Levitin-Krasnov, a Soviet exile who writes on religious affairs, the new vigor in the Orthodox Church is due to "widespread disillusionment with Marxism" among the young. Others believe that the rediscovery of Orthodoxy, complete with icons and ancient liturgical music, like a revival of interest in the nation's pre-revolutionary religious philosophers, is part of a new concern for Russia's historical culture. The best-known proponent of religious renewal is exiled Writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, but its keenest and most significant supporters are in the Soviet Union. Members of the Christian Seminar on Problems of Religious Renaissance, formed in 1974, proclaim: "We heard a call to salvation—the voice of our ancestors, our fathers, our saints. We *found* Russia."

A prelate in full panoply

Finding Russia in icons and ancient music.

The religious wing of the human rights movement is another indication of vigor. About half the *samizdat* (underground writings) that reach the West are religious in content. Young religious rights activists are bolder than their elders. The official Communist response to new religious stirrings has been modified reprisal. Five of the Christian Seminar members are under arrest; others are being harassed or undergoing forced "psychiatric" treatment. In January authorities arrested Father Dmitri Dudko, a Moscow priest whose fiery sermons attacked official atheism. In what dissidents consider a pre-Olympics "clean-up," many other prominent Orthodox believers were rounded up in late 1979 and early 1980. Among them: Father Gleb Yakunin, an Orthodox priest who appealed to the regime and the World Council of Churches for religious liberty and founded the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights in 1976.

Even so, the Soviet government and the Orthodox Church leadership continue in an odd embrace—one that leaves the church semifree to operate, though it is politically controlled and thus compromised. Despite Marxist dogma, Orthodoxy as a living faith in the U.S.S.R. represents continuity with the nation's pre-Soviet past. It also serves to legitimize the Communist government and its claims to "acknowledge" religious practice.

Throngs of worshipers in Zagorsk at Easter service

SIPA PRESS

Considering the fact that the 1917 Revolution was dedicated to the destruction of religion, the present standoff is something of a triumph for Orthodoxy.* The early Bolshevik regime confiscated church lands and abolished religious influence in schools. Intense atheism campaigns in the 1920s and '30s led to the imprisonment and death of thousands of priests and the desecration of countless churches. In the Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk, workers boasted that they burned 20,000 icons in socialist competition. By 1939, when Stalin signed his pact with Hitler, the Rus-

*The Russian Orthodox, the 4 million or more other Eastern Orthodox and the 43 million Muslims in the Soviet Union are much less harassed than the 2 million Soviet Jews, 4 million Roman Catholics and a small percentage of the country's 3 million Protestants who bitterly resist all state control of the church. Seven of these Protestant dissenters have lived in the U.S. embassy in Moscow for two years, seeking in vain to emigrate

sian Orthodox Church had only 100 or so churches open throughout the Soviet Union, compared with 40,437 before the Revolution.

The historic turning point came when Hitler violated the pact, and his mechanized divisions drove deep into the Soviet Union. The all-but-crushed church called upon the faithful to defend Mother Russia and quickly raised 300 million rubles for the Red Army. In desperate need of a spiritual force that could bolster national solidarity, Stalin allowed the church more freedom. Since then, except for a strong antireligious period in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the church's right to peaceful coexistence with atheism has not been seriously threatened.

The price of survival is high. Article 52 of the 1977 Soviet constitution assures citizens the "right to profess or not to profess any religion and to conduct religious worship." But the church is not permitted to give formal religious instruction to those under age 18. It is against Soviet law for a congregation to worship in public unless its members are officially registered. The state wields total control over whether a parish can use or repair a building, indeed whether a parish can exist at all.

Within the church, government control is pervasive. The appointment of every cleric, from Patriarch Pimen on down, must be cleared by the Council for Religious Affairs, a government agency that supervises all religious matters. Under these circumstances, contends Father Michael Meyerson-Aksyonov, a convert to Orthodoxy who tried unsuccessfully to enter a Soviet seminary and is an émigré now living in the U.S., "the priest is not the spiritual or moral leader of the community. He is a performer of rites and nothing more."

State supervision is reinforced by extralegal methods. Most of this year's graduates at Zagorsk were probably approached at some point by the KGB secret police and asked to spy on colleagues. Some observers charge that promotion in the hierarchy tends to go not only to mediocrities but to men with known character weaknesses—which leaves them subject to blackmail.

A high official of the World Council of Churches, which the Russian Orthodox Church was permitted to join in 1961, points out that the Orthodox hierarchy consists of "churchmen who are struggling to safeguard their Christian integrity against great odds."

"What is amazing," notes Father Meyerson-Aksyonov, "is not that the church leadership is corrupt but that it is not *so* corrupt." In a possible sign of new independence, the Soviet delegates to the W.C.C. Executive Committee did not register opposition to a resolution expressing "serious concern" over the Soviet "military action" in Afghanistan, and other world conflicts.

Government spokesmen profess pleasure with things as they are. So does Archbishop Nikodim, 59, who is substituting for the ailing Metropolitan Yuvenali as foreign affairs director of the church. "In the West, for some reason, thousands of Orthodox priests in Russia are considered nearly as traitors, and two or three [dissident] persons are considered to be the church," says Nikodim. "I don't know Father Dudko. Maybe he is a wonderful person. But I think groups that exist, or would like to exist, around Dudko and others are not for the benefit of the church, since our church finds its beauty in unity. The action of the church is not for sensation or effect. In our diocese in Kharkov, all the priests work zealously every day, take care of the people and preach. Thousands of priests work the same way and have no conflicts with the state." When problems arise with the state's watchdog agency, "we have respect for each other, and we always try to find a reasonable solution that would not destroy the harmony of relations between church and state, nor harm the freedom of action of the church." ■

Graduating seminarians at Trinity Monastery of St. Sergius in Zagorsk

Among the young, "widespread disillusionment with Marxism."

. . . And an Atheist Bestseller



Karl Marx

When the new edition hit the bookstores late last year, 100,000 copies were snapped up in a matter of days. The smash seller? A revised and expanded version of the *Atheist's Pocket Dictionary*, first issued in 1973 and put out by a state-run political publishing house called Politizdat. The 280-page paperback, though "designed for propagandists, lecturers and organizers of atheistic work," has some of the appeal of forbidden fruit; few books are ever published in the U.S.S.R. that deal with religion, even in a backhanded way.

Definitions in the *Atheist's Dictionary* are written to conform with the basic Marxist line that religion is either 1) pure superstition or 2) "the opium of the people." God? An idea "used to justify and protect the social order of exploiters." Heaven? It distracts people from "the real tasks of the Communist rearrangement of life on earth." Conversely, hell dampens "the rage of the working people against their oppressors by planting a hope that the latter will be punished after death." Easter fosters "ideas of a class peace and forgiveness." Christ's love-thy-neighbor teaching is "egotistical and antihumane."

The Russian Orthodox Church wins grudging praise for gradually surrendering to "the strengthening of Soviet power" and for denouncing "fascist aggression" during the "great patriotic war" (World War II). Still, its essence is defined as "reactionary." Judaism comes off less well, though the lexicon avoids anti-Semitism. Zionism is dismissed as "an ideology of chauvinism and a policy of anti-Sovietism by the big Jewish bourgeoisie closely connected with imperialistic circles of capitalist countries."

The word is not all negative, however. Atheism, readers learn, expresses the interests and aspirations of the working class and "serves the cause of spiritual liberation of the working masses from the burden of prejudices and delusions of the past."

With Justice for (Almost) All

The system that was to fade away is now arbiter of everything

Noon in the Babushkinsky District People's Court in northern Moscow. The judge, a petite brunet in a striped blouse and skirt, enters the room. Two citizen-jurists called "people's assessors," an elderly man and a young woman, follow her to the high-backed chairs behind the bench. On the docket: *Borisova* vs. *Borisov*, a divorce case.

Boris Borisov, a researcher at a Moscow institute, and his wife Nadezhda, who have been married for 15 years, sit apart in the front row of seats facing the bench. They might have been able to dissolve their marriage after a three-month waiting period simply by applying at the civil registry office, but because a child is involved, a boy of four, a court proceeding is required.

The judge begins by questioning Mrs. Borisova, who tells about how her husband has been unfaithful and even ran off with another woman during her pregnancy. That ended all trust between them

Judge: But you have lived together these four years?

Wife: If you call that living

Judge: How does he treat you now?

Wife: We only communicate because of the child.

After eliciting a few more details—one point of contention has been Mrs. Borisova's dinners of potatoes or *kasha*—the judge turns to the husband. He seems as resentful of his wife's unforgiving attitude as she is of his infidelity. Eventually, the judge and the assessors reach their decision: no divorce, for now. A final judgment will be postponed until August in hopes that the Borisovs can settle their differences by then.

Laws and courts, like the state, were supposed to fade away as the Soviet system developed. Instead they have flourished. The Babushkinsky District People's Court, one of 32 in Moscow, is a typical tribunal empowered to try practically all civil and criminal cases. It employs ten full-time judges (seven of them women) and 750 people's assessors; these lay jurists, elected by co-workers or neighbors, consider the job an honor. Judicial business is booming, explains the chief judge, Polina Gorelova, because "here any citizen can take his case to court."

Many do. Civil cases account for about 85% of all judicial activity, reflecting the fact that courts have become not only a guardian of the state's authority but also the arbiter of all sorts of social matters. Says Columbia Law Professor John Hazard: "They spend most of their time determining who should get what apartment space, who has earned what salary, who should do what job, and so on."

Justice, Soviet-style, is relatively cheap and quick. Lawyers are not required in civil cases. The attorney's role is often played by the judge, who not only sets aside time to hear citizens' legal plaints but also prepares the person's case if the claim is valid. Courts hear disputes involving employment and alimony free of charge; in other civil actions, such as complaints about living quarters, the fee can be as low as 75¢. Divorces, which are on the rise, if still less frequent than in the U.S. (.3 divorces per marriage, *vs.* America's .5), are also inexpensive: the basic filing fee is about $15, though additional charges can run the final divorce bill up to $150, a big chunk of the average worker's $240-a-month wage

By law, a civil suit should be wrapped up within a month after it is filed, and a criminal pretrial investigation is to be completed within two months, unless an extension is granted. In some circumstances, accused persons can be held for nine months before trial, although this limit may be extended in cases of political crimes. Indeed, dissidents and other government targets live in an entirely different legal world. Once authorities decide that they want to convict a troublemaker, they bend any rules that interfere.

The U.S.S.R.'s legal system is a product in part of reforms launched by Nikita Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s to make Soviet justice fairer than it was in Joseph Stalin's era of terror. Each of the 15 republics has its own criminal code; they are basically similar to one another, dealing not only with standard crimes like theft and rape but also with peculiarly Soviet offenses. It is forbidden, for example, to "speculate")buy and resell products for profit) and to issue repeatedly poor-quality or nonstandard goods. Some of the codes, particularly those of the Central Asian republics, reflect old regional attitudes. In Uzbekistan, which is predominantly Muslim and has a tradition of men taking many wives, bigamy has been made a crime punishable by a fine of $150 or a year of hard labor, but there is no law, or need for it, against bigamy in the Ukraine, where European monogamy prevails

The Soviet system roughly follows the French and German model. While defendants have many legal safeguards, including a few that even Americans lack —they cannot be convicted on the basis of a confession alone, for instance—the concept of the rights of the accused is not as developed as it is in the U.S. Says Political Science Professor Paul Zinner of the University of California at Davis: "The key difference is that society's interests in the U.S.S.R., as interpreted by the judge, are paramount to any individual interest. So there is no question, as there is in the U.S., about protecting individual rights per se."

Criminal cases feature a pretrial investigation supervised by a state official called the procurator, who acts as both the prosecutor and protector of the suspect's interests; the defendant may not have counsel participate until the investigation is completed. Generally, procurators strive to be objective. Defendants whose cases reach court are almost al-

V. SAVELYEV

Flanked by two citizen-jurists, a judge hears a case in a People's Court

Enforcing bans on "speculating," bad goods and bigamy in Uzbekistan

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

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ways convicted, but that is because the procurators drop weak cases before they are tried. The accused are presumed innocent in theory. In practice, a person who is tried frequently has the burden of proving that he is not guilty. There are no juries; the judge and the lay assessors alone decide cases. While in U.S. courts only the defendant may appeal, Soviet law extends this right to both parties.

Matters of Communist Party discipline are settled in secretive party tribunals. Commercial disputes between state enterprises, typically involving delivery delays and complaints about quality, are dealt with by special arbitration panels. Minor civil and criminal matters are handled by Comrades' Courts, which deal with such petty matters as tenant grievances and driver's license suspensions. Under an antihooliganism law enacted in 1966 to cover crimes ranging from disorderly conduct to assault, a patrolman can write up a citizen for minor offenses like rowdyism and public drunkenness, and within 24 hours the chief of police will decide whether to fine the offender or forward the case to the People's Court.

Sentences can be harsh; some economic crimes, such as major embezzlement of state property, can even bring death. Judges generally do not hand down the long prison hitches that U.S. courts often mete out in anticipation of early parole, but Soviet convicts are more likely to serve full terms. And they toil hard, both in the prisons where repeat offenders or dangerous criminals are kept and in the work camps housing most of the convict population of about 2 million.

In the U.S. the Constitution is paramount, and courts can toss out laws judged inconsistent with it. In the U.S.S.R., laws enacted by the Supreme Soviet take precedence over conflicting provisions in the constitution, which is less a legal pillar than a policy statement; among other things, it limits the work week to 41 hours, and it obliges children to care for and help their parents. While the Soviets do have a Supreme Court, it does not, in effect, have the power to make law, nor can it strike down statutes enacted by the legislature.

Traditionally the Soviets have held lawyers in low esteem, which may be apt for a country in which laws were supposed to be necessary only during the transition to a self-governing society that would not require courts, prosecutors and police. But increasingly the Soviet authorities find themselves resorting to law to accomplish goals and deal with change.

One result has been a heavy demand for attorneys. The number of law schools has risen from 36 to 50 since 1970, and an unprecedented measure of prestige is accruing to the profession. Some observers have even suggested something that Marx, Lenin or Stalin would have found unthinkable: in 30 years or so, the country's Establishment could include a liberal sprinkling of lawyers. ■

A Bit Wild in the Big City

Youth crime grows, as booze spreads and Babushka *recedes*

Mark Kasakevich, 19, a Soviet emigrant to the U.S., has a haunting recollection of his old life in Moscow. "It is amazing how cruelty to animals was so accepted," he says. "Boys, totally unprovoked, would kick dogs until they were half dead. You would see cats and dogs limping around with an ear cut off or stab wounds in the side."

Animals, sadly, are not the only targets of destructive youths, who account for about half of the nation's street crime, theft and burglary, and one out of ten murders. In Georgia last year two girls of 15 were charged with killing two other teenagers just to get their prized blue jeans. In Belorussia, eleven youths were arrested after a rampage in which they beat a policeman to death. In Leningrad vandals thought to be youths smashed 29 statues in the garden of the Summer Palace.

Moscow is still safer than New York City, but the U.S.'s high juvenile crime rate is small comfort to Soviet officials. What they call hooliganism—public disorderliness, minor assault and vandalism—is widespread; gangs of youths often lurk around the paths and stairwells of Moscow's apartment complexes, bullying residents. As a result, the city is encouraging the growth of volunteer auxiliary police and bolstering the already highly visible regular police force.

It is not only the extent of juvenile crime that worries the Soviets but the ideological contradiction that is involved: in a Communist society antisocial behavior should be on the wane. "It hits the regime where it hurts most," says the University of South Carolina's Gordon Smith, who has written extensively on Soviet youth and criminal justice. At the root of the problem are such social ills as alcohol abuse, broken families, crowded living conditions—and boredom. "Drunkenness," says Police Lieut. General Pyotr Oleinik, "is the mother of hooliganism."

A Leningrad study found that in most families of youthful offenders one or both parents had a drinking problem. According to an official Soviet report, 84% of young people begin drinking before the age of 16. Because of the high divorce rate and because most wives have jobs, youngsters are too frequently left to their own devices. The days of the extended family, when *Babushka* (Grandmother) was a stabilizing influence, are disappearing.

Moscow police arresting a young man suspected of having committed a robbery

A spreading phenomenon that "hits the regime where it hurts the most."

Urbanization, restricted living space (many Moscow families still live in a single room) and growing independence mean that Grandmother is no longer available to care for grandchildren. With no supervision and little to do, particularly in the suburbs, youngsters are primed for trouble. Explains Criminology Professor Louise Shelley of American University in Washington, D.C.: "One of the stereotypes in the U.S.S.R. is the kid who lives on the edge of Moscow, comes in for the day, gets drunk in the train station and goes a bit wild in the big city."

Offenders may be tried in adult courts if they are over 16 and the crime is serious. Otherwise they are handled by the Commissions on Juvenile Affairs, which emphasize rehabilitation by counseling rather than imprisonment (though in some cases parents may be fined for their children's transgressions). There are exceptions, though. Last year two technical school students were sent to a labor camp for seven years after they stabbed to death three of the Moscow Zoo's kangaroos. ■

Neat and attentive children listen to their teacher in a Siberian elementary school

Why Ivan and Tanya Can Read

Six days a week: drill, drill and still more drill

At General Education School No. 402, in the Perovsky district of eastern Moscow, 30 fourth-grade pupils rise to their feet when their teacher enters. Respectfully, they address him as Alexei Grigoryevich, using his first name and patronymic. The pupils, who wear uniforms (brown frocks and orange neckerchiefs for girls, blue jackets with shoulder tabs for boys), remain standing until their presence is acknowledged by the teacher, a short, bald man in his 50s. Then he turns brusquely to business.

"What do the words *futbol, stadion* and *patriot* have in common?" he asks. Hands shoot up across the classroom, but the pupils are silent, and there is no squirming to catch the teacher's attention. Alexei Grigoryevich points to a girl in the third row, who rises to explain that all these words are of foreign origin. The teacher draws back a curtain covering part of the blackboard, disclosing a chart of verbs. Asked to explain where the accent falls in various verb forms, students respond by reciting grammatical rules. Invariably, they answer in complete sentences. Each pupil is graded on his performance in a daybook, a running report that is sent home to be initialed by his parents at the end of every week. The daybook keeps track of misbehavior with notes such as "Created a disturbance in the gym" or "Arrived five minutes late for physical culture."

Vocational student at work

The pattern of School No. 402—daybook, drill and the use of specialized subject-matter instruction as early as the fourth grade—is repeated in 147,000 "general education" schools across the U.S.S.R. Soviet children go to school six days each week, typically from 8:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. The required curriculum generally runs through tenth grade and covers about the same amount of schooling that U.S. students get attending five days a week from kindergarten through twelfth grade. City schools are better than rural schools, but most Soviet students study the same standard curriculum. Usually there is only one current textbook authorized for each major subject, though the 15 republics of the Soviet Union are allowed to have special courses in the history and geography of their regions.

The curriculum is stiff and compulsory. On the average, two mathematics courses are required in each grade (including heavy doses of geometry and algebra, plus a year or two of calculus in the final grades). And 5½ years of biology, five years each of physics and geography, four years of chemistry, one year of astronomy, ten years of shop and mechanical drawing and up to seven years of foreign language (most frequently English and French). Apart from languages, the humanities are largely taken up with the detailed study of Marxism-Leninism. Zoya Malkova, the director of the Institute for General Pedagogy in Moscow, defends the standardized curriculum as "one way toward the equalization of our society."

In theory at least, Soviet schools avoid grouping pupils by ability. Says Malkova: "We are in principle against the IQ theory. We consider that every healthy child is capable of effectively mastering the school program." Even so, a few gifted or privileged students are selected for special schools.

While public schools in the U.S. have swung from open classrooms to back-to-basics during the past two decades, the Soviets, like Europeans generally, have kept fairly steadily to traditional teaching methods. Says Malkova: "In the U.S., you have a tendency to do things in extremes, first one direction, then another. We never had this problem. We are concerned, though, about trying to encourage reasoning about problems rather than rote memorization. A central task of contemporary Soviet pedagogy has been just how to develop independent thinking."

Pupil independence, however, plays second balalaika to the pressure for top marks on the nationwide exams at the end of the eighth grade, which decide the careers of pupils. Top scorers are bound for higher education as scientists, engineers, teachers and economists. The middle-ranked enter four-year schools for technicians. Those at the bottom get vocational training and jobs on the assembly line or in small workshops. In the U.S., 54% of high school seniors go on to some sort of higher education, compared with roughly 20% in the Soviet Union.

The drill and discipline do risk making Ivan a dull boy. In Stalin's time, a pedagogical textbook defined *initiative* as "the search for the best way to fulfill an order." Today initiative is given more encouragement—but not all that much more. Especially in such humanistic subjects as literature and history, the emphasis on ideology leaves little room for personal interpretation. Recalls Vita Kronik, 42, a Moscow-born academic who emigrated to Detroit in 1976: "If a student is asked to write a composition describing an anticapitalistic hero of a novel, he must underline the political tendency of this hero, not the humanity or the values of this character."

But in science and engineering, the Soviet system does increasingly well. In a report for the National Science Foundation last December, Mathematics Professor Izaak Wirszup of the University of Chicago, an expert on Soviet scientific education, concluded that the Soviets, through "an educational mobilization of the entire population," had far outstripped the U.S. in the quality of scientific and mathematical education at elementary and secondary levels.

Wirszup based his conclusions on a

study of Soviet school texts and educational magazines. The Soviet mathematics program he found "modern in content, innovative in approach, well integrated and highly sophisticated." Most remarkable to Wirszup were magazines aimed at students. One, an illustrated monthly on math and science for ninth- and tenth-graders, called *Unitechnic Journal*, had a circulation of 1.6 million. Among the contents: a serious mathematical article that discussed Einstein's equations and another that presented a complex analysis of the atom and nuclear power. As Wirszup notes, the periodical is more colorful and clearly written than similar materials available even to advanced high school students in the U.S.

While Soviet schoolchildren are now taught algebra, geometry and some calculus, Wirszup points out that even college-bound U.S. high schoolers usually manage only eight years of arithmetic, one or two of algebra and two or three of science. He estimates that in 1978 and '79 more than 5 million Soviet high school students took advanced calculus, compared with 105,000 U.S. students at the secondary level. Significantly, Wirszup found that more than 56% of U.S. school districts reporting to the National Science Foundation in 1977 required only one or no math course for high school graduation.

The Soviet Union insists on very close ties between parents and schools. First-grade teachers are required to visit the homes of entering pupils during the first eight weeks of school. And schools seek out neighborhood adults to serve as counselors for after-school activities: model building, rocketry, dancing instruction, chess clubs. William Green, 24, a U.S. citizen and a graduate student at the University of Southern California, went to a Soviet middle school for two years while his father was stationed in Moscow as a U.S. Foreign Service officer. Green recalls that his parents were required to attend a special classroom session with his teacher at least four times a year: "Parents would sit at students' desks, and the teacher would lay it on the line. It would be very explicit criticism, like 'Your child isn't working hard enough' or 'We don't think you're encouraging this or that development.' " If parents fail to respond, school officials may notify the parents' supervisors at work, who in turn strenuously urge employees to do a better job of child rearing. Many Soviet émigrés —no friends of Communism—vigorously defend Soviet education for its seriousness and rigor, if not its ideology. As Emigré Emil Draitser, 42, currently a teaching fellow in the department of Slavic languages at U.C.L.A., puts it, "Frankly, I am in this country just five years, and I see no harm in [the Soviet approach]." Draitser faults the leniency and lack of seriousness of American education. Says he: "This is ridiculous. If a man stops school in the Soviet Union after eighth grade, at least he knows something." ■

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

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Movies for the Masses

Film makers must edify as well as entertain

"Cinema is for us the most important of the arts," declared Lenin in 1922, and not since Pope Julius ii commissioned Michelangelo to paint the Sistine Chapel ceiling had the proclamation of a chief of state resulted in such a sunburst of high art. A troika of young film maker-theoreticians—Sergei Eisenstein, V.I. Pudovkin and Alexander Dovzhenko—seized the movie toy and remade it into a sophisticated machine that dazzled the world intelligentsia, even as it instructed the Russian proletariat. As long as the party hierarchy was amused too, all was well. But in 1924 Stalin rephrased the famous dictum, and his diaphanous threat holds to this day: "The cinema is the greatest means of mass agitation. Our problem is to take this matter into our own hands."

Director Mikhalkov acts in *Siberiada*

There the matter has rested for the past half a century, and the hands of the Soviet film industry's "editors" (censors) can be heavy indeed. The two men who by international critical consensus are the heirs of Soviet film greatness—Andrei Tarkovsky and Sergei Paradjanov—have been harassed, cajoled and officially criticized. Tarkovsky, best known for the chilling sci-fi parable *Solaris* (1972), recently was named "People's Artist of the U.S.S.R.," but the film bureaucracy has refused to fund some of his projects, delayed the release of others or exhibited them for only a few weeks in out-of-the-way theaters. Paradjanov astonished Western film buffs with the extravagant lyricism of his *Shadows of Our Forgotten Ancestors* (1964), but the state saw him as a troublemaker and sent him to prison—for almost four years.

Paradjanov's more cautious colleagues have referred to him as "kind of mad." It may be equally delirious for Westerners to demand of today's Soviet film makers that they bring to their craft the passionate recklessness of their predecessors. Revolutionary fervor, like first love, passes quickly; in the long run, any marriage of art and the state demands fidelity and fealty. Official Soviet cinema is settling into middle age with all the virtues of a Chekhovian "good wife": it is handsome, thoughtful, often charming and, above all, discreet about the master's excesses and failings.

It is precisely this Chekhovian quality—the rueful romanticism, the generous fatalism, the belief that everyone has his reasons—that permeates the best "approved" Soviet films, and perhaps the spirit of the men and women who make them as well. In the Soviet system, everyone has his function. Some people make films (about 150 features a year from the three major and 20 regional studios). Some people "edit" them (there are often three censors assigned to a production). Some people exhibit them (though theater managers, who have admissions quotas to meet, frequently pair Soviet films with livelier fare from abroad). And some people go to see them (80 million tickets were sold every week in 1977, at an average cost of 50¢ each).

The Soviet public may get to see only bland or self-critical films from the West, but the elite are permitted to study the works of leading film makers from all nations. As a result, the best Soviet movies, whatever their content, have the look and feel of the best European films.

White hats and Red ideals: Yelena Solovey in Mikhalkov's *Slave of Love*

There are directors who, if they worked elsewhere, would surely have achieved international recognition. Among them is Georgi Daneliya, who made the appealing, comic *Autumn Marathon* (1979). It is about a teacher-translator trying to balance the requirements of his overextended double career with the equally pressing demands of a suspicious wife and a possessive mistress—a situation familiar to members of the Western bourgeoisie. The movie offers an agreeable insight into the life of the educated, privileged class in the Soviet Union.

Daneliya is working safe terrain here: the romantic comedy. There are other comfortable places for a Soviet director to work—screen adaptations of classic novels and plays, for example. Pictures that show the suffering and steadfastness of ordinary citizens during World War II also win the approval of the editors—and of the public. As the Revolution of 1917—which provided the first Soviet film makers with their great subject—recedes in memory, World War II has replaced it in the country's hagiography.

A scene from Gubenko's *The Orphans*

Nikolai Gubenko's *The Orphans* (1978) takes place in a state orphanage right after the war. If the institution's staff is seen as rather too noble, the problems of the children—ranging from withdrawal to rebelliousness—are sensitively portrayed. It is a strong and absorbing work.

So is the somewhat ungainly but poetic *Siberiada* (1979), directed by Andrei Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky. The Soviets have lost neither their taste for, nor their skill with, the epic historical drama. *Si-*

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A wedding in Sergei Paradjanov's *Shadows of Our Forgotten Ancestors*

A marriage of art and the state demands fidelity and fealty

beriada traces the history of an obscure Siberian village from snowbound primitivism and isolation at the beginning of this century through war and revolution, to the discovery of a great oilfield in the late '60s. Like Dovzhenko before him, Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky has a way of linking a peculiarly Russian feeling for the sacredness of native ground with the developing force of the revolution.

Most-favored-director status goes to Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky's brother Nikita Mikhalkov, 34. His *Slave of Love* was one of the few recent Soviet films to receive critical acclaim and a measure of box-office success when it was released in the U.S. last year. A touching, gently comic portrait of a movie company on location in 1917, *Slave of Love* shows a group of innocents trying to avoid being caught up in the revolution. In *Five Evenings*, Mikhalkov tells the story of a middle-aged man and woman trying to pick up the threads of a romance they were forced to sever during World War II. And in his latest film, *Oblomov*, he tackles the elusive, lethargic hero of Ivan Goncharov's 19th century masterwork.

Mikhalkov, who recently returned to the U.S.S.R. from a trip to the U.S., sees similarities between the best films of both countries. Says he: "It seems to me that the time has come to return to a type of romanticism—to Chaplin, to films that give people some hope—*Breaking Away*, *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, *Nashville*, *Paper Moon*." But as a Soviet film maker, is he not asked to make cuts in his movies to satisfy the cultural bureaucrats? Mikhalkov shrugs his shoulders. "Of course, that's only natural," he replies. "Whoever pays can call the tune. Here it is from Goskino [the centralized film bureaucracy]; in America it would be the producer. But as far as I am personally concerned, if I have to be financially dependent, I would prefer that I not be dependent on one or two producers but on what is called the fatherland. I just try to do my job as honestly as possible."

The question is whether "honesty" and "fatherland" are, in the U.S.S.R., irreconcilable enemies. Soviet film makers work under many ideological restraints, some subtle, some blatant—that began with a five-year plan set down by Goskino. Like the production schedule of an oldtime Hollywood studio, the code calls for production funds to be divided among pictures in a variety of genres. But the genres in question touch on themes that only an apparatchik could love: tales of young workers and peasants heroically exceeding their quotas.

All scripts must be filtered through an editor, who claims that his desire is merely to "clarify" the writer's aims. Says Mikhail Bogin, an émigré Soviet director: "The editor wonders, 'What can be learned from this film? How does it serve the Soviet people?' He'll probably begin to think, 'I'm afraid. I'm worried.' " He should be, for he will share the blame with the film's creators if something offends someone further up the line —a cultural bureaucrat in one of the republics, or perhaps even the Central Committee in Moscow. Like Stalin before him, Brezhnev has been known to enter these debates. He once got a movie shelved simply by inquiring after a screening, "Who needs it?"

Usually, however, a film is well laundered before the party boss gets to play movie mogul. One director found himself squabbling with censors when he made a comedy about corruption in the wine industry: in one scene a bad barrel was labeled "48," which happened to be precisely the number of years that had passed since the revolution. Was he perhaps implying that the revolution had gone sour too? Another film maker got into trouble when he included a song called *Bring Me a Piece of the Moon*—during the time that Americans had landed there and the Russians had not. Was he belittling the Soviet space effort? Edward Topol, an émigré screenwriter, once tried to explain a picture about juvenile delinquency to a Soviet official, who said that in his travels round the Soviet Union he had never seen any youthful criminals, so how could they exist? Re-edited and reshot, a new version was permitted to go forth by KGB Boss Yuri Andropov.

This hassling creates a climate of self-censorship and an implicit demand to pretty-up reality. Says Topol: "If you just set up a camera anywhere in the Soviet Union and shoot life as it is, it looks terrible. It jumps out at you from the screen." Yet the directors soldier on. Some search patiently for a historical or fantastical work that will not overstrain the censorious mind. Still others find a style of shooting an approved scene that will change its meaning without altering a word of the preapproved script. A happy ending darkly lit will not, for example, play in quite the way the editors thought it would.

For some directors, the endings are darkly lit. The first director assigned to *Slave of Love* was a wildly talented young Uzbek named Rustam Hamdamov, the hope of the Soviet film school, who seemed destined to drag this once proud national cinema back to glory. But according to a friend, when the editors saw Hamdamov's lyrical-surreal footage, they fired him and brought in Nikita Mikhalkov to reshoot the film. Hamdamov's art, it seems, no longer appears in state cinemas; it hangs on the walls and in the closets of private homes. At last report, the U.S.S.R.'s most promising director was in Soviet Georgia, working as a painter and dress designer. ■

Andrei Tarkovsky's sci-fi parable *Solaris*

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Inside the Big Red Machine

An athletic program for everyone yields Olympic gold

In a Leningrad gym, a class of ten-year-old schoolgirls begins one of its twice-weekly sessions by executing handstands on the parallel bars. In Moscow's Central Army Sports Club, teams of soldiers exchange their combat boots for skates; a hockey puck is soon cracking like gunfire against the wooden boards. Near by, in Luzhniki Park, a group of middle-aged citizens sets out on a supervised 10-km walk, picking berries along the way.

A few vignettes from everyday sporting life in the Soviet Union, where fitness is virtually a state religion and millions of citizens take part in an elaborate system of athletic instruction and awards. Designed for the masses, the Soviet sports machine has nonetheless produced an athletic elite of awesome proportions, with all the international political benefits that implies. Just as do many other countries, the U.S.S.R. views sport as a useful political weapon. Since participating in its first modern Olympiad in 1952 in Helsinki, the Soviet Union has won 685 medals in the Summer Games—more than any other nation during those years (the U.S., in second place, has collected 603). The Kremlin considered this year's Games in Moscow—the first ever held in a Communist nation—not only as another quadrennial chance to demonstrate Soviet athletic prowess, but also as the best possible way to show off its society to the rest of the world.

The Soviet sports program, supervised by the Physical Culture and Sports Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, is organized down to the level of nursery school and factory. At the top are 39 "voluntary sports societies" run by regional labor unions. Each has its own teams, facilities, and badges: Spartak, for example, has 4 million members, mostly white collar workers, each of whom pays 30 kopecks (45¢) annual dues.

Then come the nearly 1.5 million sports clubs, ranging from the tiny Kolos of the Kalinin collective farm near Pinsk in Belorussia to the nationwide Central Army Club, which draws its members from the armed services. According to official figures, enrollment in the societies and the sports clubs totals 57 million —one-fifth of the nation's population.

To encourage mass participation, Moscow pushes a set of nationwide physical tests for citizens aged ten to 60 called G.T.O. (*Gotov k Trudu i Oborone*, or Prepared for Work and Defense). To earn a gold badge in the Strength and Courage (ages 16 to 18) category, for instance, a citizen must be able to do twelve chin-ups and toss a grenade 40 meters, among other feats. In 1976, the last year for which figures are available, 20.5 million Soviets of all ages won silver and gold badges.

Starting at age seven, school children must take part in two 45-minute physical education classes weekly. By age ten or eleven, those who show promise attend one of 5,000 "junior sports schools" operated after regular classroom hours. One result of this early introduction to sport and fitness is the development of an enthusiasm for athletics that encompasses the whole society.

The most skilled young Soviet athletes graduate to one of the country's 600 Olympic reserve schools, located in the larger cities. The schools offer complete academic programs as well as athletic training, and their yearly graduating classes form the pool from which members are selected for national and individual republic squads in such sports as basketball and volleyball. Top athletes may also be drafted by the army specifically to play on the service's various teams.

Young athletes on parade at the National Children's Sports Games in the Crimea

Grenade throwing, stipends from the state and a crash program for handball.

Through this gleaning process the Soviet Union eventually selects its Olympic athletes. The best in team sports are selected through regional and national championships, while the finest in individual sports are determined in the quadrennial Spartakiad, a sort of dress-rehearsal Olympics held in Moscow the summer before the Games. In 1979, 90 million Soviet athletes tried out in local and regional contests, and 10,000 eventually took part in Spartakiad.

The best Soviet athletes win more than just medals. An Olympic-caliber competitor is a kind of professional amateur, with a salary paid by the state and a standard of living roughly equivalent to that of a successful factory manager. Vladimir Yashchenko, 21, a world-class high jumper busily training for the Olympics, receives a stipend of $400 from the government. Irina Rodnina, 30, and Alexander Zaitsev, 28, the 1980 winter Olympic champion figure-skating pair, live in a two-bedroom apartment in downtown Moscow, a privilege seldom granted to a couple so young. Once their playing days are over, many Olympic athletes can look forward to careers as coaches and sport administrators.

Soviet authorities deny that their athletes use steroids, chemicals that promote muscle development but are outlawed in international competition. A few athletes have defected to the West with tales of widespread steroid use, but such charges are difficult to prove. Still the Soviet athletic establishment is under intense pressure to succeed, and athletes are sometimes asked to take up unpopular sports. Several years ago, the Sports Committee decided that Olympic gold could be mined from handball—a sport not seriously pursued in the Soviet Union. Word went out to the local sports schools to set up crash training programs for *gandbolisty*. "We are proud of such 'interference,'" said Sergei Pavlov, Minister of Sports. At the first Olympiad after that decision, in Montreal in 1976, Soviet players entered both the men's and women's handball matches and walked away with gold medals. ■

Members of Pesnyary, "the Soviet Beatles," in full and sentimental cry: plunging into the past, souping up the present

Keeping the Comrades Warm

Rock rolls in on the air waves, and the Soviets hear it their way

Show me round your snow peaked
mountains way down south
Take me to your daddy's farm
Let me hear your balalaikas
ringing out
Come and keep your comrade
warm.
—John Lennon and Paul McCartney

The Beatles never made it to the Soviet Union. Nor has the "White album" ever been available there officially. This does not mean, however, that a Soviet citizen under the age of 30 has not heard *Back in the U.S.S.R.*, with its wicked inversion of some old Chuck Berry sentiments and its slap-happy political satire. For that matter, young Muscovites could probably chime in on a chorus of *Let It Be*. Officially, there is little imported rock or pop music available. Unofficially, Moscow is like Alice's Restaurant. You can get anything you want.

The place to go record shopping is a small downtown park, just off Mayakovsky Square. The most desirable rock albums, often on tape, are available there, says a Muscovite fan who frequents the park, "if you approach the right people. If you can wait. If you can pay." The tariff is high. A Rolling Stones album may go for 80 rubles (about $120). Prices for mint-condition albums range from 50 to 70 rubles ($75 to $105), which makes record buying a gilt-edged hobby. Cassette tapes are cheaper (around 40 rubles), or even less if they have been copied from records, other tapes, or recorded off Voice of America broadcasts.

On a weekend evening, the park is crowded with record buyers, traders and tape pirates, who carry a list of merchandise and escort a customer to a private apartment where money and merchandise change hands. The result of this underhanded commerce is a surprisingly timely taste for Western trends. One habitué of the park recently boasted of owning "two Sex Pistols records and an Ian Dury." Another effect is more striking: tolerance—unofficial, of course—of the record deals, and an attempt to give Soviet pop some Western-style spin.

Because Soviet youth has shown such a taste for Western tunes, a few rock acts, chosen by the Ministry of Culture, have been allowed to tour some of the major cities. Elton John may seem like the Liberace of rock, but in the U.S.S.R. he could have passed for the Clash. Of the seven government-run radio stations in Moscow, two play rock from abroad; the music gets no more raucous than that of the Eagles. The stations also boost home-grown talent. To a Westerner, Soviet rock sounds like a not entirely successful hybrid of imported kitsch, slicked-up folk melodies and a touch of Russian soul. "Soviet pop music has absorbed contemporary rhythms, but it has remained something individual in its musical phrasing," insists Lev Leshchenko, whose baritone soared above massed strings and a choir on one of the country's biggest hits, *Day of Victory*, a pop-sized commemoration of the end of World War II. Much Soviet pop plunges into the past. Pesnyary (the Songsters) is a band regarded in official circles –if not among the kids—as the Soviet Beatles.

Maybe in popularity. Pesnyary is the U.S.S.R.'s best-known attraction on record and in concert. The group sings soupy, over-orchestrated versions of Belorussian folk tunes and looks like a polka band that got lost on the way to a beer bust. Still, Pesnyary is most prominent in a field that includes groups like Optimisty (the Optimists) and Vesyoliye Rebyata (the Happy Fellows). The titles suggest what the material is like: *How Wonderful the World Is!, It Isn't Your Flowers That I Love* and *I'll Take You Away to the Tundra*. Even newer, rock-oriented music does not stray far from this sentimental mold. One of the most progressive of Moscow's young rock bands, Mashina Vremeni (Time Machine), lays down reheated versions of vintage Chicago riffs.

The lesson may be that rock travels well, but does not translate. Conversely, what does not translate easily to the West sounds the best, like the luminous, haunting folk-song collections of Zhanna Bichevskaya, whose mesmerizing soprano melds historical traditions and new directions. Alla Pugacheva has attained greater popular success, however, by going West. Pugacheva's act is a salmagundi of recycled Pink Floyd instrumentals, a sort of sunflower delicacy grafted from Joni Mitchell and *chanteuse* dramaturgy.

It is a measure of the power of rock that it should be so sought after and imitated in a country where pop traditions are so hidebound. But Soviet rock so far is a feeble effort at cultural cross-fertilization, like the Rockettes doing a saber dance. Back in 1958, the great New Orleans rocker Huey ("Piano") Smith wrote a clownish cold war ditty that included the lines, "Like I said before, you can be certain/ You have rockin' behind that old Iron Curtain." Huey might be cheered to know now that it is there for sure and maybe for good. Even though he might not recognize it. Then again, they might not know Huey either, not even in the park off Mayakovsky Square. ■

Breaking Through in Fiction

New writers shatter the conventions of the past

"You can cover the whole world with asphalt, but a few blades of green grass will always break through," concluded Soviet Novelist Ilya Ehrenburg, as the Stalin era faded. And still they come: surprising new writers who have shattered the deadening conventions of the past. They have recoiled from the novel, viewing it as prefabricated Stalinist architecture. The genre of choice is the short story or novella. Many writers have managed gradually to escape from Socialist Realism, with its obligatory jargon and hortatory themes, traveling a world away —back to 19th century realism. Even Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the two major Russian writers to produce big novels, did so in the classical manner

Of all the short story writers to emerge since Stalin's death, Vasili Aksyonov, 47, continues to display the greatest virtuosity. Although he has written enormously popular stories in a realist vein, Aksyonov has gone on to explore a variety of modes and permutations of language, entering the 1980s as the Soviet Union's only truly modern prose writer. His evolution is instructive. Aksyonov's first fiction dealt with a previously unheard-of theme: the real life of Soviet teen-agers.

In his 1961 novella *Starry Ticket*, for example, a group of Muscovite dropouts run away to the Baltic beaches to escape the crushing conservatism of their elders. Old guard critics were scandalized, as much by the "uncivic" behavior of Aksyonov's heroes and heroines as by their use of colloquial speech, mixed with underworld and concentration-camp slang, invented words and such Americanisms as *gudbai*, *Brodvei* and *bugi-vugi*. Funny, fresh and richly expressive, Aksyonov's idiom has been his contribution to the larger effort of modern Russian poets to rescue the Russian language from deadening officialese.

Much of Aksyonov's fiction has a dark and enigmatic cast that is the shadow of the Gulag. Like many other contemporary Soviet writers, he is the child of Stalin's victims: Aksyonov was brought up in one of the infamous orphanages called Homes for the Children of Enemies of the People. Few writers can reproduce the lingering stench of brutality and fear better than he. In his story *Victory*, a gem of Russian short fiction, a chance game of chess on a train between a brutish but canny player and an intellectual becomes a moral life and death struggle.

The Steel Bird, which was published last year in the U.S., marks Aksyonov's break with realism in favor of the grotesque. This novella features a ghastly



Yuri Trifonov



Vasili Aksyonov

Fazil Iskander

Valentin Rasputin

Though they escaped from Socialist Realism the hounds keep biting at their heels.

Excerpt

"He came to see me and complained about his appetite. His stomach actually was swollen and covered with blue lines. My appetite has disappeared, he said. Then take the matter to the police, I advised boldly. What about the digestion tract, he asked. Some rivets in the gut really had worked loose, there were bolts rattling around, and some welded seams had come apart. When all's said and done I'm no engineer and we're not living in some science fiction novel, but in ordinary Soviet reality, I announced to him and washed my hands of it. Very well, Doctor Zeldovich, you'll end up in here, he said and slapped his swollen belly. I opened the window and suggested he vacate the flat. He flew out of the window. His flight was heavy, sometimes he would fall, like a plane in air pockets, but then he would suddenly soar and disappear. Of course I realize I'll have to pay for my boldness, but the prospect of ending up in his stomach, in that steel bag, I tell you straight, I don't relish in the least."

humanoid with a metal carapace who blackmails the superintendent of an apartment house into letting him live in the elevator. Acting with Stalinist guile, the steel bird takes over the entire building and its tenants. The structure soon collapses; the creature is left to roost triumphantly atop the elevator shaft, surveying the debris.

This allegory of dictatorship scarcely endeared Aksyonov to Soviet authorities. Much of his recent work has been deemed unacceptable, including *The Burn*, a novel that will be published in Russian in July by Ardis Press in Ann Arbor, Mich., and in English next year by Houghton Mifflin. A masterwork of modern Russian literature, *The Burn* offers an engrossing view of the life of party officials and literary bureaucrats in the Brezhnev era. Aksyonov, who has been under heavy official pressure to leave the U.S.S.R., ought to be in the U.S. in time to help his translator render 230,000 words of racy experimental prose.

The reigning Soviet master of realism, Yuri Trifonov, 54, is also a child of the Gulag. Among his first writings is a biographical work about his father, Valentin Trifonov, an old comrade of Stalin's whom the dictator ordered shot in the late 1930s. Trifonov's forte is the novella evoking the mean-spiritedness and venality afflicting much of the Soviet urban middle class. Trifonov's stories turn on moral choice—seemingly paltry everyday decisions that make the difference between a life of decency or betrayal of self, family and friends.

Trifonov's most important recent work is his novella *The House on the Embankment*, which deals with the ultimate Soviet dilemma: whether or not to turn in a fellow creature to the secret police. The book explores the process by which a student comes to denounce the teacher who is also his benefactor and prospective father-in-law, all the while justifying his actions as perfectly reasonable. A dramatization of the novel was cut by censors, who removed unflattering references to Stalin before allowing the play to open. In spite of these deletions, Trifonov's powerful theme riveted audiences when the play opened in Moscow last month.

A different strain of realism is represented by the *derevenshchiki* (village writers), who celebrate Russia's traditional rural values and lament the woes of the peasantry. The most promising *derevenshchik* is a Siberian writer, Valentin Rasputin, 43, author of numerous stories and small-scale novels, including *Live and Remember*, published in the U.S. in 1978. *Live and Remember* is an unsentimental yet compassionate depiction of a peasant couple: a World War II deserter on the run and his wife, one of the strong, suffering women who have remained the queens of Russian literature.

These works have not appeared in print without a struggle. Many remained in limbo for years until cuts and revisions were made to fit political demands. Books by such established writers as Andrei Bitov and Fazil Iskander have been dismembered or suppressed altogether. Only odds and ends of Bitov's novel, *Pushkin House*, have appeared in various Soviet magazines. The full text of this elegant portrayal of a Leningrad literary family is only available from Ardis Press, publisher of Iskander's wonderfully funny cycle of stories, *Sandro from Chegem*.

Pop Fiction Lives

Books for the masses are published in huge numbers in the U.S.S.R., but they are not always the uplifting tracts that Marx and Lenin envisioned as the people's literature. New police and spy thrillers and science fiction are snapped up by fans on publication day. The country's top mystery writer is currently Julian Semyonov, 48, whose latest, *Tass Is Authorized to State . . .*, was published in an edition numbering 100,000 copies. It is the stirring tale of intrepid KGB agents *vs.* the CIA in an unnamed African country—manifestly Angola.

Because publishers base the size of printings on political, ideological and other noncommercial considerations, Soviet bestsellers cannot be reckoned by Western standards. Even when books sell out they are rarely reprinted because of the arbitrary mechanics of the system. The real gauge of a work's popularity is how much it is ultimately worth on the flourishing black market. An example is *Heavy Sand*, by the popular adventure and mystery writer Anatoli Rybakov. Despite the large printing (150,000), readers could not get enough of this bathetic story of love and death among Jews in the Ukraine during World War II; copies now fetch $150 on the black market.

Some hugely successful novels have spawned a curious mass-market *samizdat* that differs sharply from the writings of dissidents. The newest underground hit is *At the Last Frontier*, a trashy historical novel by Valentin Pikul about Grigori Rasputin, the sexy, self-styled holy man who held the Russian imperial family in thrall. Originally published in the magazine *Our Contemporary*, which has a circulation of 300,000, the novel caused a sensation as much for its scenes of debauchery as for its virulent anti-Semitism. Unfavorable reviews, which criticized the book for its non-Marxist attitudes and hostile treatment of Jews, merely piqued readers' interest. Not only are black market second-hand copies of *Our Contemporary* selling at $150, but typewritten copies of a longer, unexpurgated text of *At the Last Frontier* are being passed from hand to hand.

Some of the Soviet Union's most important writing has never been published there at all. Instead, it circulates widely from hand to hand in the process known as *samizdat* (literally, self-publishing). Varlam Shalamov's lapidary concentration-camp stories, some of which were recently published in the U.S. by W.W. Norton under the title *Kolyma Tales*, have been in *samizdat* for 20 years. Currently the most prized *samizdat* work is Venedikt Yerofeyev's *Moscow-Petushki*. The account of a phantasmagoric drunken excursion on a suburban train, Yerofeyev's novella may be the most innovative piece of prose written in the U.S.S.R. for more than four decades. The Russian text has been published in France.

Once a book has been forced into exile, its author often follows. Solzhenitsyn was ostentatiously deported in 1974, while Andrei Sinyavsky, Joseph Brodsky, Victor Nekrasov, Anatoli Gladilin, Yuz Aleshkovsky and others were pressured in various ways to emigrate. Vladimir Voinovich, the author of *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin*, a *samizdat* favorite published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux in 1977, was warned by the Soviet authorities in March that his life would become "intolerable" unless he left the Soviet Union.

Georgi Vladimov, 49, is another exceptionally talented writer who has been cut down in mid-career and who is being hounded by the KGB. One reason for the persecution is his celebrated novella, *Faithful Ruslan*, which has circulated all over the country in *samizdat*; it was published in the U.S. last year by Simon & Schuster. *Ruslan* tells of a concentration-camp dog, pitilessly trained to guard convicts, that becomes a stray when most of the Stalinist camps are closed down in 1956. Ruslan, and other dogs of his kind, keep a vigil at the local railway station, hoping for the arrival of the familiar convoys of prisoners whom they can once again herd to the camp. "Anyone who waits with such single-minded devotion is always rewarded in the end." Sure enough, one day "an incredible horde" came tumbling out of a train, laughing and shouting. "In a moment Ruslan was transformed: flexible, alert, his yellow eyes sharp and keen." The dogs mistake for prisoners a group of construction workers who have come to turn the abandoned camp site into a factory. When the young people begin strolling toward the site in a disorganized column, some singing and even dancing to the music of accordions, the dogs know what to do: attack.

Vladimov's allegory of contemporary Soviet society, which was inspired by an actual event, hardly needs to be explained to Soviet readers. As a fable of literary life, it signifies that the official hounds schooled under Stalin are likely to keep biting at the heels of insubordinate writers in the Soviet Union for a long time to come. — ***Patricia Blake***

Ritual of continuity: graduating students of Moscow Academic Choreographic School debut on the Bolshoi Theater stage

Dance

A Cultural Marvel in Crisis

Defections and artistic disputes rock the Bolshoi Ballet

It was a mild spring evening in Moscow, and the city's balletomanes had turned out in force. The setting was familiar: the ornately gilded, plush-trimmed Bolshoi Theater. So was the program, which included an adagio from *Sleeping Beauty* and variations from *Don Quixote* and *Le Corsaire*. But wait. Up onstage were none of the usual Bolshoi Ballet stars, no Plisetskayas or Vasilyevs, no familiar figures at all. In fact, although the dancers showed flashes of the rigorous technique and expressive line that mark the Bolshoi style, there was here and there an unaccustomed slip, a slack fouetté, a leaden lift. What, then, accounted for the electric atmosphere in the theater? Why was the audience applauding so encouragingly, pointing out dancers and scribbling notes in programs?

Answer: a great cultural ritual was being enacted. The occasion, two weeks ago, was the graduation program of the Moscow Academic Choreographic School, training arm of the 204-year-old Bolshoi. The young dancers were making their traditional debuts on the stage where they hope one day to reign as soloists. Bolshoi training—indeed, Soviet ballet training in general—imbues the students, from their first moments at the barre, with a deep sense of style and history. Says the Bolshoi Ballet's administrative director, Pyotr Khomutov: "When our classical heritage is made a part of the educational program, the students, afterward, can do anything. In the West, you seem to be anti-this and anti-that, as if such an approach were modern and novel. But anything new must be bolstered by a true knowledge of things past."

No doubt. But Khomutov is mistaken in suggesting that the Bolshoi's classical heritage is under attack in the West. At the moment, it seems far more endangered from within. Even as the company celebrates its latest crop of dance graduates, it is torn by internal dissension and wobbling in its artistic course. Its troubles broke out into the open last summer, as the company began a U.S. tour. One of its most forceful stars, Alexander Godunov, asked for asylum in New York City. Three weeks later, in Los Angeles, two of its lesser known principals, Leonid and Valentina Kozlov, bolted as well.

At the center of the troupe's difficulties is its wiry, intense artistic director, Yuri Grigorovich, 53. There is a widespread feeling among the dancers that he is arbitrary and dictatorial, plays too many favorites and tampers heavyhandedly with the traditional repertory, while stifling new choreography by reserving the major assignments for himself. Prima Ballerina Maya Plisetskaya, now 54 and a revered figure in the U.S.S.R., has become leader of a rebellious faction of Bolshoi veterans, including Maris Liepa and Mikhail Lavrovsky. Many younger dancers, not outspoken, are nevertheless known to feel that Grigorovich denies them opportunities if they fail to catch his capricious favor.

If some of Grigorovich's problems appear to be backstage ego jostling, many others involve fundamental questions of policy. A former character dancer, he came to the Bolshoi in 1964 from its great rival, the Kirov, bringing successful new works with him. Then as now, the Kirov exemplified the ideal of a pure, classical style. The Bolshoi, by contrast, championed a more soulfully Slavic style, often bold and gaudy. Grigorovich seemed to offer the hope of synthesizing the best of both companies. In 1968 he created a hit, *Spartacus*, with its surging mass movements, virile male roles and a long, lyrical pas de deux. Since then, however, his work has begun to seem monotonous and eccentric. Two years ago, in an unusual article in *Pravda*, the much beloved Liepa accused Grigorovich of showing a "disrespectful attitude" in his sweeping revisions of traditional productions like *Romeo and Juliet*.

Pavlova and Husband Gordeyev performing in *Romeo and Juliet*

Grigorovich had a lot riding on last year's U.S. tour. A smashing success could have reconfirmed the Bolshoi's stature, boosted morale and quieted the critics. His dancers certainly won their share of bravos; his wife Natalya Bessmertnova, Godunov before his departure, and

the young ballerina Lyudmila Semenyaka. In particular, audiences took to their hearts the husband-wife team of Vyacheslav Gordeyev and Nadezhda Pavlova. But Grigorovich's choreography only came in for more lumps. Then there were the defections. Grigorovich returned to Moscow more embattled than ever. He is well connected in the bureaucracy, but his company faces stricter KGB surveillance and curtailed foreign travel.

The Bolshoi's ten-month season, which normally finishes in June, is being extended through Aug. 3 this year to accommodate Olympics visitors. To the international audiences that will soon flock to the Bolshoi Theater, the company may still seem to be a marvel of Moscow, an institution that glories in lavish productions and virtuoso dancing. But to dance buffs, the current season has been lackluster, relying heavily on stock repertory and a dwindling pool of leading dancers. The most eagerly anticipated new production, Plisetskaya's *The Sea Gull*, which she performed to music composed by her husband, Rodion Shchedrin, evoked the atmosphere of Chekhov's play in stylized vignettes but contained little real dancing.



Grigorovich

Particularly with Godunov gone, there is a shortage of up-and-coming stars. Hence all eyes are on Gordeyev and his wife Pavlova —"Slava" and "Nadya," as they are affectionately known—the young comets of the company. Gordeyev, 32, a Muscovite and a product of the Bolshoi's school, has been dancing with the company since 1969. Pavlova, 23, is an example of the Bolshoi's growing need to reach out to regional companies for new soloists. A former co-winner of the U.S.S.R.'s national dance competition, she was recruited in 1975 from the ballet company in Perm. Five months later, on the same day that she made her debut in *Giselle*, she and Gordeyev were married.

Gordeyev is an immaculate classical dancer. When he leaps, he seems suspended in air, an illusion that never fails to thrill audiences. He is also fiery enough to fill up a role like *Spartacus*. Pavlova is soft and romantic next to his virility, more an ingénue than a dramatic performer. But she cuts the air with quicksilver leaps and pirouettes, and her precision and control, especially in adagio movements, can be breathtaking.

So far the pair appear to be basking in Grigorovich's good graces, as well as enjoying the blessing of Plisetskaya. Dedicated and rather conservative, they remain apart from the controversies raging within the company. Says Gordeyev: "Our lives, after all, revolve around the ballet, our art." It will be a good thing for the Bolshoi if they, and dancers like them, can keep it that way. ■

Television

Soviet TV Is Good—and Bad

Lots of propaganda, but a window on the world

Soviet TV is the government's loudspeaker to the people. "Television serves and will serve as a mighty weapon of the propaganda of the beautiful," says the party journal, *Kommunist*. Americans will not be surprised to learn that the propaganda programs are relentlessly boring. They may be somewhat startled, however, to discover that many of the others are astonishingly good.

In the twelve hours or so in which programs are being beamed, there are good programs for children, concerts almost every night, operas and opulent ballets. In addition to the culture, there is one regularly scheduled quiz show, and, as they do everywhere else, sports receive saturation coverage. There are also more news shows and propaganda, of course—lots of propaganda.

Travel Host Senkevich

Much of the propaganda is slipped in with the news, documentaries and interview programs, which take up a third of TV's time. *Vremya* (time), the equivalent of the evening news in the U.S., comes on at 9 p.m. and lasts 35 minutes, with a man and a woman, both about 40, alternately reading the day's events. Stories dealing with the West, particularly the U.S., tend to be heavily disapproving. Viewers learn that President Carter has turned on to "the path of a new cold war and arms race" and that the American people oppose Washington's boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

Between the culture and the propaganda, there is little room for fun, and many Soviet viewers seem to long for more diverting fare. That is one reason why the Soviets seem less addicted than Americans to the black box. There are no figures of comparison for adults, but Soviet children watch TV an average of only 21 hours a week, compared with some 30 hours for youngsters in the U.S. Another reason is more practical: some 80% of Soviet households own TV sets, compared with a saturation 98% in the U.S.

One of the few programs that are both fun and uplifting is a 60-minute weekly show called *Film Travel Club*, which is a window on the world for travel-restricted Soviets. Surveys indicate that 150 million people watch *Film Travel Club* and its backpacker host, Yuri Senkevich, 43, every Sunday night.

Film Travel Club usually leaves the beautiful propaganda to others and concentrates on natural wonders, like the Grand Canyon, or exotic people in remote, politically inoffensive settings. "We'll show anything that holds people's interest," says Senkevich, whose TV style can best be described as low-key. "What interests them most of all is mysterious tribes, like the Australian aborigines or peoples that live along the Amazon."

Since the show runs every week, Senkevich and his crew must search the world for new places and faces. The viewers themselves help; the show gets some 2,000 letters a month, most of them suggesting stories. *Film Travel Club* has only a small staff at the central television studios at Ostankino, in northern Moscow. Most of the reports on Soviet sights are received from Gosteleradio, the official agency handling TV production; stories from abroad are reported by regular Soviet correspondents or are purchased from foreign networks. Occasionally, Senkevich himself travels to spots around the world. When Soviet skiers completed a 78-day, 1,056-mile trek to the North Pole, for example, he was flown there to interview them.

Senkevich is a doctor who specializes in the effects of extreme conditions upon mind and body, and he spent a year in Antarctica researching his doctoral dissertation. That arduous experience brought him some renown, because his name was first on the list when Norwegian Explorer Thor Heyerdahl asked Moscow science authorities in 1969 to suggest a Soviet doctor to accompany him and four others on a papyrus-reed boat across the Atlantic. That *Ra* expedition, in turn, brought him to the attention of the producers of *Film Travel Club*, who hired him as host in 1973. The next time he set sail with Heyerdahl, on a trip down the Tigris River to the entrance to the Red Sea, Senkevich took his camera with him. Millions of fans waited for his reports, and the Soviets, he notes with pride, know more about the expedition than do Heyerdahl's own countrymen.

Still, Soviet viewers miss, quite literally, most of the color in *Film Travel Club*. Though Soviet TV sets, unlike most other consumer goods, are of excellent quality, only about 7% are equipped to receive color. Since a 23-in. color set costs $980, or the equivalent of four months' salary for the ordinary worker, most armchair travelers will continue to see the world in black and white for a long time to come. ■

Of Aeroflot, Volgas and the Flu

Some joys and sorrows of the Soviet way

PLANE SPEAKING

For passengers of Aeroflot, the Soviet national airline, life is rarely just up, up and away. Among the world's carriers, Aeroflot belongs in the white-knuckle class; its safety record is somewhat cloudy since domestic crashes are rarely announced unless foreigners are aboard. Aeroflot food is all but inedible, with garlic sometimes being the only identifiable ingredient. It is wise to accept one of the gray paper bags offered before takeoff; they can be in great demand during the flight.

Just getting aloft presents its challenges. Planes regularly land and take off not just hours but even days late. One foreign traveler waited in a Moscow airport for 17 hours before his flight to Tbilisi was announced. His airport bus proceeded to roll along the tarmac and stop at three different planes; at each one the ground hostess would yell out: "Is this the plane to Tbilisi?" The bus finally came to the fourth—and right—plane. There was only one problem: no pilot. The traveler finally abandoned the effort at 3 a.m., luggage unclaimed and Tbilisi unvisited.

COTTAGE INDUSTRY

For most Westerners, the word dacha conjures up images of lovely forest cottages or posh state guesthouses by the sea, where top Soviet officials spend their leisure hours. Such places do indeed exist, but the majority of Soviets vacation at dachas that are little more than primitive cottages. City dwellers love the countryside and consider summer holidays essential for recovering from the long winter and girding for the next one. Anyone who can afford to do so rents a dacha—or even just a room in a dacha—for a month or so, no matter what the inconvenience. "When I want to restock the cupboard I have to come back to the city and buy everything there," says one Moscow schoolteacher, who vacations in the suburbs. "Our dacha also needs a new roof, so my husband bangs and works all day while I cook meals on a hotplate and fight mosquitoes." Many vacationers relish swapping tales of the challenges of their rustic lives. But give up those precious days in the country? *Nyet!*

LIQUOR IS QUICKER

Cash or credit cards may be the accepted way to pay for services in most parts of the world, but in the U.S.S.R. the popular medium of exchange is vodka. Want a repairman to make a house call to fix the TV set? Pay him with a half-liter of vodka. Need someone to paint a room? Offer him his wages in bottles. Vodka is also the ideal gift for minor officials from whom a small favor is needed. Since vodka flows as freely as the Volga in the U.S.S.R., why do so many Soviet citizens welcome it as either pay or present? For the regular drinker, vodka is expensive at $5.50 a half-liter. And the better brands, which are customarily used as currency and gifts, are often hard to find in stores.

HOUSE SPECIALTIES

The monotonous Russian diet is dominated by pork, potatoes and pickles, but certain of the country's foods are unsurpassed anywhere. Russian white flour, for example, is superb, making for the best of breads, cakes, pie crusts and blini. Milk, for some reason, is thin and watery, but the sour cream is excellent. Ice cream, rich and smooth, is among the world's best, though vanilla is usually the only flavor available. *Kefir*, a kind of cross between buttermilk and yogurt, is exceptionally good, as is a soft curd cheese called *tvorog*. Fruits and vegetables are found only in season, but often have more flavor than those in the U.S. Canned salmon and crab meat are especially delicate. Caviar? Nothing matches Russian beluga, which costs about $27 per lb. (compared with $420 per lb. in the U.S.), when it is available.

BROTHERS CARAMAZOV

Nikita Khrushchev denounced them as "foul-smelling armchairs with wheels," but the comrade who owns a car today treasures it as much as a Russian nobleman once valued his Fabergé eggs. The U.S.S.R. has only about 5 million cars, compared with 104 million in the U.S. The list of models available to the average Soviet citizen is small and the price high, ranging from the tiny two-door Zaporozhets ($6,000) to the large Volga sedan ($22,500).

To buy a new car, the ordinary citizen must place his name on an official waiting list, pay the full purchase price at that time and then wait two years for delivery. Getting a used car is easier, if just as pricey. Legally the seller must work through a government agency, which skims a 7% commission off the sale price, but the canny seller usually finds a willing buyer first, makes his deal and then collects as much as $6,000 more on the side from the eager purchaser.

There is the matter of theft. Auto parts are so scarce that the wise driver removes such tempting features as windshield wipers and side-view mirrors whenever he parks on the street. Even when the Soviet motorist leaves his car in the shop he must take care, for his auto may be stripped of items needed to repair other cars. A favorite Soviet axiom: "Your car comes out of the shop with fewer parts than it went in with."

To get a license, the fledgling motorist must take a state-run driver's education course that lasts 180 hours, including 32 hours behind the wheel; truck and taxi drivers must endure 660 hours of instruction. The country's premier car buff is none other than Leonid Brezhnev; he is the proud owner of ten snazzy foreign models, all gifts from heads of state.

ILL-FOUNDED ADVICE

Despite their comprehensive (and free) medical system, Soviet citizens are not above consulting some rather peculiar practitioners. The current toast of Moscow, for example, is a Georgian nurse named Dzhuna Davitashvili, who claims she can diagnose illnesses without laying eyes on the patient. Muscovites are clamoring to see her, and eagerly pass stories about how she cured cancer or made roses bloom with a wave of her hand. Nurse Davitashvili refuses to charge fees—but she does accept presents.

The average Soviet, of course, cannot rely on a Georgian psychic when faced with pain or disease. Folk nostrums will have to do. At the onset of a cold, many quickly gulp down a glass of vodka mixed with two teaspoons of black pepper. Stuffy nose? Take one spoonful of onion juice in each nostril. And there are those who insist on calling the slightest chest pain or palpitation a heart attack, thus leaving foreigners amazed that they are still alive and apparently well as they recount their fifth or sixth coronary.

Illustrations for Time by Sandy Huffaker

MITSUBISHI

INNOVATION FROM THE INSIDE OUT.

EPA estimates for Dodge Colt Hatchback and Plymouth Champ with 1400 cc engine and 4-speed manual transmission. Use this number for comparisons. Your mileage may vary depending on speed, trip length and weather. Actual highway mileage will probably be lower than the highway estimate. California estimates are lower.

37 EST. MPG.
47 HWY. EST.



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Outside, we designed the smooth-skin bodyshell that is not only aesthetically pleasing, but extremely aerodynamic as well.

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MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION

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	tar mg./cig.	nicotine mg./cig.
Carlton Box (lowest of all brands)	**less than 0.01**	**0.002**
Carlton Soft Pack	**1**	**0.1**
Carlton 100's Box	**1**	**0.1**
Carlton 100's Soft Pack	**less than 6**	**0.5**
Kent	11	0.9
Kent 100's	14	1.0
Merit	8	0.6
Merit 100's	10	0.7
Vantage	11	0.8
Vantage 100's	12	0.9
Winston Lights	14	1.1
Winston Lights 100's	13	1.0

Carlton Menthol.

King & 100's

The lighter menthols.

King—Less than 1 mg. tar, 0.1 mg. nic. 100's—Only 5 mg. tar, 0.4 mg. nic.

Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.

Box: Less than 0.01 mg. "tar", 0.002 mg. nicotine; 100's Box: 1 mg. "tar", 0.1 mg. nicotine av. per cigarette by FTC method. Soft Pack: 1 mg. "tar", 0.1 mg. nicotine; Menthol: Less than 1 mg. "tar", 0.1 mg. nicotine; 100's Soft Pack: Less than 6 mg. "tar", 0.5 mg. nicotine; 100's Menthol: 5 mg. "tar", 0.4 mg. nicotine av. per cigarette, FTC Report Dec. '79.